Weaver v. State, 8 Div. 470
Citation | 401 So.2d 344 |
Decision Date | 30 June 1981 |
Docket Number | 8 Div. 470 |
Parties | Mark Anthony WEAVER v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Maria Jane C. Wells of Carnes & Carnes, Albertville, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Joseph G. L. Marston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant was indicted and convicted for burglary in the third degree. Ala.Code § 13A-7-7 (Supp.1979). Upon determination that appellant was a habitual offender pursuant to Code § 13A-5-9(b)(1) (Supp.1979), the trial court fixed his punishment at ten years and one day. This appeal primarily concerns procedural questions; therefore, a lengthy recital of the facts is unnecessary.
The State's evidence was sufficient beyond any reasonable doubt to prove that appellant instigated and participated in the February 28, 1980, burglary as charged. Appellant was accompanied by two juveniles. The trio had been drinking and "riding around" for several hours prior to appellant's encouraging the juveniles to commit the breakin. Appellant assisted and supported the juveniles by words and acts as was necessary in accomplishing the crime. In the words of one of the juveniles, "He put us up to it."
Appellant first let one of the juveniles out of his car with a tire tool which was used to break out a window, and he then rode around for a while with the other juvenile. Later, appellant let both juveniles out at the same residence to "get some more stuff" and then transported some of the stolen items to his house.
The next day the two juveniles made statements incriminating themselves and implicating appellant. Later that day appellant surrendered to authorities and signed a voluntary statement consistent with the juveniles' story, but denying his complicity in the actual burglary.
Suffice it to say, the jury verdict was well supported by the evidence. What follows is a discussion of the facts relevant to the procedural questions which are raised on this appeal.
Appellant was arraigned on September 23, 1980, and pled not guilty in the presence of counsel. At that time the trial court informed appellant his trial was set for October 27, 1980, stating, On October 29, 1980, appellant's case was called for trial, and defense counsel stated that he was ready to proceed. The jury was struck, empaneled, sworn, and sequestered. After the lunch recess, but before any witnesses were called, the following exchange occurred:
This is the only indication in the record before Judge Clark E. Johnson, the presiding judge at appellant's trial, that appellant sought a continuance in an attempt to procure Mike Horton as a defense witness.
Appellant was sentenced on December 19, 1980. That same day appellant's motion for new trial, which alleged among other things that he should have been given a continuance to procure the witness, was denied. Appellant then gave notice of appeal and was provided with a free transcript and counsel was appointed. The trial transcript was filed in this court on February 10, 1981.
On March 3, 1981, appellant's counsel filed the following motion under Rule 10(f), Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure:
By order of the trial court, a hearing was set on this motion for March 23, 1981; the court reporter was directed to transcribe testimony at the hearing and to "correct the record herein to be added to the reporter's transcript for submission to the Appellate Court."
At the March 23 hearing Judge William D. Jetton made it clear at the outset that most of the communication to the court concerning the absent witness "occurred outside of the courtroom, in conversation":
James Dee Walker, appellant's trial counsel, was called as appellant's first witness. Mr. Walker testified that he answered docket call on Monday, October 27, 1980, and that he told the trial court at that time that he was not ready to try appellant's case without witness Mike Horton, that Horton had been subpoenaed but was not present. "I believe the Court at some point that day issued a bench warrant or writ of attachment for that witness to a residence in Guntersville." Mr. Walker stated that later that day he found out that Horton was in custody at the youth facility at Mt. Meigs. Mr. Walker was emphatic that "on a number of occasions that day and the next morning, there were conversations at the bench, and I made known to the District Attorney and to the Court that I was not prepared to proceed without the witness." Mr. Walker admitted that a court reporter was not present on any of those occasions. Mr. Walker stated that on Monday the trial court "did not feel" that Horton's absence was ground for a continuance.
On cross-examination Mr. Walker testified that if he announced "ready" to the Monday docket call he later told the trial court he was not ready to proceed without Horton. Judge Jetton then interjected the following:
Mr. Walker testified that he had not talked to Horton at the time he made his requests to the trial judge for a continuance.
Deputy Sheriff Lacy Galloway of Marshall County testified that a writ of attachment was issued for Horton, but that he reported to the Judge "we could not find the boy."
District Attorney John W. Starnes of Marshall County testified that Sheriff Rex Smalley called him late Tuesday afternoon, October 28, 1980, and told him Horton had been "at the juvenile detention facility somewhere south of Montgomery, and there was no possible way he knew of at that point in time to go down to Montgomery unless he kept somebody up all night to go down there." Mr. Starnes stated that Mr. Walker had "announced ready on Monday morning without any reservation."
Judge Jetton entered the March 23 testimony as part of the record. The district attorney then objected:
Judge Jetton sustained the objection stating that "it is the burden of the attorney to make sure that it gets on the record." However, the court ultimately made the March 23 testimony part of the record for purposes of appeal.
In summary, we again point out that Judge Clark E. Johnson, Jr., presided over appellant's ...
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