Weathers v. WEST YUMA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT RJI, Civ. A. No. C-5432.

Decision Date12 December 1974
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. C-5432.
PartiesDonald WEATHERS, Plaintiff, v. WEST YUMA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT R-J-1 et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Colorado

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Larry F. Hobbs, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff.

Gerald A. Caplan, Boulder, Colo., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ARRAJ, Chief Judge.

This action arises under 42 U.S. C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Plaintiff, Donald Weathers, was employed as a teacher by defendant school district from August 25, 1970 through August 24, 1972. On March 9, 1972, the Board of Education for the school district voted not to renew Mr. Weathers' employment contract for the following academic year. He was notified of this fact by letter. Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to provide him with notice of the reasons for their decision and with a pretermination hearing to review the board action. He maintains that such failures constitute deprivations of both "property" and "liberty" without the procedural due process demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment. He further alleges that defendants' action was, on its merits, arbitrary and capricious, in violation of his substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 By way of relief, plaintiff seeks, inter alia, reinstatement to his teaching position together with back pay plus damages for emotional distress and loss of reputation.

Defendants are the West Yuma County School District R-J-1 and the various directors of the district serving in that capacity at the time of the challenged action.2 The latter defendants are sued in both their official and individual capacities. The primary contentions of the defendants may be summarized as follows: (1) that plaintiff was a probationary, nontenured teacher under the Colorado Employment, Dismissal and Tenure Act of 1967 C.R.S. (1963), 123-18-1 to XXX-XX-XX (Supp.1967), and as such he possessed no "property interest" within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) that the decision not to reemploy the plaintiff, including the circumstances surrounding that decision, did not deprive him of any "liberty interest" within the meaning of any constitutional provision; (3) that the decision was not, on its merits, arbitrary and capricious; (4) that the court lacks jurisdiction over the defendant school district, because it is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (5) that the doctrines of sovereign and official immunity either bar this action entirely or that they limit the relief which may be afforded the plaintiff.

After trial to the court, the matter is ripe for disposition. Because of our decision below on plaintiff's primary constitutional claims, it is unnecessary to reach all the issues raised by the defendants. Consequently, we restrict our preliminary discussion to those questions which relate to the jurisdiction of the court.

I. The School District as a Section 1983 Person

In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), the Supreme Court declared that a "municipal corporation is not a `person' within the meaning of § 1983." (Id. at 191, n. 50, 81 S.Ct. at 486) Subsequently, many lower courts construed the rule in Monroe as applying only to suits seeking damages, and that for purposes of equitable relief, political subdivisions of the state as well as state agencies could be treated as § 1983 persons. See, e. g., Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961); cf., Harvey v. Sadler, 331 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1964) This was also the dominant view as regards school districts. See, e. g., Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991, 91 S.Ct. 451, 27 L.Ed.2d 439 (1971); Adams v. School Bd. of Wyoming Valley West School Dist., 53 F.R.D. 267 (M.D.Pa.1971); Abel v. Gousha, 313 F.Supp. 1030 (E.D.Wis. 1970) Indeed, this court held in Local 858 of the American Federation of Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D.Colo.1970), that "the School District is a `person' within the meaning of 1983 for purposes of injunctive and declaratory relief . . .." (Id. at 1074) This holding was consistent with the precedents of this circuit. See, e. g., Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970)

However, in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L. Ed.2d 109 (1973), Justice Rehnquist stated:

We find nothing in the legislative history discussed in Monroe, or in the language actually used by Congress, to suggest that the generic word "person" in § 1983 was intended to have a bifurcated application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of the relief sought against them. Since, as the Court held in Monroe, "Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of" § 1983, 365 U.S. at 187, 81 S.Ct. at 484, they are outside of its ambit for purposes of equitable relief as well as for damages. Id. at 513, 93 S.Ct. at 2226

We believe this reasoning dictates that we not follow our holding in Local 858, supra. The original distinction between legal and equitable relief against municipal corporations, state agencies, and other governmental units, including school districts, was predicated on the limiting construction of Monroe. Thus, we hold that the school district is not a § 1983 person for purposes of either legal or equitable relief. See, Kelly v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 367 F.Supp. 1388 (E.D.Wis.1974) Of course, if a school district is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 for any purpose, it is also not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Potts v. Wright, 357 F.Supp. 215 (E.D.Pa.1973) This court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction over the claims against the defendant school district under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

Finally, plaintiff asks us to "bootstrap" our jurisdiction over the school district by application of the "federal question" statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, the remedies sought by plaintiff are directly dependent upon or ancillary to §§ 1983 and 1985. Since no remedy exists against the school district under these provisions, our assertion of federal question jurisdiction would be, at best, meaningless.

II. Sovereign Immunity, Official Immunity and Privilege

Our conclusion that no remedy is available against the defendant school district means that we need not decide whether plaintiff's claim for damages is also barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment. See, Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973); but see, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908, 94 S.Ct. 2604, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974) As to plaintiff's claim for equitable relief, it is clear that any decree against the individual board members would be just as effective as a decree issued against all the defendants, including the school district. See, e. g., Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973)

We also believe that the holding in Smith v. Losee, supra at 340-344 is dispositive of the official immunity asserted by the individual board members. There is no per se bar to the court's jurisdiction over these defendants. See also, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) However, the doctrine of official immunity is available to them as a matter of affirmative defense or qualified privilege. Smith v. Losee, supra at 344

We conclude, therefore, that this court has jurisdiction over the present claims against the individual board members under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1331.

III. Plaintiff's Constitutional Claims

The thrust of plaintiff's cause of action rests on two Supreme Court holdings: Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). In these cases, the Court held that if the nonrenewal of a probationary or nontenured teacher's contract constitutes a deprivation of either a "property" or "liberty" interest encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment, then the teacher is entitled to notice of the reasons for nonrenewal as well as a pretermination hearing. The Court defined the "property" interest requisite to these procedural guarantees as follows:

To have a property interest in a benefit, a person must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Board of Regents v. Roth, supra at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709
A person's interest in a benefit is a "property" interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. supra at 601, 92 S.Ct. at 2699

In short, plaintiff must establish an objective expectation of continuing employment — an expectation which would be commonly recognized and which is evidenced either by explicit statutory or contractual entitlement or by the implicit policy and practices of the parties.

As to the "liberty" interest which might arise from nonrenewal of an employment contract, the Court recognized two means of demonstrating such interest: first, where the nonrenewal occurs under such circumstances or after such accusations as "might seriously damage plaintiff's standing and associations in his community." Board of Regents v. Roth, supra at 573, 92 S. Ct. at 2707; and second, where the nonrenewal and related circumstances impose on the teacher "a stigma or other disability that forecloses his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities." Id.

The success of plaintiff's procedural due process claim, then, depends on our finding that he possessed either the "property" interest or one of the two...

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