Weaver v. State, 526
| Decision Date | 12 December 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 526,526 |
| Citation | 224 A.2d 684,244 Md. 640 |
| Parties | Maybelle WEAVER v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Archie D. Williams, Baltimore, for appellant.
John C. Cooper, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Thomas B. Finan, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Moylan, Jr. and R. Samuel Jett, Jr., State's Atty. and Asst. State's Atty., respectively, for Baltimore City, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.
Before HAMMOND, C. J., and HORNEY, MARBURY, BARNES and McWILLIAMS, JJ.
The question posed by this appeal is whether or not the Municipal Court of Baltimore City, absent the signing of a formal order of contempt and the giving of reasonable time to make a defense, had jurisdiction to punish for a contempt arising out of the failure of a party defendant to appear at the postponed hearing of a case in obedience to an oral command given by the court at the time of postponement.
In this proceeding, the plaintiff-appellee is the State of Maryland and the defendant-appellant is Maybelle Weaver. The defendant and her mother were charged with separate violations of the housing regulations on or about the same time. When the defendant, who had not been summoned, appeared in court on July 15, 1965 to represent her invalid mother, who had been summoned, the defendant sought to have the case against her heard with that of her mother. Apparently the case against the mother was heard but, because the case against the defendant was not on the calendar for that day, it was postponed until August 19, 1965 and the defendant was told to be present in court on that date. The defendant, however, who had a prior engagement on the same day that she wanted to keep, consulted an attorney and, on his advice, left the city and failed to appear in the municipal court as scheduled. When the defendant finally appeared in court on August 31, 1965 she was served with the summons theretofore issued on the housing charge against her and, according to the State, was also orally cited for contempt, for which she was tried forthwith and fined $25 and costs. On appeal to the Criminal Court of Baltimore, the judgment of the municipal court was affirmed and the appeal to this Court followed.
The power of the Municipal Court to punish for contempt is regulated by § 121 of Article 26 of the Code (1965 Cum.Sup.) providing that-
Section 4 of Article 26 provides in pertinent part that:
'The power of the several courts of this State to issue attachments and inflict summary punishments for contempt of courts shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the following: * * *; (3) the disobedience or resistance by any officer of the said courts party, juror, witness or any other person or persons to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command of the said courts; * * *.'
Procedurally, before it was repealed following the adoption of Subtitle P (Contempt) of the Maryland Rules of Procedure, § 5 of Article 26 provided in substance that the courts should sign a formal order and state therein the contempt alleged to have been committed and that the record in such cases should consist of the order of contempt, the affidavits filed by the party adjudged in contempt, the affidavits filed by the State's Attorney in support of the action of the court and such testimony as was offered by the parties.
Maryland Rule P3 b provides in part that '(w)here a direct contempt is committed, the court shall sign a written order to that effect,' but the rules of procedure, except by necessary implication in some cases, 1 do not apply to the Municipal Court of Baltimore City.
On appeal to this Court, the appellant, in addition to claiming that the municipal court was without jurisdiction to give her a valid command to appear because she had not then been summoned in the housing violation case, also contends that the court lacked jurisdiction to punish her because the alleged contempt was not committed in the presence of the court or so near to it as to interrupt its proceedings. On the other hand, the State, besides claiming that the appellant, having voluntarily appeared and sought an immediate hearing of her case along with that of her mother, had thereby waived service of process and consented to the jurisdiction of the court, contends that the court is a constitutional court with inherent power to punish for contempt.
Essentially, the only contentions requiring a decision in this case are (i) whether or not the failure of the appellant to obey the oral order or command of the municipal court to attend the postponed hearing constituted a direct contempt under the provisions of subsection (3) of § 4 of Article 26 and (ii) whether or not the court should have signed a formal order stating the reasons for the citation of contempt and have afforded the defendant reasonable time to make a defense.
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Giant of Maryland, Inc. v. State's Attorney for Prince George's County
...to comply with the judicial command was based on the advice of counsel is generally held to be no justification,' Weaver v. State, 244 Md. 640, 644, 224 A.2d 684, 687 (1966); Tyler v. Baltimore County, 256 Md. 64, 67, 259 A.2d 307, 309 (1969), and although advice given by a State's Attorney......
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Thomas v. State
...(2) that this order be "signed by the judge and entered of record." It has repeatedly been regarded as mandatory. See Weaver v. State, 244 Md. 640, 224 A.2d 684 (1966); Jones v. State, 61 Md.App. 94, 102, 484 A.2d 1050 (1984); A.V. Laurins & Co. v. Prince George's County, 46 Md.App. 548, 42......
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Pearson v. State
...acts in Article 26, § 4 is not limiting on the courts, and also is not all-inclusive as a statement of the common law; Weaver v. State, 244 Md. 640 (224 A.2d 684) (1966). Moreover, it would be unconstitutional for the legislature to attempt to strip the courts of their inherent contempt pow......
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Murphy v. State
...therefore, punishable summarily under Md. Rule P3. Kandel v. State, supra, 252 Md. at 672, 250 A.2d at 855; see Weaver v. State, 244 Md. 640, 644, 224 A.2d 684, 687 (1966). In summary, we conclude that Judge Edmondson had sufficient personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances surround......