Weaver v. Beneficial Finance Co., 4677
Decision Date | 14 June 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 4677,4677 |
Citation | 199 Va. 196,98 S.E.2d 687 |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | WESLEY JAMES WEAVER v. BENEFICIAL FINANCE CO., INCORPORATED AND R. S. COSTIGAN. Record |
William N. Eason (Philip White, on brief), for the plaintiff in error.
Thomas H. Willcox and Edward R. Willcox, Jr. (Richard B. Spindle, III; Willcox, Cooke & Willcox, on brief), for the defendants in error.
Wesley James Weaver, appellant, instituted action on June 8, 1956 against Beneficial Finance Co., Incorporated and R. S. Costigan, appellees, for compensatory and punitive damages in the sum of $50,000 'due to the republication on or about March 21, 1956,' of a certain false, insulting and libelous letter written by appellees to appellant's employer on February 23, 1955.
Appellees filed a special plea in bar in which they averred that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. Appellant moved to dismiss the plea. The trial court overruled the motion to dismiss, sustained the special plea in bar and dismissed the motion for judgment with prejudice, to which action of the court appellant excepted. We granted plaintiff a writ of error.
No evidence was heard and the case is before us, as it was before the trial court, upon the motion for judgment and the special plea in bar. It is conceded by the parties that the one year statute of limitations applies (§ 8-24, Code 1950), and the sole question presented is whether or not the cause of action arose within one year from the date of institution of this action.
Appellant alleged in his motion for judgment that as additional security he gratuitously endorsed a note drawn by William E. Webster and Mary T. Webster, his wife, secured by a deed of trust on certain personal property for a loan of $300 advanced by the appellees to the Websters; that on January 29, 1955 appellees, through their agent, informed appellant that the Websters had defaulted in the monthly payments due on their note and called upon appellant to pay the balance due of $95, at which time appellant paid $5.20 and agreed to pay the then balance on or about June 15, 1955 which was satisfactory with appellees; that on February 23, 1955 appellees unlawfully and with malice wrote an insulting and libelous letter to Industrial Relations Officer, Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia, appellant's employer, with intent to force payment which was not due; that the libelous letter in question was republished on or about March 21, 1956 before a promotion board convened to consider appellant's record, at which time the contents of the letter were first made known to appellant; that the letter suggested that appellant was and is dishonest, insolvent and one to whom credit should not be extended; that it attacked his reputation for integrity; that appellees knew the libelous letter would be a permanent part of his record and would be republished in the future; that the republication of the letter was the natural and probable consequence of the appellees' act, and that the letter written and signed by appellee Costigan, manager of appellee Beneficial Finance Co., Incorporated, who was acting in the ordinary course of his employment, was authorized and ratified by appellee Beneficial.
The alleged libelous letter which was incorporated in the motion for judgment, is dated February 23, 1955, and reads as follows:
'Any consideration given us in regard to this matter will be greatly appreciated.'
Appellant's cause of action is grounded upon the republication of the letter, on March 21, 1956. He contends that appellees are liable since the republication was the natural and probable consequence of their act or that they actually or presumptively authorized or directed its republication and that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until March 21, 1956, the date of such republication. On the other hand, appellees maintain that the cause of action against them arose on February 23, 1955, the date the letter was written or published, and not on March 21, 1956, the date it was republished by a third party.
It is well settled that the author or originator of a defamation is liable for a republication or repetition thereof by third persons, provided it is the natural and probable consequence of his act, or he has presumptively or actually authorized or directed its republication. This is based upon the principle that such republication constitutes a new cause of action against the original author. However, the original author is not responsible if the republication or repetition is not the natural and probable consequence of his act, but is the independent and unauthorized act of a third party.
In 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 85, p. 137, it is stated:
Newell, Slander and Libel (4th Ed.) § 303, p. 339, defines the author's liability for repetition by third persons as follows:
For a further discussion of the liability of the author of a defamation for republication and repetition by third persons, see 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, § 196, p. 184 and § 197, pp. 185-186; Sawyer v. Gilmers, Inc., 189 N.C. 7, 126 S.E. 183, 41 A.L.R. 1184, and for a discussion of the rules applicable to newspapers and magazines see Hartmann v. Time, 166 F.2d 127, 1 A.L.R.2d 370.
In 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 83, p. 136, it is said 'As a general rule, each time defamatory matter is brought to the attention of a third person there is a new publication constituting a separate cause of action against the person responsible for such new publication. ' In Irvine v. Barrett, 119 Va. 587, 591, 89 S.E. 904, 905, Judge Whittle, speaking for the court, stated 'It would seem plain on principle that no matter on how many separate occasions one may utter slanderous words about another (though all may refer to the same transaction) each slander constitutes a new cause of sction. ' Cf. Jean v. Hennessy, 69 Iowa 373, 375, 28 N.W. 645.
"When the right of action has been once barred by the statute of limitations, it cannot be revived by an admission of defendant that he did utter the slanderous words, nor can the running of the statute be prevented by repetitions of the slander, although, of course, a separate action will lie for any repetition within the statutory time.' 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 156, p. 239, Cf. Jean v. Hennessy, supra.
This action is expressly based on a republication of the alleged libelous letter on or about March 21, 1956 and not upon the original publication on or about February 23, 1955. If it be determined by the jury that the republication thereof was the natural and probable consequence of the original publication, or that appellees actually or presumptively authorized or directed its republication, then this latter...
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