Weaver v. Giffels
Decision Date | 10 November 2016 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 327844. |
Parties | WEAVER v. GIFFELS. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Miller Johnson (by Julie A. Sullivan, Kalamazoo and Richard E. Hillary, II, Grand Rapids) for Lisa A. Weaver.
James M. Giffels, Portage, in propria persona.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and BECKERING, JJ.
Typically a divorced parent's child support obligation ends when the child turns 18 years old, i.e., is no longer a minor. An exception to that rule exists, however, when the child turns 18 but is still attending high school and is residing on a "full-time basis" with the child support recipient.
MCL 552.605b(2). This case presents the question of what is meant by residing on a "full-time basis" with the child support recipient. The circuit court, focusing on the parties' argument over the meaning of "full-time basis," concluded that residing on a full-time basis meant that the child must still be residing with the support recipient in full compliance with the child custody or parenting-time order. We hold that the support order is irrelevant to the analysis and that an 18–year–old child is residing on a "full-time basis" with the support recipient when the child is residing only with that parent. As a result, we reverse the circuit court order to the extent it ruled that compliance with the parenting-time order constituted "full-time," and we remand for the trial court to determine whether the 18–year–old resided with her mother on a full-time basis.
According to defendant, following entry of the judgment, the parties informally agreed to a parenting-time arrangement that allowed the children to reside with plaintiff four days per week and with defendant three days per week. That arrangement continued for all times relevant to these proceedings.
KG turned 18 years old on November 26, 2014. At that time, she was still enrolled in high school, with an expected graduation date in the spring of 2015. After she turned 18, defendant filed a motion in the Family Division of the Kalamazoo Circuit Court praying for an order terminating his support obligation as to KG, retroactive to November 26, 2014. In support, defendant recited the pertinent portion of the Uniform Child Support Order providing that defendant's support obligation ended either (1) at the end of the month of KG's eighteenth birthday or (2) at the end of the month in which KG no longer attended high school full-time while residing on a "full-time basis" with plaintiff. Defendant argued that the latter provision was inapplicable—and therefore his support obligation ended upon KG's eighteenth birthday—because while KG was still enrolled full-time in high school, she did not live, nor had she ever lived, with plaintiff on a full-time basis; instead, the parents shared physical custody, with KG spending three days per week with defendant.
A hearing on defendant's motion was held before a family division referee, who agreed with defendant, concluding that "[t]he statute [MCL 552.605b ] is really quite clear": it allows for postmajority child support only where the child is "regularly attending high school on a full-time basis, with a reasonable expectation of completing sufficient credits to graduate" and is living with the recipient of support on a full-time basis. With regard to the term "full-time basis," the referee opined that the term "means what it says," i.e., that the child must be living full-time with the recipient of support, not simply the full amount of time allotted to the recipient under the custody agreement. On the basis of these conclusions, a recommended order was submitted granting defendant's motion to terminate his support obligation to KG effective November 26, 2014.
Plaintiff filed a written objection to the referee's recommended order, asserting that the referee's definition of "full-time basis," effectively requiring KG to reside with plaintiff at all times rather than merely the time allotted to her under the parenting-time arrangement, was erroneous. Plaintiff asserted that "it would be unlikely that any child for whom child support is presently being ordered in the State of Michigan resides ‘full-time’ with either parent given the progression of shared parenting time, joint custody, etc." Thus, she argued, to define the term "full-time basis" in such a way as to require that the child live with the recipient of child support at all times, irrespective of a parenting-time arrangement, would lead to an "inequitable" result, i.e., that almost no parent supporting a postmajority child in high school would receive support.
After a hearing on plaintiff's objection, the circuit court entered an order denying defendant's motion to terminate his support obligation to KG as of her eighteenth birthday, holding that defendant's support obligation extended beyond KG's eighteenth birthday because she resided with plaintiff in full compliance with the custody order:
Following entry of the trial court's order, we ultimately granted defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal, Weaver v. Giffels, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 15, 2015 (Docket No. 327844). We now reverse and remand for further proceedings.3
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