Weaver v. NEW YORK CITY EMP. RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Decision Date | 21 July 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 88 Civ. 2662 (MBM).,88 Civ. 2662 (MBM). |
Citation | 717 F. Supp. 1039 |
Parties | Stephen WEAVER, by his Next Friend Rosalie WEAVER, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, the City of New York, Harold E. Herkommer, personally and as Executive Director, New York City Employees' Retirement System, and Milad S. Eskalis, personally and as Assistant Deputy Director, New York City Employees' Retirement System, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
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Jonathan A. Weiss, Legal Services for the Elderly, New York City, for plaintiff.
Susan Rockford, Anne Carson and Peter L. Zimroth, Corp. Counsel of the City of New York, New York City, for defendants.
Plaintiff Stephen Weaver was a retired New York City employee who received a pension from defendant New York City Employees' Retirement System ("NYCERS"). Plaintiff died on December 29, 1988. This action, styled a § 1983 claim,1 has been brought by his niece Rosalie Weaver, suing as his next friend, to challenge an alleged NYCERS policy of cutting off payments to a pensioner perceived to be incompetent until a committee or conservator is appointed. In the spring of 1988, NYCERS terminated plaintiff's pension checks after it determined that plaintiff was incompetent. Plaintiff claims that the practice of terminating benefits of incompetent claimants is arbitrary and therefore a violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; plaintiff asserts also that defendants did not afford him notice and a hearing regarding this termination, and shifted the burden to him to prove that he was not incompetent, thus violating his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages plus interest from NYCERS. Plaintiff's prayer for injunctive relief is conceded by both sides to be moot because he is dead. Plaintiff requests punitive damages from the individual defendants.
Defendants Milad Eskalis, NYCERS Assistant Deputy Director, and Harold Herkommer, NYCERS Executive Director, now move for summary judgment claiming that they are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity.2
Plaintiff, a pensioner since 1970, received his pension benefit payments monthly through February 1988. By form letter dated October 6, 1987, defendant Eskalis notified Rosalie Weaver, plaintiff's niece, that NYCERS suspected that Stephen Weaver was incompetent and, accordingly, all payments would be suspended until, inter alia, a conservator or committee was appointed. In order to give the reader the full flavor of this document, which defendants assert constitutes adequate notice apprising plaintiff of an opportunity to be heard, I reprint it in full (handwritten portions are underlined):
(Carson Aff., Exh. 12) Eskalis never received any psychiatrist's report rebutting the finding that Weaver was incompetent, and, accordingly, ceased sending pension checks. Plaintiff alleges that Herkommer approved Eskalis' actions. (Complaint at ¶ 19)
Government officials performing discretionary functions are protected by qualified immunity. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity shields officials from liability for damages "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. In order for an official to be held liable despite this qualified immunity, the right allegedly violated must be "sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violated that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The action in question need not previously have been held unconstitutional, but the unlawfulness must be apparent in light of preexisting law. Id.; Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662, 665 (2d Cir.1989).
Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court has held and the Second Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that qualified immunity defenses should be decided before the commencement of discovery, for example, as here, on a motion for summary judgment. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Eng v. Coughlin, 858 F.2d 889, 895 (2d Cir.1988); Francis v. Coughlin, 849 F.2d 778, 780 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) and cases cited therein. This is because the test of whether an official acted in good faith is objective. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-819, 102 S.Ct. at 2737-38.
New York State courts have held that the right to a government pension is a property right protected by due process guarantees. Balash v. New York City Employees' Retirement System, 34 N.Y.2d 654, 311 N.E.2d 649, 355 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1974); see also Brown v. New York State Teachers' Retirement System, 107 A.D.2d 103, 485 N.Y.S.2d 871 (3d Dep't 1985).
Plaintiff's substantive due process claim asserts that defendants' practice of terminating benefits to incompetent claimants unless a committee or conservator is appointed is arbitrary. This policy is in sharp contrast to one followed by the Social Security Administration, which provides detailed regulations whereby the claimant may contest the finding of incompetence or, if the claimant is incompetent, provides an informal and inexpensive mechanism whereby a claimant's relative may be designated a "representative payee" and thus be able to cash claimant's check. See generally D. Sweeney & J. Lyko, Practice Manual for Social Security Claims, 157-59 (1980).
As these payments are not a "fundamental right," defendants' decision is reviewed under the most deferential standard of review and will not be overturned "unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment." Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185, 97 S.Ct. 431, 434, 50 L.Ed.2d 389 (1976) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640, 57 S.Ct. 904, 908, 81 L.Ed. 1307 (1937)); Gutierrez v. Bowen, 702 F.Supp. 1050, 1061 (S.D.N.Y.1989).
Defendants had a fiduciary responsibility to make effective payment to plaintiff and, thus, may be absolutely liable to the named beneficiary if they make payment to a person other than the named beneficiary. Ellis v. Kelsey, 241 N.Y. 374, 150 N.E. 148 (1925); Scott on Trusts § 226 (4th Ed.1988); see also Pete v. United Mine Workers of America Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 517 F.2d 1275, 1286 (D.C.Cir.1975). Moreover, defendants' agency, NYCERS, is explicitly prohibited from making retirement allowance payments to an assignee. See Administrative Code of the City of New York, § 13-181 (1986). Plaintiff denies violating this prohibition, reasoning that commercial assignments usually require a contract and no one contends that Rosalie Weaver and Stephen Weaver had one. However, assignments of retirement allowances may be effected by assignments that would not be considered valid in a commercial context. See, e.g., Federal Tax Regulations, § 1-401(a)-13(c)(ii) (West 1989). Therefore, defendants have a valid argument, based on the prohibition of assigning retirement allowances, to defeat the claim that they acted arbitrarily when they adopted a practice designed to head off apparently unlawful assignments.
Furthermore, New York law holds that a conservator should be appointed to manage the business affairs of an incompetent person. Matter of Klein, 57 A.D.2d 895, 394 N.Y.S.2d 282 (2d Dep't 1977) ( ). Plaintiff argues that...
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