Weaver v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co.

• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SOMERVILLE, J.
• Citation: Weaver v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364 (Ala. 1917)
• Decision Date: 21 June 1917
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 850
• Parties: WEAVER v. ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN R. CO.

76 So. 364

200 Ala. 432

WEAVER v. ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN R. CO.

7 Div. 850

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 21, 1917

Appeal from Chancery Court, De Kalb County; J.E. Blackwood Chancellor.

Bill by the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company, an Alabama corporation, against Walter Weaver, a resident of De Kalb county, Ala., to enjoin the prosecution by respondent of an action for damages against complainant in the city court of Atlanta, Ga. From an order granting a temporary writ respondent appeals. Affirmed.

Carmichael & Wynn, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Goodhue & Brindley, of Gadsden, for appellee.

SOMERVILLE J.

It is well settled that the courts of one state may take jurisdiction of a transitory cause of action originating in another state, when the defendant has been locally found and served, even though both parties are at the time domiciliary residents of the foreign state. Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 94 Wis. 70, 68 N.W. 664, 34 L.R.A. 503, 59 Am.St.Rep. 859, and note, 869; Tenn. Coal Co. v George, 233 U.S. 354, 34 Sup.Ct. 587, 58 L.Ed. 997, L.R.A.1916D, 685.

In this case it is not denied by complainant that the city court of Atlanta, Ga., has acquired jurisdiction of the cause, and may properly proceed with its trial and determination, if prosecuted there by the plaintiff.

Complainant, however, invokes another principle which is also thoroughly well settled by the highest authority. This principle is stated by Judge Story as follows:

"But, although the courts of one country have no authority to stay proceedings in the courts of another, they have an undoubted authority to control all persons and things within their own territorial limits. When, therefore, both parties to a suit in a foreign country are resident within the territorial limits of another country, the courts of equity in the latter may act in personam upon those parties, and direct them, by injunction, to proceed no further in such suit. In such a case, these courts act upon acknowledged principles of public law in regard to jurisdiction. They do not pretend to direct or control the foreign court, but, without regard to the situation of the subject-matter of the dispute, they consider the equities between the parties, and decree in personam according to those equities, and enforce obedience to their decrees by process in personam. *** It is now held that whenever the parties are resident within a country, the courts of that country have full authority to act upon them personally, with respect to the subject of suits in a foreign country, as the ends of justice may require; and, with that view, to order them to take, or omit to take, any steps or proceedings in any other court of justice, whether in the same country, or in any foreign country." Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 899, 900.

This text is quoted, and its doctrine affirmed, in Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 118, 10 Sup.Ct. 269, 33 L.Ed. 538, Allen v. Buchanan, 97 Ala. 399, 402, 11 So. 777, 38 Am.St.Rep. 187, Engel v. Scheuerman, 40 Ga. 206, 2 Am.St.Rep. 573, Wierse v. Thomas, 145 N.C. 264, 59 S.E. 58, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1008, 122 Am.St.Rep. 446, and in Judge Freeman's note to Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 94 Wis. 70, 68 N.W. 664, 34 L.R.A. 503, 59 Am.St.Rep. 859, 879. The leading textwriters are in full accord with Judge Story: 6 Pom.Eq.Jur. § 670; 1 High on Injunctions, §§ 103, 107; 16 A. & E.Enc.Law, 421; 14 R.C.L. §§ 113-116. A few of the leading cases in which this doctrine is expounded and applied are: Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen (Mass.) 545; Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203, 28 Am.Rep. 448; Sandage v. Studabaker Co., 142 Ind. 148, 41 N.E. 380, 34 L.R.A. 363, 51 Am.St.Rep. 165; Rader v. Stubblefield, 43 Wash. 334, 86 P. 560, 10 Ann.Cas. 20, and note, 26. The chief foundation for the rule is that:

"As long as a citizen belongs to a state, he owes it obedience, and as between states, that state in which he is domiciled, has jurisdiction over his person, and his personal relations to other citizens of the state." Keyser v. Rice, supra; Sandage v. Studabaker Co., supra; Carpenter v. Hanes, 162 N.C. 46, 77 S.E. 1101, Ann.Cas.1915A, 832; 14 R.C.L. § 114.

It is now settled beyond controversy that the exercise of this power of restraint by the courts of a state over its own citizens does not offend the federal Constitution, especially sections 1 and 2, art. 4, guaranteeing full faith and credit in each state to the judicial proceedings of the several states, and equality of privileges and immunities for their citizens. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 10 Sup.Ct. 269, 33 L.Ed. 538; Allen v. Buchanan, 97 Ala. 399, 403, 11 So. 777, 38 Am.St.Rep. 187.

The power is not exercised capriciously, nor merely to compel litigants to use the courts of their own state, nor even because the complainant has good reason to apprehend a less favorable result for himself in the foreign court. 14 R.C.L. § 119. The true basis for its exercise is, we think, correctly stated by Judge Freeman, as follows:

"It may, therefore, with confidence, be affirmed that the courts of one state may enjoin the prosecution of a judicial proceeding in another state upon substantially the same grounds that the courts of one nation may enjoin the prosecution of a suit or action in the courts of another nation. It will be found, upon an examination of the decisions upon this subject, that it is not necessary, in order to obtain relief, to establish the usual grounds for equitable interposition, namely, fraud, accident, or mistake, but that it will be sufficient to entitle a citizen of a state to injunction, preventing another citizen thereof from prosecuting an action against the former in the courts of another state, to show that the purpose or necessary effect of such action is to obtain an advantage to which the plaintiff therein is not entitled in the domicile of the parties." (Italics ours.) Note to Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 59 Am.St.Rep. 869, 880.

Numerous authorities supporting this statement of the law are collected in the notes to Rader v. Stubblefield, 10 Ann.Cas. 26, and Greer v. Cook, 16 Ann.Cas. 673. A purpose to evade the effect of the law of the domicile of the parties, by suing in a foreign state where the substantive law is materially different, is everywhere recognized as a sufficient ground for injunctive relief. 14 R.C.L. § 116, and cases cited. This is founded on the just conception that there is essential injustice in the enforcement of rights and duties according to any other standard than that fixed by the law of the place where the parties reside, and where the right or duty arose and the alleged breach occurred. The doctrine is summarized by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Engel v. Scheuerman, 40 Ga. 206, 2 Am.Rep. 573, by declaring that:

"In the language of the Master of the Rolls, in Cranstown v. Johnston, 3 Vesey, Jr. 183, this court will not permit the defendant to avail himself of the law of any other country, to do what would be gross injustice."

And we may here appropriately observe that it makes no difference whether the law to be evaded is one of legislative enactment (as in Allen v. Buchanan, 97 Ala. 399, 11 So. 777, 38 Am.St.Rep. 187) or of judicial decision, for the injustice of the result is the same in either case, and the logic of the remedy tolerates no such distinction. The real and decisive question in the instant case is whether or not there is such a difference between the law of Georgia and the law of Alabama, with respect to the effect of respondent's conduct in crossing complainant's railroad track upon his right to recover for the negligence of complainant, as would deprive complainant of a substantial right in resisting and defeating respondent's action in the Georgia court. Or, to state it differently, can respondent there subject complainant to liability, notwithstanding conduct of his own which in Alabama courts would be a complete legal bar to such liability?

In Alabama it is a fixed rule of law that one who goes upon a railroad track without stopping, looking, and listening for approaching trains immediately before doing so, and thereby proximately contributes to his injury by collision, cannot recover damages for the previous simple negligence of the railroad company; and where obstructions interfere with his view of the track, it is all the more his duty to stop, look, and listen at a point where he can best see and hear, and, seeing or hearing, avoid an on-rushing train. L. & N.R.R. Co. v. Turner, 192 Ala. 392, 68 So. 277, and cases cited; Peters v. So. Ry. Co., 135 Ala. 533, 33 So. 332; C. of Ga. R.R. Co. v. Foshee, 125 Ala. 213, 27 So. 1006; Gothard v. A.G.S.R.R. Co., 67 Ala. 119.

So, also, it is a fixed rule of law in Alabama that one who discovers the imminent approach of a train moving at a dangerous rate of speed, and, measuring the distance to the crossing, attempts to beat the passage of the train, and fails to his hurt, cannot recover for the previous simple negligence of the railroad company. M. & C.R.R. Co. v. Martin, 117 Ala. 367, 386, 23 So. 231.

In Georgia the doctrine of comparative negligence has been established by statute, but, in adjudicating causes of action originating in other states, the Georgia courts will apply the statutory law of these states, in so far as the substance of the right may be affected thereby. If the right to be adjudicated is not controlled by a statute, the Georgia courts will apply to it the principles of the common law as they have...