Weaver v. Chester
| Decision Date | 17 April 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. A90A0361,A90A0361 |
| Citation | 393 S.E.2d 715,195 Ga.App. 471 |
| Parties | WEAVER v. CHESTER et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Christina Petrig, Wendy J. Glasbrenner, Gainesville, Patricia D. Barron, Vicky O. Kimbrell, Phyllis J. Holmen, Atlanta, for appellant.
David E. Ralston, Blue Ridge, for appellees.
The Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR) sued appellee Ronnie Chester pursuant to the Child Support Recovery Act, OCGA § 19-11-1 et seq., seeking reimbursement for certain public assistance benefits which it had paid to the appellant, Paula A. Weaver, for the support of a minor child alleged to be Chester's son. Ms. Weaver was added as an additional plaintiff; and the issue of paternity was ultimately tried before a jury, resulting in a determination that Chester was in fact the biological father of the child. Based on this verdict, the trial court entered judgment against him in the amount of the public assistance benefits which had been paid to the appellant for the support of the child and also ordered him to make future child-support payments in the amount of $147.50 per week. However, the court denied a request by Ms. Weaver for an award of back support from Chester for those periods during the child's life when she had not been receiving public assistance benefits, concluding that "no legal basis" existed for such a claim. The case is before us pursuant to our grant of Ms. Weaver's application for a discretionary appeal from this latter portion of the court's judgment. Although the DHR is styled as a co-appellee in the case, it has filed a brief supporting the appellant's claim for back child support. Held:
There would appear to be no question that the father of a child born out of wedlock is under a legal obligation to support the child, regardless of whether there has been a prior adjudication of paternity. Pursuant to OCGA §§ 19-7-2 and 19-7-24, it is the duty of each parent, whether of a legitimate or an illegitimate child, "to provide for the maintenance, protection, and education" of the child until the child reaches the age of majority, "except to the extent that the duty of one parent is otherwise or further defined by court order." Implicit in the latter language is the assumption that the parent's duty to support his or her child exists prior to the entry of any such court order.
It is, of course, well settled that a putative father may be subjected to criminal sanctions for abandonment under OCGA § 19-10-1 without a prior paternity adjudication. See, e.g., Crayton v. State, 166 Ga.App. 544, 305 S.E.2d 19 (1983). If a father can be imprisoned for having failed to support his child during the period before a judicial determination of paternity was made, there would appear to be no bar to the entry of a civil judgment against him to enforce the same support obligation. Indeed, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act expressly provides for the recovery of past support expenses from a putative father, as follows: "If the court of the responding state finds a duty of support, it may order the respondent to furnish support and to pay arrearages due under any existing court order or to furnish reimbursement for reasonable expenses actually incurred in the absence of a court order and may subject the property of the respondent to such order." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 19-11-63. We must agree with the appellant that the Legislature could not have intended to give out-of-state custodians of minor children a greater entitlement to recover child support from Georgia parents than is enjoyed by custodians who are residents of this state.
Chester argues that a putative father's obligation to support his illegitimate child is expressly conditioned by the following emphasized language from the Child Support Recovery Act on a prior adjudication of paternity: "Whenever a man has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction as the father of a child born out of wedlock ... he shall be legally liable for the support of the child in the same manner as he would owe the duty of support if the child were his legitimate child." OCGA § 19-11-14. (Emphasis supplied.) See also OCGA § 19-11-43(6). However, as we interpret this language it is not the father's obligation to support the child which is made contingent upon an adjudication of paternity but simply the right to enforce that obligation through legal process. Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C. 98, 116, 225 S.E.2d 816, 827 (1976).
In concluding that OCGA...
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Loomis, In re
...is not contingent on a judgment of paternity; the judgment merely grants the right to enforce his obligation. Weaver v. Chester, 195 Ga.App. 471, 393 S.E.2d 715, 716-17 (1990)(superseded by statute in other respects); Commonwealth v. Chase, 385 Mass. 461, 432 N.E.2d 510, 516-17 (1982); Tidw......
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Day v. Mason
...their arguments regarding Mason's right to recover these expenses, both parties rely upon this Court's opinion in Weaver v. Chester , 195 Ga. App. 471, 393 S.E.2d 715 (1990), for the proposition that Mason was entitled to reimbursement for Day's share of "reasonable and necessary" actual, p......
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Ellison v. Walter ex rel. Walter
...child support should be the rule rather than the exception); Mason v. Reiter, 564 So.2d 142 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990); Weaver v. Chester, 195 Ga.App. 471, 393 S.E.2d 715 (1990); State v. Johnican, 830 S.W.2d 215 (Tex.Ct.App.); Goheen v. Koester, 794 S.W.2d 830 (Tex.Ct.App.1990) (writ of error ...
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