Weaver v. John Lucas Tree Expert Co.

• Decision Date: 10 October 2013
• Docket Number: C.A. No.: 2:13-CV-01698-PMD
• Parties: Dean L. Weaver, Plaintiff, v. John Lucas Tree Expert Co., Arthur Batson, Jr., and Arthur Batson, III, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Dean L. Weaver, Plaintiff, v. John Lucas Tree Expert Co., Arthur Batson, Jr., and Arthur Batson, III, Defendants.

C.A. No.: 2:13-CV-01698-PMD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION

Date: October 10, 2013

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants John Lucas Tree Expert Co., Arthur Batson, Jr., and Arthur Batson, III's (collectively "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff's request for leave to amend his Complaint is denied.

JURISDICTION

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States." Id. § 1332(a), (a)(1). Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of the State of South Carolina. Defendant John Lucas Tree Expert Co. is organized under the laws of the State of Maine and maintains its principal place of business in Falmouth, Maine. Likewise, the individual Defendants, Arthur Batson, Jr. and Arthur Batson, III, are residents of the State of Maine. Plaintiff alleges damages in excess of the jurisdictional prerequisite.Therefore, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the termination of Plaintiff from his employment with John Lucas Tree Expert Co. ("Company"). Accepting the truth of the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint and viewing all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011), the facts, for purposes of ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, are as follows.

Plaintiff was initially hired by the Company, which provides tree maintenance services, on January 18, 1977, as a "tree climber" in Maine. In 2004,¹ he was offered a position as manager of the Company's South Carolina division by Arthur Batson, Jr. ("Batson, Jr."), the Company's president. Plaintiff subsequently accepted Batson, Jr.'s offer and "entered into a handwritten, signed contract agreeing on wages and a profit sharing arrangement." Copy attached to Complaint Ex. A ("Agreement"). The Agreement, which was purportedly signed by Batson, Jr. in his capacity as the Company's president, states in its entirety:

Dean Weaver

12/24/03

A. Pay effective Jan 1

1,200 @ week ($62,400)

B. Signing bonus:

$10,000 ($2,500 @ month for 4 months)

C. Moving expenses:

up to $6,000

D. Travel:

up to $500 @ month for 6 months

E. Vehicle:

pick-up with AC

F. Snow removal:

Lucas will snowplow 2004

G. 10% of NET profit from South Carolina operations

H. Mortgage:

two mortgage payments if necessary if house not sold by

June

I. Room & Board:

150 @ week for board and room covered by Lucas and

price mutually agreeable for Jan to June 1

[SIGNATURE]

Plaintiff alleges that after relocating his family to South Carolina and "perform[ing] the job of manager as requested," in 2010, Batson, Jr. transferred the management responsibilities associated with the South Carolina division of the Company to his son, Arthur Batson, III ("Batson, III"), who is or was the Company's Chief Financial Officer. Plaintiff also contends that, despite his repeated requests, Defendants failed to compensate him pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. Plaintiff alleges that he nevertheless continued to work and perform in his capacity as manager prior to and until his termination from the Company on August 15, 2012.

As of the time of his termination, Plaintiff had accrued thirty-five years of experience with the Company and, "prior to his interaction with [Batson, III] acting as president of the South Carolina Company, had no disciplinary actions or negative comments on performance reviews."² Plaintiff further alleges that, since his separation from the Company, he has been unable to secure similar employment, and he has experienced extreme emotional trauma, depression, and distress. In view of his thirty-five-year tenure with the Company and his annual earnings of approximately $65,000, Plaintiff claims to be owed an amount in excess of $75,000. Following his termination, Plaintiff instituted this action.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging three causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and (3) a violation of the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-10 et seq.

On July 29, 2013, Defendants filed their collective Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint and moved to dismiss Plaintiff's breach of contract cause of action, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), to the extent that Plaintiff's claim is based on his termination from the Company. Defendants also moved to dismiss Plaintiff's cause of action alleging a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), as well as Plaintiff's cause of action under the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act. Plaintiff filed his Response on August 29, 2013, and also requested, in the alternative, leave to amend the Complaint. Defendants thereafter filed a Reply, asserting that Plaintiff's Response raised issues not previously addressed. This matter is now ripe for consideration.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss pursuant Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint." Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) ("A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses."). To be legally sufficient a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court "articulated a 'two-pronged approach' to assessing the sufficiency of a complaint." Robertson v. Sea PinesReal Estate Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). First, the complaint must "contain factual allegations in addition to legal conclusions." Id. Under Rule 8's pleading standard, "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do," id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted), and "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement'" will not suffice, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Second, the complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). More specifically, to state a facially plausible claim the complaint must demonstrate that the plaintiff's right to relief is more than a mere possibility, but it need not rise to the level of evincing a probability of success. Id. Nevertheless, under notice pleading, a complaint must simply provide the defendant with "fair notice" of the claim and the grounds upon which the plaintiff seeks to obtain relief. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d at 440. Accordingly, "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the trial judge must accept as true all of the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. E.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d at 440. The court must determine whether the allegations give rise to a plausible right to relief, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; however, it should "not accept 'legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonableconclusions, or arguments,'" United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, although the court must accept a plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes of ruling on the motion, the complaint must nevertheless satisfy the "two-pronged" test articulated by the Supreme Court. Id. at 679.

ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a violation of the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act. The Court will address the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff's claims, as well as Defendants' arguments and objections thereto, seriatim.

I. Breach of Contract

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's breach of contract cause of action "[t]o the extent . . . [it] is based on the termination of his employment." Plaintiff claims that, "in contravention of the parties [sic] mutual agreement, [he] was not compensated per the terms of the contract." Plaintiff also alleges that he "was terminated without cause, out of compliance with Defendant's policies and procedures and in a manner inconsistent with the treatment of similar...