Wearry v. Cain

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 194 L.Ed.2d 78, 577 U.S. 385 (2016)
• Decision Date: 07 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 14–10008.,14–10008.
• Parties: Michael WEARRY v. Burl CAIN, Warden.

577 U.S. 385

136 S.Ct. 1002

194 L.Ed.2d 78

Michael WEARRY

v.Burl CAIN, Warden.

No. 14–10008.

Supreme Court of the United States

March 7, 2016.

PER CURIAM.

Michael Wearry is on Louisiana's death row. Urging that the prosecution failed to disclose evidence supporting his innocence and that his counsel provided ineffective assistance at trial, Wearry unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief in state court. Contrary to the state postconviction court, we conclude that the prosecution's failure to disclose material evidence violated Wearry's due process rights. We reverse the state postconviction court's judgment on that account, and therefore do not reach Wearry's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

I

A

Sometime between 8:20 and 9:30 on the evening of April 4, 1998, Eric Walber was brutally murdered. Nearly two years after the murder, Sam Scott, at the time incarcerated, contacted authorities and implicated Michael Wearry. Scott initially reported that he had been friends with the victim; that he was at work the night of the murder; that the victim had come looking for him but had instead run into Wearry and four others; and that Wearry and the others had later confessed to shooting and driving over the victim before leaving his body on Blahut Road. In fact, the victim had not been shot, and his body had been found on Crisp Road.

Scott changed his account of the crime over the course of four later statements, each of which differed from the others in material ways. By the time Scott testified as the State's star witness at Wearry's trial, his story bore little resemblance to his original account. According to the version Scott told the jury, he had been playing dice with Wearry and others when the victim drove past. Wearry, who had been losing, decided to rob the victim. After Wearry and an acquaintance, Randy Hutchinson, stopped the victim's car, Hutchinson shoved the victim into the cargo area. Five men, including Scott, Hutchinson, and Wearry, proceeded to drive around, at one point encountering Eric Brown—the State's other main witness—and pausing intermittently to assault the victim. Finally, Scott related, Wearry and two others killed the victim by running him over. On cross-examination, Scott admitted that he had changed his account several times.

Consistent with Scott's testimony, Brown testified that on the night of the murder he had seen Wearry and others with a man who looked like the victim. Incarcerated on unrelated charges at the time of Wearry's trial, Brown acknowledged that he had made a prior inconsistent statement to the police, but had recanted and agreed to testify against Wearry, not for any prosecutorial favor, but solely because his sister knew the victim's sister. The State commented during its opening argument that Brown "is doing 15 years on a drug charge right now, [but] hasn't asked for a thing." 7 Record 1723 (Tr., Mar. 2, 2002). During closing argument, the State reiterated that Brown "has no deal on the table" and was testifying because the victim's "family deserves to know." Pet. for Cert. 19.

Although the State presented no physical evidence at trial, it did offer additional circumstantial evidence linking Wearry to the victim. One witness testified that he saw Wearry in the victim's car on the night of the murder and, later, holding the victim's class ring. Another witness said he saw Wearry throwing away the victim's cologne. In some respects, however, these witnesses contradicted Scott's account. For example, the witness who reported seeing Wearry in the victim's car did not place Scott in the car.

Wearry's defense at trial rested on an alibi. He claimed that, at the time of the murder, he had been at a wedding reception in Baton Rouge, 40 miles away. Wearry's girlfriend, her sister, and her aunt corroborated Wearry's account. In closing argument, the State stressed that all three witnesses had personal relationships with Wearry. The State also presented two rebuttal witnesses: the bride at the wedding, who reported that the reception had ended by 8:30 or 9:00 (potentially leaving sufficient time for Wearry to have committed the crime); and three jail employees, who testified that they had overheard Wearry say that he was a bystander when the crime occurred.

The jury convicted Wearry of capital murder and sentenced him to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.¹

B

After Wearry's conviction became final, it emerged that the prosecution had withheld relevant information that could have advanced Wearry's plea. Wearry argued during state postconviction proceedings that three categories of belatedly revealed information would have undermined the prosecution and materially aided Wearry's defense at trial.

First, previously undisclosed police records showed that two of Scott's fellow inmates had made statements that cast doubt on Scott's credibility. One inmate had reported hearing Scott say that he wanted to " ‘make sure [Wearry] gets the needle cause he jacked over me.’ " Id., at 22 (quoting inmate affidavit).² The other inmate had told investigators—at a meeting Scott orchestrated—that he had witnessed the murder, but this inmate recanted the next day. "Scott had told him what to say," he explained, and had suggested that lying about having witnessed the murder "would help him get out of jail." Pet. Exh. 13 in No. 01–FELN–015992, pp. 104, 107. See also Pet. for Cert. 22 (quoting police notes).

Second, the State had failed to disclose that, contrary to the prosecution's assertions at trial, Brown had twice sought a deal to reduce his existing sentence in exchange for testifying against Wearry. The police had told Brown that they would " ‘talk to the D.A. if he told the truth.’ " Pet. for Cert. 19 (quoting police notes).

Third, the prosecution had failed to turn over medical records on Randy Hutchinson. According to Scott, on the night of the murder, Hutchinson had run into the street to flag down the victim, pulled the victim out of his car, shoved him into the cargo space, and crawled into the cargo space himself. But Hutchinson's medical records revealed that, nine days before the murder, Hutchinson had undergone knee surgery to repair a ruptured patellar tendon. Id., at 10–11, 15–16, 32.³ An expert witness, Dr. Paul Dworak, testified at the state collateral-review hearing that Hutchinson's surgically repaired knee could not have withstood running, bending, or lifting substantial weight. The State presented an expert witness who disagreed with Dr. Dworak's appraisal of Hutchinson's physical fitness.

During state postconviction proceedings, Wearry also maintained that his trial attorney had failed to uncover exonerating evidence. Wearry's trial attorney admitted at the state collateral-review hearing that he had conducted no independent investigation into Wearry's innocence and had relied solely on evidence the State and Wearry had provided.⁴ For example, despite Wearry's alibi, his attorney undertook no effort to locate independent witnesses from among the dozens of guests who had attended the wedding reception.

Counsel representing Wearry on collateral review conducted an independent investigation. This investigation revealed many witnesses lacking any personal relationship with Wearry who would have been willing to corroborate his alibi had they been called at trial. Collateral-review counsel's investigation also revealed that Scott's brother and sister-in-law would have been willing to testify at trial, as they did at the collateral-review hearing, that Scott was with them, mostly at a strawberry festival, until around 11:00 on the night of the murder.

Based on this new evidence, Wearry alleged violations of his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Acknowledging that the State "probably ought to have" disclosed the withheld evidence, App. to Pet. for Cert. B–6, and that Wearry's counsel provided "perhaps not the best defense that could have been rendered," id., at B–5, the postconviction court denied relief. Even if Wearry's constitutional rights were violated, the court concluded, he had not shown prejudice. Id., at B–5, B–7. In turn, the Louisiana Supreme Court also denied relief. Id., at A–1. Chief Justice Johnson would have granted Wearry's petition on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Id., at A–2.⁵

II

Because we conclude that the Louisiana courts' denial of Wearry's Brady claim runs up against settled constitutional principles, and because a new trial is required as a result, we need not and do not consider the merits of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. "[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady, supra, at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (clarifying that the rule stated in Brady applies to evidence undermining witness credibility). Evidence qualifies as material when there is " ‘any reasonable likelihood’ " it could have " ‘affected the judgment of the jury.’ " Giglio, supra, at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) ). To prevail on his Brady claim, Wearry need not show that he "more likely than not" would have been acquitted had the new evidence been admitted. Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, –––– – ––––, 132 S.Ct. 627, 629–631, 181 L.Ed.2d 571 (2012) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). He must show only that the new evidence is sufficient to "undermine confidence" in the verdict. Ibid.⁶

Beyond doubt, the newly revealed evidence suffices to undermine confidence in Wearry's conviction. The State's trial evidence resembles a house...