Weaver v. Bowersox

Decision Date16 February 2006
Docket NumberNo. 03-2880.,No. 03-2938.,03-2880.,03-2938.
Citation438 F.3d 832
PartiesWilliam WEAVER, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Michael BOWERSOX, Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Assistant Atty. Gen., Michael J. Spillane, argued, Jefferson City, MO (Asst. Atty. Gen., Stephen D. Hawke, on the brief), for appellant/cross-appellee.

Eric W. Butts, argued, St. Louis, MO, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before BYE, BOWMAN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

The State of Missouri appeals the grant of habeas relief to William Weaver. The district court1 concluded that the prosecutor's closing arguments during the penalty phase of Weaver's capital murder trial violated the United States Constitution. Weaver cross-appeals the denial of his claim that the prosecutor made improper closing arguments during the guilt phase of the trial. We affirm.

I.

In separate Missouri state court trials held in 1988, William Weaver and Daryl Shurn were convicted of the execution-style shooting death of Charles Taylor. Taylor was an acquaintance of Shurn who was going to testify against Shurn in a drug case. Shurn hired Weaver to kill Taylor, and Weaver was convicted of doing so.

During his closing argument in the penalty phase, the prosecutor made a series of statements relevant to the claims in this matter. In a claim the parties identify as Claim 2E, the prosecutor made the following statements:

So, yeah, is there a possibility he's innocent? A possibility. I'm not going to deny that. But that's not what's required by the law and that's not what we could live by. If that's required, nobody would ever be sentenced to die. We wouldn't have a death penalty. And, quite frankly, if you don't sentence him to die in this case, there's no point in having a death penalty.

Weaver's trial counsel objected to the statements as improper and misstatements of the law. The state trial court sustained the objection and issued a curative instruction for the jury to disregard the statements.

In a claim the parties identify as Claim 2F, the prosecutor made the following statements:

Then I'll say what I said earlier. If these facts don't justify, don't cry out for the death penalty, then which facts do? If a cold-blooded hit on behalf of drug scum isn't enough for the death penalty, then what facts justify it?

I know there's a movie, Patton, and in the movie, George Patton was talking to his troops because the next day they were going to go out in battle and they were scared as young soldiers. And he's explaining to them that I know that some of you are going to get killed and some of you are going to do some killing tomorrow morning. And they all knew that. And he was going to try to encourage them that sometimes you've got to kill and sometimes you've got to risk death because it's right. He said: But tomorrow when you reach over and put your hand in the pile of goo that a moment before was your best friend's face, you'll know what to do.

Defense counsel objected to the statements as improper on the grounds that they were intended to inflame and prejudice the jury. The state trial court overruled the objection.

Finally, in a claim the parties identify as part of Claim 2M, the prosecutor made statements that Weaver contends improperly focused the jury on society's general war on drugs, urged the jury to sentence Weaver to death merely to send a message to other drug dealers, and caused the jury to ignore its obligation to individualize its sentencing consideration by focusing on the particular facts involved in his case:

It strikes right at the heart of our system. You've got to look beyond William Weaver. This isn't personal. This is business. You people represent the entire community. You represent society. You have to give a message here. You have to tell the Williams Weavers and the Daryl Shurns of the world, and you have to be willing to look them right in the eye when you do it, that there's a point at which we won't allow you to go. And when you do, prison's too good. It's the death penalty.

Sometimes killing is not only fair and justified; it's right. Sometimes it's your duty. There are times when you have to kill in this life and it's the right thing to do. If Charles Taylor had been able to get his gun out that day, would you have said it was right for him to kill Weaver and Shurn? Of course, you would. It would have been self-defense. Well, it was right to kill then and it's right to kill him now.

. . . .

This case — I guess it's the one that just cries out to you to say protect the community. The drug dealers, they are taking our streets away from us. Are we going to take them back? Are we going to let them have the streets or are we going to fight back? If the drug peddlers are going to run our community, then all is lost. Then there's no point in having jurors. The death penalty applies in some cases. It applies in this case.

When it comes time after [defense counsel] talks to you, I'll talk to you again briefly, and then you've got to go to the jury room and you've just got to toughen up and do what's right, even though it's going to be tough. You've got to say this is bigger than William Weaver. It's not personal; it's business.

. . . .

And I'm going to beg you for the entire community and for society not to spare his life. I'm going to beg you for the right message instead of the wrong message. The right message is life? For an execution? That's the right message? That's the message you want to send to the drug dealers, the dope peddlers and the hit men they hire to do their dirty deeds: Life in prison is what you get when we catch you and convict you. Life in prison? That's the message you want to send to the scum of the world? That when we catch you and we're convinced you're guilty, we're going to give you life in prison? That's not the right message.

. . . .

The message has to be death for these types of people. That's the only message they are going to understand.

The one thing you've got to get into your head, this is far more important than William Weaver. This case goes far beyond William Weaver. This touches all the dope peddlers and the murderers in the world. That's the message you have to send. It doesn't just pertain to William Weaver. It pertains to all of us, the community. They are our streets, our neighborhoods, our family. The message is death, not life. And you've just got to geer [sic] yourself to that.

. . . .

You've got to think beyond William Weaver. As I told you earlier, this is our worst nightmare. This is society's worst nightmare. If they could kill witnesses and we don't execute them in exchange, then there's no deterrence. Then the whole system fails and then chaos reigns and our streets are never safe. The dope peddlers reign and people like William Weaver do.

. . . .

It's bigger than William Weaver. And you've got to have the guts to do it. I'm the Prosecuting Attorney in this county, the top law enforcement officer in the county. I decide in which cases we ask for the death penalty and in which cases we don't.

Weaver's counsel objected to the last statement regarding the prosecutor being the top law enforcement officer in the county who chooses the cases in which to pursue the death penalty. The trial court sustained the objection to that statement, and instructed the jury to disregard it.

The jury sentenced Weaver to death for his role in the offense.

After exhausting his state post-conviction remedies, Weaver filed a petition in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which, after amendment by counsel, raised twenty-two separate claims for relief. The district court granted relief on the first of those claims that Weaver's Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the prosecutor exercised two peremptory strikes against black venirepersons during jury selection. The State of Missouri appealed. This court reversed and remanded with instructions to address the remaining twenty-one issues raised in Weaver's petition. Weaver v. Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024, 1032 (8th Cir. 2001).

On remand, the district court again granted relief, this time on three claims related to improper closing arguments the prosecutor made during the penalty phase of Weaver's trial. The district court vacated the death sentence, and ordered that Weaver either be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole or be given a new penalty-phase trial. The district court denied relief on all other claims, but granted a certificate of appealability on two claims related to closing arguments the prosecutor made during the guilt phase of Weaver's trial.

II.

We first briefly address the cross-appeal. In claims the parties identify as 2B and 2C, Weaver contends the prosecutor made six statements during the guilt-phase closing argument and rebuttal which improperly referred to the prosecutor's personal beliefs or threatened the jury. A discussion of the actual statements is not necessary because the district court determined the claims had been procedurally defaulted. As a consequence, Weaver has to show "cause and prejudice" or a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" to have the claims reviewed. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) ("[F]ederal habeas review of [a procedurally defaulted claim] is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.").

The district court determined Weaver failed to show cause and prejudice or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice arising from the failure to consider the claims. In an abundance of caution, the district court addressed the merits of the claims...

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