Weaver v. Shaffer
Decision Date | 19 December 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 14415,14415 |
Parties | Clarence WEAVER v. Gus SHAFFER, Chairman, Boone County Deputy Sheriff's Civil Service Commission, et al. |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. W.Va.Code, 7-14-15(a) [1971] which prohibits political activity on the part of deputy sheriffs covered by civil service is not unconstitutional since this Court gives the statute an adequately narrow interpretation and in this regard we hold that Code, 7-14-15(a) [1971] proscribes only the following: (1) holding a party office; (2) working at the polls; (3) acting as a party paymaster for other party workers; (4) organizing a political party or club; (5) actively participating in fund-raising activities for a partisan candidate or political party; (6) becoming a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective public office; (7) actively managing the campaign of a partisan candidate for public office; (8) initiating or circulating a partisan nominating petition or soliciting votes (i.e., campaigning) for a partisan candidate for public office; and (9) serving as a delegate, alternate or a proxy to a political party convention.
2. Where a statute serves an urgent and necessary public purpose but is technically deficient for constitutional reasons, this Court will apply the doctrine of the least intrusive remedy and give the statute, wherever possible, an interpretation which will cure its defect and save it from total invalidation.
Boettner, Campbell & Crane and John Boettner, Jr., Charleston, for appellant.
Peter A. Hendricks, Asst. Pros. Atty., Boone County, Madison, Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Atty. Gen., Marianne Kapinos Hoover, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for appellees.
The appellant, Clarence Weaver, challenges a provision of the West Virginia Civil Service for Deputy Sheriffs Act which prohibits political activity on the grounds that the statute is vague and overbroad. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County found that the appellant had engaged in proscribed political activities while a member of the classified civil service and concluded that the challenged statute is not so vague or broad as to be constitutionally infirm. We affirm. 1
In 1971 our Legislature enacted W.Va.Code, 7-14-1 [1971] et seq. establishing civil service for deputy sheriffs. The act bars dismissal or reduction in rank for political reasons except that Code, 7-14-15(a) [1971] provides in pertinent part that:
On and after the effective date of this article [July 1, 1971], no deputy sheriff covered by the provisions of this article shall engage in any political activity of any kind, character or nature whatsoever, except to cast his vote at any election or shall act as an election official in any municipal, county or state election. Any deputy sheriff violating the provisions of this section shall have his appointment vacated and shall be removed, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of this section.
The Act provides two methods for removing a deputy sheriff. Code, 7-14-13 [1971] allows private citizens to petition the county civil service commission for removal and Code, 7-14-17 [1971] provides for removal by the sheriff.
On 1 January 1973, the then recently elected sheriff of Boone County, John Protan, discharged the appellant pursuant to Section 17 for unlawful political activity. Mr. Weaver initially demanded a hearing before the Boone County Civil Service Commission, but later decided to abandon the hearing and seek a writ of mandamus in this Court. This Court denied the writ in Hall v. Protan, 156 W.Va. 562, 195 S.E.2d 380 (1973), on the grounds that the facts surrounding the discharge were in dispute and Mr. Weaver had not exhausted his administrative remedies.
A citizens' petition for the appellant's removal was filed on 6 July 1973, again alleging unlawful political activity as the grounds for removal. Hearings were held before the Civil Service Commission from June 1973 through April 1974. On 16 April 1974, the Commission ordered Mr. Weaver dismissed from his position as deputy sheriff finding that the appellant had regularly been present in the campaign headquarters of sheriff candidate Albert Gore during the primary election in the spring of 1972; that he attended at least one political dinner during the campaign; and, that appellant transported and/or distributed campaign literature during the same campaign in support of some candidates who were not definitely identified. Appellant sought review in the Circuit Court of Boone County from which the case was transferred to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County where the findings of the Commission dismissing Mr. Weaver were affirmed. This appeal followed.
At the outset, the appellant contends that the findings of the Civil Service Commission are clearly wrong and not supported by the evidence. This assignment is without merit. Ample evidence taken at several hearings supports the Commission's conclusion that Mr. Weaver engaged in political activity by being present in the campaign headquarters of sheriff candidate Gore, attending one political dinner and transporting and/or distributing campaign literature. This Court has held that " Scott v. Ernest, 164 W.Va. 595, 264 S.E.2d 635 (1980).
The essence of the appellant's other assignments is that W.Va.Code, 7-14-15(a) [1971], denies his constitutional right to free political expression because it is both vague and impermissibly broad in its scope. During the 1960s and 1970s the United States Supreme Court wrestled with the doctrine of overbreadth. Certainly the cases on this subject are not consistent, but there does appear to be a context specific withdrawal from the Rhadamanthine application of the doctrine in civil service cases. The point of entry to the resolution of the challenge at hand, therefore, is the recognition that there is a legitimate governmental interest in restricting political activities of classified employees. United States Civil Service Commission v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947). Such restrictions are designed to insure advancement based on merit in the governmental service and to protect employees from improper political influence. Mitchell, supra. The government, therefore, has an interest in regulating the conduct and speech of its employees that differs significantly from the interest it possesses in regulating conduct and speech of the citizenry in general. Pickering v. Board of Education, supra.
Historically the problem which statutes such as W.Va.Code, 7-14-15(a) [1971] present is that they are so broadly written that they appear to proscribe activity which is protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and which, under any set of facts, the government cannot be considered as having a legitimate interest in proscribing. In this regard we do find that W.Va.Code, 7-14-15(a) [1971] is overly broad since it would appear to proscribe activities which the Supreme Court of the United States has indicated are protected by the First Amendment even with respect to employees of a classified civil service. 2
We must now turn to the remedy which is enjoined upon us by the United States Supreme Court with regard to curing a statute of this type; the issue is whether this statute can be cured by judicial construction or must be struck down in its entirety.
In analyzing Supreme Court authority it is necessary to establish an historical perspective which will lead us to appreciate that in the First Amendment area many holdings are quite context specific. It must be remembered that in the 1960s there was still broad-based, state government supported, militant resistance to Fourteenth Amendment racial equality. Racial equality was indeed inextricably intertwined with problems inherent in wealth discrimination and this led to a confluence of the issue of racial equality with certain issues of social equality (not necessarily related to race) in the area of both civil rights and civil liberties. While the cases which require the strict application of the overbreadth doctrine are not necessarily directly related to efforts towards either racial or social equality, nonetheless, an absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment emerged ineluctably from the judicial mind set of the time.
No effort of judicial imagination is capable of intelligently reconciling the inconsistent precedent generated by the United States Supreme Court in the last twenty years with regard to the overbreadth doctrine. The only reasonable conclusion is that once the Supreme Court began striking broad statutes in highly context specific situations while attempting to sustain their conclusions with general principles, the principles were per force applied to other contexts for which they were not originally conceived, which ultimately required a retreat from the principles themselves. 3 This, probably more than anything else, explains the dramatic retreat from overbreadth in Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) since that case is entirely at odds with Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2276, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975). 4 For...
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