Weaks v. Gress
| Decision Date | 06 December 1971 |
| Citation | 474 S.W.2d 424,3 Pack 593,225 Tenn. 593 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 225 Tenn. 593 Charles H. WEAKS and wife, Helen J. Weaks, Appellants, v. Gary T. GRESS and wife, Barbara J. Gress, Appellees. |
Wayne S. Taylor, Nashville, for appellants.
Reau E. Folk, Jr., Nashville, for appellees.
Gary T. Gress and wife, Barbara J. Gress, filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, alleging that Charles H. Weaks and wife, Helen J. Weaks, had sold and conveyed by warranty deed with covenant against encumbrances, a piece of property held by the Weaks as tenants by the entirety, at a time when a judgment lien had been attached to Charles H. Weaks' interest therein, in accordance with § 25--501 et seq., T.C.A., our Lien of Judgment Statutes. The Gresses sought to have the Weaks remove the judgment lien as a cloud on their title, and asked that they be awarded a decree against both Charles H. Weaks and Helen J. Weaks in an amount sufficient to clear the title; and that if necessary the interest owned by Helen J. Weaks in a separate piece of property be subjected to the judgment of the Gresses. The Weaks demurred on the ground that as a matter of law they had conveyed a good and marketable title to the Gresses, based on the legal proposition that the property of the Weaks, which was held by them as tenants by the entirety, was conveyed free from the judgment lien where only one of the tenants by the entirety was a judgment debtor. The demurrer was also based on the proposition that Helen J. Weaks had conveyed good and marketable title to the property insofar as she was concerned, so that the bill stated no cause of action against her.
Kimbrough-Kavanaugh Associates, who were made defendants to the bill, answered, disclaiming knowledge of any of the allegations except that there was a trust deed in their favor on the separate piece of real property of Helen J. Weaks, in the amount, at that time, of $11,522.18.
The demurrer was overruled with leave to rely thereon in an answer, but the Weaks were granted a discretionary appeal to this court on the court's ruling on the demurrer. Here, errors are assigned on the court's action therein.
Although there appears to be respectable authority to the contrary, we are of opinion that the judgment lien existing at the time of the conveyance was a lien against Charles H. Weaks' interest therein so that the sale of it free from encumberances was a breach of covenant. 2 Washburn Real Property, p. 658. We predicate this conclusion on our Lien of Judgment Statutes, § 25--501 et seq. T.C.A., which in our opinion are intended to subject every alienable interest in land to the lien of a judgment, when the requirements of the statutes are met, and on two cases to which we shall refer.
Section 25--501 provides that judgments and decrees obtained in any court of record in this state, in the county where the debtor resides at the time of rendition, shall be liens upon the debtor's land in that county from the time the same were rendered.
Section 25--503 makes it evident that the reference in § 25--501 to 'debtor's land' is descriptive of every interest in land by its reference to 'equitable interest' as being covered. The words 'debtor's land' would not, ordinarily, include equitable interests. So, when we are told, in effect, by § 25--503 that such interests are included, we have clear evidence that the words are used in their broadest sense.
Section 25--504 makes provision for fixing a judgment lien on both legal and equitable interests in personal property.
Thus, we have a scheme for making every character of alienable property right subject to the lien of a judgment. In consideration which there is no valid reason for excluding the interest owned by the husband in property held by the entirety, if it is alienable.
Two of our cases, Ames v. Norman, 36 Tenn. 683, and In re Guardianship of Plowman, 217 Tenn. 487, 398 S.W.2d 721, make it clear the interest of a husband in a tenancy by the entirety is alienable. In Ames, the facts were that Ames and his wife owned land as tenants by the entirety. A judgment was recovered against Ames and the land was levied on and sold at execution in satisfaction of this judgment. Norman, a creditor of Ames, redeemed the land from the purchaser at the execution sale. Ames' wife sued Ames for divorce, and sued Norman contending he owned no interest in the property by reason of the peculiar nature of a tenancy by the entirety. In a well reasoned opinion, taking into consideration of this...
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Robinson v. Trousdale County
...courts, as of this time, have not reconciled the conflict. The latest pertinent pronouncement of our Supreme Court is Weaks v. Gress, 225 Tenn. 593, 474 S.W.2d 424 (1971), from which we quote at length because this case summarizes the Ames and Cole rule, as well as 'In the Ames opinion the ......
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In Re: Barbara Allen Chadwick
...that creditors of only one tenant may not obtain rights in the present, possessory interest held by the couple. Weaks v. Gress, 474 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1971). Since the present possessory interest is not an asset, that portion of the entirety interest cannot be "transferred" und......
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Smartbank v. Stephens, E2018-01900-COA-R3-CV
...by a judgment creditor is not destroyed by the dissolution of the tenancy by the entireties."). Likewise, in Weaks v. Gress, 225 Tenn. 593, 474 S.W.2d 424 (Tenn. 1971), a case involving a transfer of property owned by the entirety and encumbered by a judgment lien against only the husband, ......
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In re Giles, Bankruptcy No. 97-1-5460-PM.
...tenancy by the entireties." Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Knobler, 789 S.W.2d 254, 255 (Tenn. 1990). Similarly, in Weaks v. Gress, 225 Tenn. 593, 474 S.W.2d 424 (1971), the court held that a conveyance by a husband and wife, after a judgment lien had attached to the interest of one of th......