Weathers v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill

• Decision Date: 30 September 2013
• Docket Number: 1:12CV1059
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: ANDREA C. WEATHERS, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, HERBERT B. PETERSON, in his individual and official capacity, JONATHAN KOTCH, in his individual and official capacity, BARBARA K. RIMER, in her individual and official capacity, EDWARD M. FOSTER, in his individual and official capacity, and SANDRA L. MARTIN, in her individual and Official capacity, Defendants.

ANDREA C. WEATHERS, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, HERBERT B.

PETERSON, in his individual and official capacity,

JONATHAN KOTCH, in his individual and official

capacity, BARBARA K. RIMER, in her individual and official

capacity, EDWARD M. FOSTER, in his individual and official

capacity, and SANDRA L. MARTIN, in her individual

and Official capacity, Defendants.

1:12CV1059

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

September 30, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge

Presently before this court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (Doc. 27). Defendants have filed a memorandum in support of their motion (Doc. 28),¹ Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition (Doc. 30), and Defendants have filed their reply (Doc. 33). Defendants' motionis now ripe for adjudication, and for the reasons that follow, this court will grant the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

In November 2008, Dr. Andrea C. Weathers ("Plaintiff") filed suit in this court alleging that she was denied reappointment and tenure in 2007 as a result of Defendants' racially discriminatory conduct (civil case number 1:08CV847 - "Weathers I"). On November 18, 2010, this court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims. That decision was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit on appeal. Weathers v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 447 F. App'x 508 (4th Cir. 2011), aff'g, No. 1:08CV847, 2010 WL 4791809 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 18, 2010).

In December 2011, Plaintiff discovered four documents among her files related to her reappointment process in 2004. (First Amended Complaint ("First Am. Compl.") (Doc. 24) ¶ 35.) Those documents include: (1) a letter from Defendant Kotch, who was the department chair at the time, addressed to Plaintiff and dated January 16, 2004, regarding her reappointment for a second term and stating that "a copy of the departmental review procedures that were approved and distributed October 30, 1996," was attached; (2) an enclosure titled "Memorandum" and dated October 30, 1996, that states "Please find enclosed the revisedreviewed procedures for faculty promotion which will be used in the department"; (3) a document titled "Department of Maternal and Child Health Revised Review Procedures for Faculty Promotion October 1996" ("1996 Departmental Policy"); and (4) an email dated February 4, 2004, from Sharon Bowers to Defendant Kotch, with a carbon copy to Ms. Bowers and Plaintiff, forwarding an email between Defendant Kotch and Ms. Bowers which references the 1996 Departmental Policy. (Id.)

According to the First Amended Complaint, these documents contradict statements made by Defendants in Weathers I regarding whether the 1996 Departmental Policy was an established policy governing applications for faculty promotion in the Department of Maternal and Child Health during Plaintiff's employment at Defendant UNC. (Id. ¶ 36.) Specifically, Defendants' reply brief in support of their motion for summary judgment stated that "there is no evidence that [the 1996 Departmental Policy] ever had any official status in [the Department of Maternal and Child Health], that the procedures described therein were ever followed or that [Plaintiff] would have complied with the procedures if they had been policy." (Defs.' Reply to Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. ("Defs.' Reply Br.")(Doc. 75) at 3 in civil case 1:08CV847.)² In addition, the reply brief noted that Defendant Peterson "did testify [in a deposition] that he never implemented procedures and does not know if they ever were implemented in [the Department of Maternal and Child Health]." (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff contends that the procedures used for her promotion application process were at the heart of her prima facie case in Weathers I. (First Am. Compl. (Doc. 24) ¶ 37.) Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant UNC has "engaged in fraud on the court, fraud and/or a material misstatement of the evidence in its discovery materials, its evidentiary disclosure, and its court filings." (Id. ¶ 40.)

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint includes seven claims for relief. In her first two claims, Plaintiff seeks to set aside the judgment in Weathers I pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d) for fraud on the court and through an independent action in equity. Plaintiff also alleges new claims against Defendant UNC and Defendants Peterson, Kotch, Rimer, and Martin (collectively the "Individual Defendants") under the following legal theories: (1) fraud, (2) negligent misrepresentation, (3) civil conspiracy, (4) violations of 42U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and (5) violations of her due process rights under the United States and North Carolina Constitutions.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must allege "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). For a claim to be facially plausible, a plaintiff must "plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable" and must demonstrate "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true. Id. However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions," and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III. ANALYSIS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)

Plaintiff first contends that she is entitled to equitable relief from the judgment in Weathers I under both a fraud on the court theory and through an independent action in equity. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d) recognizes the authority of federal courts to "entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding," and to "set aside a judgment for fraud on the court." For the reasons that follow, this court finds that Plaintiff's claims for equitable relief should be dismissed.

"Not all fraud is 'fraud on the court.'" Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349, 1356 (4th Cir. 1982). Fraud on the court "should be construed very narrowly," and "is typically confined to the most egregious cases, such as bribery of a judge or juror, or improper influence exerted on the court by an attorney, in which the integrity of the court and its ability to function impartially is directly impinged." Id. "By contrast, perjury and fabricated evidence alone, being evils which can be exposed by the normal adversary process, do not constitute grounds for relief as fraud on the court.'" Rainwater v. Mallas, No. 94-1122, 1994 WL 712570, at *2 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1994) (percuriam) (citing Great Coastal Express, 675 F.2d at 1357); see also In re Genesys Data Techs., Inc., 204 F.3d 124, 130-31 (4th Cir. 2000).

Similarly, independent actions are "reserved for those cases of 'injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure' from rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata." United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998) (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944)); see also id. at 47 ("[A]n independent action should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice."). Accordingly, independent actions are subject to a "demanding standard," id., and "perjury and false testimony are not grounds for relief in an independent action in the Fourth Circuit for many of the same reasons that apply to fraud on the court." Great Coastal Express, 675 F.2d at 1358.

In support of her request to set aside the Weathers I judgment, Plaintiff contends that the 1996 Departmental Policy was produced late in discovery and only "after numerous depositions and interrogatories denied time and again that this document was ever adopted by Defendant UNC and that the Department did not have a separate written policy on promotion and tenure." (Pl.'s Resp. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss("Pl.'s Br.") (Doc. 30) at 2.) However, Plaintiff has not directed this court to any of the "numerous depositions and interrogatories" denying that the document had ever been adopted.³ Instead, she relies on the statements in Defendants' summary judgment reply brief that there was no evidence the policy had ever been adopted and that Defendant Peterson testified that he did not know if the policy had ever been implemented.

For the following reasons, this court finds that the allegations in the First Amended Complaint do not satisfy the demanding standard for setting aside a judgment for fraud on the court or through an independent action. First, allegations that an opposing party committed perjury or fabricated evidence in an earlier proceeding are generally insufficient to satisfy the requirements for fraud on the court or an independent action inequity. Great Coastal Express, 675 F.2d at 1358; see also George P. Reintjes Co. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 71 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 1995) ("In sum, perjury alone, absent allegation of involvement by an officer of the court . . . , has never been sufficient."); cf. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 245 ("This is not simply a case of a judgment obtained with the aid of a witness who, on the basis of after-discovered evidence, is believed possibly to have been guilty of perjury."). Although "[i]nvolvement of an attorney, as an officer of the court, in a scheme to suborn perjury would certainly be considered fraud on the court," Great Coastal Express, 675 F.2d at 1357, the First...