Weaver v. City of Shreveport, 52,869-CA
| Decision Date | 14 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 52,869-CA,52,869-CA |
| Parties | DANNY C. WEAVER, ET AL. Plaintiffs-Appellants v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT, ET AL. Defendants-Appellees |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Judgment rendered August 14, 2019. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
DUNAHOE LAW FIRM
By: Jared Dunahoe
Counsel for Appellants,
WOODLEY, BYRD & CROMWELL, L.L.P.
American Alternative
Insurance Corporation
Before STONE, STEPHENS, and McCALLUM, JJ.
The plaintiffs, Danny C. Weaver, Delores Weaver Winderweedle, Terri Weaver Escude, Linda Kay Weaver Pharr, and Rebecca Weaver Martin (collectively, the "Weavers"), appeal from the trial court's judgment granting the motion for partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the City of Shreveport, Sergeant Lee Scott, Sergeant Jeff Peters, and Corporal Joel Davidson (collectively, the "City"). For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court's judgment.
This matter arises out of the deaths of Linda and Obie Weaver, who were victims of a motor vehicle collision with Damian Pea that occurred on December 18, 2014. On that date, the Caddo Parish Sheriff's Office (the "CPSO") and the Shreveport Police Department (the "SPD") were attempting to arrest Pea on various outstanding warrants issued by the State of Oklahoma. The record reflects some dispute whether the Street Level Interdiction Unit (a unit of the Caddo-Shreveport Narcotics Unit consisting of both SPD officers and CPSO deputies) was officially involved in the operation. There is no question some CPSO deputies and SPD officers were engaged in the operation, which culminated in a high-speed pursuit of Pea and the deaths of Linda and Obie Weaver.
Prior to the incident, Teketia Pipkins had been in an exceedingly abusive relationship with Pea in Oklahoma. In connection with their relationship, Pea had been arrested several times in that state, and there were various outstanding warrants for his arrest. Pipkins' children were in the state's custody as a result of the abuse. She moved back to Shreveport, and Pea followed her. While in Shreveport and fearful for her safety, Pipkinscontacted a personal acquaintance, Deputy Lifford Jackson of the CPSO, who referred her to SPD officer Sgt. Scott. As a result of that contact between Sgt. Scott and Pipkins, on December 18, Pipkins picked Pea up and drove with him to a Circle K gas station on West 70th Street. Sergeant Scott had arranged for law enforcement officers to approach and arrest Pea at the Circle K, but when Pipkins exited her vehicle, she left the keys inside it. At that point, CPSO Deputy Earlton Parker, SPD Officer Ryan Holley, and other agents approached the vehicle from the rear. Deputy Parker exited Ofc. Holley's vehicle. At the same time, Pea moved from the passenger seat to the driver's seat and turned on the vehicle's ignition. The vehicle containing Pea was not blocked in, and he was able to drive away from the Circle K gas station. A high-speed pursuit of Pea ensued.
The police chase of Pea was over 11 minutes long. Pea and law enforcement units sped in excess of 90 miles per hour through several residential and commercial neighborhoods at night and in the rain. At some point during the pursuit on Jewella Avenue, Pea's vehicle struck a civilian vehicle, causing Pea to have a flat tire and cross the median. Pea continued to drive against the flow of traffic until he struck, head on, the vehicle occupied by Linda and Obie Weaver. As a result of the injuries sustained from the impact of the crash, Linda and Obie both died shortly thereafter. Pea was pronounced dead on the scene.
On December 3, 2015, the Weavers (who are the children of Linda and Obie) filed suit against the City of Shreveport, SPD Sgt. Larry Scott, SPD Sgt. Jeff Peters, Caddo Parish Sheriff Steve Prator (the "Sheriff"), CPSO Dep. Sheriff Earlton Parker, and CPSO Dep. Sheriff Joel Davidson. The Weavers alleged the joint operation to arrest Pea and resulting pursuitwas negligently planned and executed. In their second amending petition, the Weavers added as defendants the parties' respective insurers and Pipkins, alleging she "was operating as an employee, representative, agent and/or volunteer" of the City and/or Sheriff Prator, as well as being under their direction and/or control. In their third amending petition, the Weavers alleged (among other additional allegations) that the City and Sheriff Prator were vicariously liable for the actions of Pipkins.
The City filed an exception of no cause of action and motion for partial summary judgment on September 28, 2017. The City moved for summary judgment on the basis that no master-servant relationship existed between it and Pipkins such that the city would be vicariously liable for Pipkins' actions (i.e., leaving the keys in the vehicle that allowed Pea to initiate the chase). The Weavers filed an opposing motion for summary judgment on the same issue, arguing conversely that the City was vicariously liable for Pipkins' actions. The City's motion was granted, and judgment was entered in favor of the City.1 This appeal by the Weavers ensued.2
The Weavers raise only one assignment of error on appeal. They argue the trial court erred in granting the City's motion for partial summary judgment because there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City was vicariously liable for Pipkins' negligent acts. According to theWeavers, the facts establish that Pipkins was acting as a volunteer for the City during the operation regarding the apprehension of Pea, making the City vicariously liable for her actions. They argue that Sgt. Scott asked Pipkins if she would "volunteer" to pick up Pea in order for law enforcement to facilitate the arrest of Pea. The Weavers maintain that Pipkins acted in accordance with directions of the City. As to the trial court's reasons for judgment and its statement that "Pipkins had her own agenda in wanting Pea arrested for her own personal safety and for the safety of her children," the Weavers note that an individual can volunteer for a myriad of reasons. "Selfish motives" of the volunteer, as characterized by the Weavers, do not change the status of a volunteer. We agree.
Summary judgments are reviewed de novo on appeal, with the reviewing court using the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate, whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966; Smith v. Robinson, 2018-0728 (La. 12/5/18), 265 So. 3d 740, 744; Franklin v. Dick, 51,479 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/21/17), 224 So. 3d 1130; Capital One Bank (USA) NA v. Thompson, 47,994 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/15/13), 115 So. 3d 704. We view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hines v. Garrett, 2004-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So. 2d 764. When considering a motion for summary judgment, it is improper to weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter; rather, the trial court is only to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Franklin, supra.
A genuine issue is one about which reasonable persons could disagree. Hines, supra; Franklin, supra. A material fact is one that potentially ensures or precludes recovery, affects the ultimate success of the litigant, or determines the outcome of the dispute. Hines, supra; Franklin, supra. Whether a fact is "material" for purposes of summary judgment is determined in light of the substantive law applicable to the particular case. Richard v. Hall, 2003-1488 (La. 4/23/04), 874 So. 2d 131.
The substantive law upon which the Weavers' claim against the City is based arises from La. C.C. art. 2320, which provides that masters and employers are answerable for the damage caused by their servants in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed. For liability to attach under art. 2320, the Weavers must show a master-servant relationship existed. That is, was Pipkins, considering these particular facts, the City's servant in this law enforcement operation leading to Linda's and Obie's deaths? See Knoten v. Westbrook, 2014-0892 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/18/16), 193 So. 3d 380, writ denied, 2016-1260 (La. 10/28/16), citing, Richard v. Hall, supra; see also Whetstone v. Dixon, 616 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1993), writs denied, 623 So. 2d 1333 (La. 1993).
A servant is one employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who is subject to the other's control or right of control with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services. Che v. First Assembly of God, Ruston, LA, 50,360 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/16), 185 So. 3d 125, citing, Ermert v. Hartford Ins. Co., 559 So. 2d 467 (La. 1990).
An unpaid volunteer may be deemed a servant of the organization accepting his services based upon the organization's right to control the volunteer's activities. Cason v. Saniford, 2013-1825 (La. App. 1 Cir.6/6/14), 148 So. 3d 8, writ denied, 2014-1431 (La. 10/24/14), 151 So. 3d 602; Whetstone, 616 So. 2d at 770. The relationship of master and servant may arise by implication and there need be no express contract of employment. Bates v. Lagars, 193 So. 2d...
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