Weaver v. Bell
| Citation | 87 Ala. 385,6 So. 298 |
| Parties | WEAVER v. BELL. |
| Decision Date | 31 May 1889 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Alabama |
Appeal from circuit court, Cherokee county; JOHN B. TALLY, Judge.
Walden & Son, for appellant.
Burnett & Smyer, contra.
The mortgage from which the plaintiff derives title to the cotton sued for was executed by J. W. Foster, September 11, 1885. In April preceding, defendant and Foster made an agreement, by which the latter gave the former a verbal lien on the crops covered by the mortgage, to secure supplies furnished by defendant, with the understanding that the crop of cotton should be his until the supplies were paid for. Defendant bases his right on a delivery of the cotton to him by Foster in pursuance of this agreement. It is not disputed that the cotton in controversy is embraced in the mortgage under which plaintiff claims, and that defendant had notice of it at the time he received the cotton. The only ground of defense is that plaintiff is estopped from asserting title against the claim of defendant. It is claimed that the estoppel arises on a conversation about furnishing Foster with supplies, which defendant testifies occurred between him and plaintiff about the last of March or first of April, 1885. We state the conversation in his own language: Thereafter, defendant made the agreement with Foster, above stated, and furnished him supplies.
By the agreement, defendant obtained only a parol mortgage of the crops. This was invalid under section 1731, Code 1886, which was in force at that time. The section declares "a mortgage of personal property is not valid, unless made in writing, and subscribed by the mortgagor." Defendant was a creditor without a lien,-without right in or to the cotton until its delivery to him. A false representation by word or conduct, or a concealment of material facts, upon which another has been induced to act to his prejudice, is essential to constitute an estoppel in pais. In ordinary cases the representation or concealment must have reference to past or present facts. A representation relating to future action or conduct operates as an estoppel only when it has reference to the future relinquishment or subordination of an existing right, which...
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Quinlan v. Jones
...the Statute of Frauds cannot be made binding by way of estoppel even though acted upon. (Langan v. Sankey, 55 Iowa 52; 7 N.W. 393; Weaver v. Bell, 87 Ala. 385; 6 So. 298.) A breach of promise cannot constitute an estoppel. (Starry v. Korab, 65 Ia. 267; 21 N.W. 600.) Plaintiff was a stranger......
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...R. A. 551, 93 Am. St. Rep. 49; Clanton v. Scruggs, 95 Ala. 279, 10 So. 757; Allen v. Bromberg, 163 Ala. 620, 624, 50 So. 884; Weaver v. Bell, 87 Ala. 385, 6 So. 298. It established in this jurisdiction that one who pays off a prior lien or mortgage, under circumstances protected in equity b......
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...breach of promise as to future conduct, a mere executory agreement, or from a mere disappointment of expectations. See, also, Weaver v. Bell, 87 Ala. 387, 6 So. 298; Morris v. Orient Insurance Co., 106 Ga. 475, 33 S. E. 430; Allen v. Rundle, 50 Conn. 9, 47 Am. Rep. 599; Edwards v. Dickson, ......
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