Weaver v. State, CR

• Decision Date: 01 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. CR,CR
• Citation: Weaver v. State, 305 Ark. 180, 806 S.W.2d 615 (Ark. 1991)
• Parties: James Ross WEAVER, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 90-203.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 615

806 S.W.2d 615

305 Ark. 180

James Ross WEAVER, Jr., Appellant, v.STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 90-203.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

April 1, 1991.

Bill Luppen, Little Rock, for appellant.

Sandy Moll, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

BROWN, Justice.

This is an appeal by appellantJames Ross Weaver, Jr. from a conviction for capital murder and a sentence of life without parole in connection with the death of John Rogers.In December 1989the appellant, who is age 19, and Rogers and a third party, Alan Hubbard, were roommates in a house in Little Rock.Ill will developed among the three, apparently relating to money and Rogers' failure to pay rent for several months.On the evening of December 13, 1989, the appellant and Hubbard went to the Caton residence to borrow an instrument which, according to the testimony of Al Caton, Sr., was for the purpose of "doing some collecting."Caton, Sr. says the appellant made that statement.A baseball bat was first requested, but Caton, Sr. refused.It is not clear whether the appellant or Hubbard made the request, but the appellant was present.Either Hubbard or the appellant then took a tire knocker owned by the Catons.

The appellant and Hubbard returned home that same night at about nine or ten o'clock and found Rogers socializing with a few friends.What happened after that is not altogether clear but the salient points which are not disputed are that Hubbard, during the early morning hours of December 14, 1989, beat Rogers to death with the tire knocker, while Rogers was asleep on the couch.Hubbard then dragged the body to his car and placed the body in his trunk.What is in dispute is the extent of the appellant's help.The appellant says he did not see the beating but only heard it and saw Hubbard holding the instrument; Hubbard says the appellant was on the couch when it happened.The appellant says he did not assist Hubbard in dragging or carrying the body to Hubbard's car.Hubbard disputes this.

The appellant did drive with Hubbard to Cabot to dispose of the body and then helped Hubbard clean the house of bloodstains.He also took the tire knocker back to the Catons.The two men then moved out of the house and into an apartment, also in Little Rock.

On December 20, 1989, at approximately 11:30 p.m. two homicide detectives, Stafford and Oberle, and another police car arrived at the new apartment of the appellant and Hubbard and said they were investigating a missing person's report on Rogers.The detectives had been alerted to Rogers' absence by his girlfriend, who had contacted the Little Rock Police Department four or five days earlier.The detectives had also received a call from Rogers' employer who had seen blood on the front porch and front yard of the house and then returned the next day to find that the blood was no longer there.The detectives had investigated the premises earlier on the evening of December 20 before accosting the two men at their new apartment and found articles in the front yard (wood chips and a doormat) with blood on them.

Prior to the visit, the detectives had done a warrant check on both men and found an outstanding traffic warrant, a misdemeanor, on the appellant.At the apartment the detectives told the men that they needed to come to the police station to discuss the missing Rogers, and the men agreed.The appellant was further told that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest on a traffic charge.The appellant rode with the detectives because of the warrant, and Hubbard rode in his own car.Detective Stafford testified that the men "volunteered" to go to the station, but the detectives made sure the men went to the station separately so they could not develop "a story."Both detectives admitted that the appellant was not free to leave, had he decided not to go to the station voluntarily.Hence, neither detective told the appellant that he was free to go.

On the way to the police station, the appellant told the detectives "the whole story."There is a conflict in testimony, however, as to when the appellant received his Miranda warnings.The appellant does not recall receiving them at all in the squad car or ever being told he was a suspect for murder.Detective Oberle first testified that Detective Stafford advised the appellant of his rights "while we were in the car" and then testified, "Stafford told him his rights before we started talking to him about it orally."Oberle further said the appellant was advised of his rights even though they"really didn't know what crime had been committed."He admitted that it was not standard procedure to give Miranda warnings for a traffic violation.Detective Stafford's testimony is less precise:

Counsel: When you got him in the car, you said you read him his Miranda Rights.

Detective: I didn't immediately.I'd say about 65th and somewhere on 65th Street, between Butler Road and Geyer Springs.

Counsel: What crime did you say that he was--had been charged with?

Detective: Well, I noticed his demeanor about him.He was very nervous.I did ask him when was the last time he saw John.His statement, I forget, didn't coincide with what I already knew, and then about that time, I felt like there was foul play.Yes, and at that time I did advise him of his rights.

Counsel: Did he first deny knowing anything about this?

Detective: He said--He made a statement first that him and somebody got into a fight on Young Road that evening.He didn't know who was involved in the fight, but they took John with them.

Counsel: Did you tell him, then, that you really knew what had happened?

Detective: I said I felt like I know better than that.Because I said there was other evidence at the house that disproves what you're saying.And I can't remember all the exact words, but between the time we got on the interstate and the time we got down to the police station, I mean, we knew the whole story.

Counsel: He then made a statement?

Detective: Yes, sir.

Counsel: In the car?

Detective: Yes, sir.

When he advised the appellant of his Miranda rights in the car, Detective Stafford said he considered him under arrest from that point forward.

At the station shortly after midnight, the detectives gave the appellant his Miranda rights and the appellant said he understood his rights and signed a waiver form.He then made a twenty minute taped statement.The statement at the station occurred within an hour of the initial visit to the appellant's apartment.Hubbard gave a statement to the detectives about thirty minutes later.Then the appellant, Hubbard, and several additional detectives traveled to Cabot and retrieved Rogers' body.

The appellant was charged with capital murder on January 5, 1990, and was tried two months later on March 6, 1990.Prior to trial the appellant filed a motion to suppress his taped statement on grounds that it was tainted by a pretextual arrest and an earlier confession where Miranda was violated.The motion was denied.He also sought a continuance the day before the trial due to the unavailability of Hubbard, a prospective witness, who was undergoing a psychiatric evaluation at the State Hospital.That motion also was denied.

At trial, the prosecutor said in his opening remarks to the jury that they would hear the statement given by the appellant.The defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's remark.Defense counsel then described the contents of the appellant's confession in his opening statement.The prosecutor, however, later informed the court that he did not intend to introduce the appellant's statement at trial, and he did not do so.The only reference to the appellant's statement during the state's case was Detective Stafford's testimony that the appellant had directed him to where the body was.Defense counsel, again, did not object to this testimony.

Defense counsel did agree with the prosecutor to make Hubbard's statement to the police a joint exhibit.That gave Hubbard's version of the events and contradicted the appellant on whether he was in the room when Hubbard bludgeoned Rogers to death and whether he helped carry out the body.

The appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole.On April 5, 1990, he filed a motion for a new trial arguing 1) insufficiency of the evidence and 2) the unconstitutionality of the capital murder statute.That motion was denied on June 12, 1990.

The appellant makes several arguments for reversal.We find that none of them has merit, and we affirm the conviction.

Pretextual Arrest

The appellant first argues that the arrest for a traffic violation was pretextual and effected by the detectives only as a sham to interrogate him.There is no question in this case that the warrant was valid.There is dispute, however, over whether the appellant was arrested on that warrant on the evening of December 20.Regardless of whether he was or not, in light of what the detectives knew before contacting the appellant, they could readily have formed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a felony under A.R.Cr.P. Rules 2.1 and 3.1.Rogers was missing.Rogers' employer had seen blood on the appellant's front porch and yard which was gone the next day.The detectives themselves had found blood on the premises.The appellant and Hubbard had changed residences, shortly after Rogers' absence.The two men were definitely suspects in the eyes of the detectives.

Under these circumstances and based on what the detectives knew, they had grounds to detain the appellant without arrest for a reasonable time under Rule 3.1 as part of their investigation into foul play.Accordingly, the detectives' failure to make it clear that the appellant did not have to go to the station for questioning and was free to go at any time is largely irrelevant.

Since the traffic warrant, which might have been pretextual under different circumstances, was not necessary...