Weatherford v. Price

Citation532 S.E.2d 310,340 S.C. 572
Decision Date05 June 2000
Docket NumberNo. 3180.,3180.
PartiesWade S. WEATHERFORD, III, Respondent, v. William "Buck" PRICE and William Price, Inc. of whom William Price, Inc., is, Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina

Paul R. Hibbard, of Johnson, Smith, Hibbard & Wildman Law Firm, of Spartanburg, for appellant.

H. Fulton Ross, Jr., of Gaffney, for respondent.

HOWARD, Judge:

This is an action by Wade Weatherford (Attorney) to collect a fee arising from representation of William Price, Inc. (Client).1 The action was tried non-jury, and the circuit court determined a fee of $32,000 was earned by Attorney, granting judgment for that amount on the theory of quantum meruit. Client appeals. We reverse and remand.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Attorney and Client were neighbors, but had no prior professional relationship. Client invented a generator-driven "hydro cooler" to provide refrigeration for crops as they were harvested in the field. Client leased this equipment to Vickery Farms ("Vickery") for use in a Jamaican farming operation. Vickery did not make the lease payments, so Client contacted Attorney to recover the equipment and the amount owed by Vickery. Attorney brought an action in federal court to recover the equipment and amounts due under the lease. Attorney claimed he needed assistance because of the work load in federal court proceedings. For this reason, Client agreed to retain associate counsel from another firm to assist Attorney. Client paid associate counsel an hourly fee which is not involved in this dispute.

According to Attorney, the parties initially agreed to a flat fee of $10,000 for Attorney's work. Client disputed this, claiming a contingency fee arrangement of 25% of the overdue lease payments, which would approximate $10,000 only if Attorney successfully recovered the $40,000 in unpaid lease revenue.

Vickery contended the equipment was illegally imported into Jamaica, precluding exportation to the United States. Attorney believed this defense dramatically expanded the scope of the legal work. According to Attorney, he discussed this with Client on numerous occasions, and Client repeatedly assured him that he would be reasonably compensated for the extra work. Under Attorney's view, no definite compensation arrangement was discussed, and no additional fee was agreed upon between the parties. Unfortunately, there was no written fee agreement.2

Eventually Attorney, Attorney's wife, and Client spent a week in Jamaica. The expenses for the trip were paid by Client. At the conclusion of the trip, the leased equipment was returned to Client. Attorney estimated the value of the equipment to be $125,000. Client disputes this, claiming the equipment was severely damaged in Jamaica. Attorney prepared a bill which was introduced into evidence in the federal suit reflecting a fee for the Jamaica trip of $5,000, based upon 40 hours billed at $125 per hour.

Attorney and associated counsel tried the federal case for one week, resulting in a jury verdict of $40,000. The verdict was set aside by the trial judge. During appeal, the case was settled for $12,000.3

About one year later Attorney sent a letter to Client asking to be paid. He requested payment of a "reasonable fee" which he calculated on the basis of 1/3 of his valuation of the recovered equipment. When Client refused to pay, Attorney brought this action for breach of contract.

At trial, Attorney sought compensation on the basis of contract and, by amendment at the conclusion of the testimony, on the theory of quantum meruit. Attorney testified he did not maintain time records for his work because he had never worked on an hourly basis, and did not do so in this case. The only testimony as to the amount of time expended on the case, other than the description of the work and the length of the federal trial, was Attorney's estimate of 500 hours. He explained that if he had kept track of his time, the fee would far surpass 1/3 of the value of the equipment ($41,666).

The trial court held there was no express contract between the parties. The court awarded a fee in the amount of $32,000 based on the theory of quantum meruit.

ISSUES PRESENTED
DOES THIS COURT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER JUISDICTION?
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO DIRECT A VERDICT?
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ERROR OF LAW BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES?
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

We first address the question of subject matter jurisdiction. Attorney argues Client failed to appeal the final order because the Notice of Appeal referred to the order denying the motion for reconsideration.

This Court has previously held that a mere clerical error in a Notice of Appeal does not warrant dismissal of the appeal. See Charleston Lumber Co. v. Miller Housing Corp., 318 S.C. 471, 458 S.E.2d 431 (Ct.App.1995)

. In Charleston Lumber Co., the court rejected the respondent's attempt to have the appeal dismissed on jurisdictional grounds when the appellant neglected to appeal one of a series of cases tried together. As in that case, Attorney demonstrates no prejudice as a result of the omission. Though Client did not "technically" appeal from the trial court's original order by referring to it in the Notice of Appeal, the Client did attach a copy of the order to the Notice. Under these circumstances, we believe Client's omission is of a clerical nature only and this Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

II. SCOPE OF REVIEW

An ordinary suit to recover attorney's fees, even one based on an implied contract asserting a quantum meruit measure of recovery, is an action at law. Lester v. Dawson, 327 S.C. 263, 268, 491 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1997) ("An action by an attorney for compensation, whether on a written contingency agreement or on a quasi-contractual obligation to pay the reasonable value of services prior to its breach, sounds in contract. The proper form of action by which to enforce payment, generally, is by an action at law on the contract....") (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Singleton v. Collins, 251 S.C. 208, 161 S.E.2d 246 (1968)

(wherein action to recover attorney's fees on theory of implied contract was at law). This appeal, therefore, is governed by the "any evidence" standard of review. See American Fed. Bank, FSB v. Number One Main Joint Venture, 321 S.C. 169, 173, 467 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1996) (in an appeal of a non-jury action at law, the trial court's factual findings will not be disturbed "unless found to be without evidence which reasonably supports the judge's findings") (citation omitted); Singleton, 251 S.C. at 211,

161 S.E.2d at 247 (in attorney's claim against client for professional services rendered, "no appeal lies therefrom if the findings of fact are supported by any competent evidence").

III. DISCUSSION
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO DIRECT A VERDICT?

Client asserts the trial court should have directed a verdict. We first note the trial court found that there was no express contract between the parties. There is no appeal from this finding, and it is, therefore, the law of this case. See Brading v. County of Georgetown, 327 S.C. 107, 490 S.E.2d 4 (1997)

. Having found no express contract, the court concluded attorney was entitled to recover the reasonable value of the services rendered, a proposition which finds ample support in our case law. See Singleton v. Collins, 251 S.C. 208, 161 S.E.2d 246 (1968).

In ruling on motions for directed verdict, "the trial court is required to view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions." Creech v. S.C. Wildlife and Marine Resources Dep't, 328 S.C. 24, 29, 491 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1997). The trial court must deny the motions when "the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt." Id. This Court will reverse the trial court only when there is no evidence to support the ruling below. Id.

We conclude Client would only have been entitled to a directed verdict if the evidence, and all of the inferences which could be drawn from it, point to the singular position advanced by the Client; that is, that the parties entered into a 25% contingency fee based solely on the successful recovery of lost revenues. However, the unappealed ruling that there was no contract is the law of this case. Therefore, this argument is without merit.

DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ERROR OF LAW BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES?

Client next argues the trial judge declined to consider the ethical and public policy considerations implicated by the attorney-client relationship. Client urges this court to hold that Rule 1.5, Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC), Rule 407, SCACR, proclaims the public policy of this State with regard to attorney fees in an attorney-client relationship, and a failure to consider the criteria set forth in RPC Rule 1.5 in determining a reasonable fee constituted an error of law.4 In determining the fee, the trial court specifically enumerated the six factors set forth in Blumberg v. Nealco, Inc., 310 S.C. 492, 427 S.E.2d 659 (1993). In that case, our supreme court ruled that a trial court should consider the following factors when determining an award of attorney fees:

1) nature, extent, and difficulty of the legal services rendered; 2) time and labor devoted to the case; 3) professional standing of counsel; 4) contingency of compensation; 5) fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services; and 6) beneficial results obtained.

Id. at 494, 427 S.E.2d at 660. Attorney maintains that once the court determined there was no express contract, the court correctly based its determination of the fee on the factors set out in Blumberg.

The question of what factors should be considered when determining a reasonable...

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    ...the Rules of Professional Conduct relevant in deciding what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees. See Weatherford v. Price, 340 S.C. 572, 581, 532 S.E.2d 310, 315 (Ct.App. 2000) ("We, therefore, conclude that our supreme court has not ruled that a fee agreement which violates Rule 1.5, RP......
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