Weaver v. Stone

• Decision Date: 25 June 1968
• Docket Number: No. 1081,1081
• Citation: 212 So.2d 80
• Parties: Marilyn I. WEAVER and Joseph N. Weaver, Appellants, v. Melvin T. STONE, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 80

212 So.2d 80

Marilyn I. WEAVER and Joseph N. Weaver, Appellants, v.Melvin T. STONE, Appellee.

No. 1081.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 25, 1968.

Rehearing Denied July 18, 1968.

Joseph D. Farish, Jr., of Farish & Farish, West Palm Beach, for appellants.

John R. Beranek of Jones, Adams, Paine & Foster, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

McCAIN, Judge.

Plaintiffs, Marilyn J. Weaver and Joseph N. Weaver, appeal a summary final judgment in favor of defendant, Melvin T. Stone.We affirm.

Plaintiffs were injured in a collision with an automobile driven by defendant but owned by defendant's employer.Plaintiffs filed suit against the employer and recovered a judgment grounded on the employer's vicarious liability for the acts of the defendant.It is not disputed that the defendant and his employer were jointly and severally liable for damage caused by the defendant's negligence and that plaintiffs could sue either or both of them.SeeFincher Motor Sales, Inc. v. Lakin, Fla.App.1963, 156 So.2d 672.Plaintiffs chose to sue the employer and were successful.Subsequently they instituted the present action against the defendant driver.After answer defendant moved for summary judgment and in support attached a certified copy of the judgment entered in the prior action.The judgment was noted as satisfied by the clerk.Upon this basis the trial court granted defendant's motion.

F.S.1965, section 55.62, F.S.A. (now F.S.1967, section 55.141, F.S.A.), provides in part as follows:

'(1) All judgments and decrees for the payment of money * * * may be satisfied * * * by payment * * * into the registry of the court where rendered.

'* * *

'(3) Full payment of judgments and decrees as in the preceding subsections of this section provided shall constitute full payment and satisfaction thereof * * *.'

Plaintiffs refused a tender of money in satisfaction of the judgment by defendant's employer, who then paid the money into the registry of the court pursuant to the above statute.The clear meaning of F.S.1965, section 55.62, F.S.A., is that such payment into court satisfies the judgment.There is no requirement that the plaintiff consent to the satisfaction.

Satisfaction of a judgment against one of several persons jointly and severally liable discharges the liability of the others.¹Leo Jay Rosen Associates, Inc. v. Schultz, Fla.App.1963, 148 So.2d 293;Restatement, Judgments, § 95.This rule obtains even though a judgment has not yet been rendered against the other tortfeasors.²Goines v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 1958, 6 A.D.2d 531, 179 N.Y.S.2d 960;Restatement, Judgments, § 95, comment a. Accordingly, satisfaction of plaintiff's judgment against defendant's employer in the manner permitted by F.S.1965, section 55.62, F.S.A. (now F.S.1967, section 55.141, F.S.A.), discharged defendant from any liability.³

Plaintiffs, however, attempt to question the existence of a valid satisfaction of their prior judgment.This challenge, raised, incidentally, for the first time on appeal, cannot be made in this action.The clerk entered a certificate of satisfaction on the final judgment.If the entry of satisfaction was for any reason improper plaintiffs should have sought amendment or vacation.Under our procedure the proper method to seek such relief is that provided by F.R.C.P. 1.540, 31 F.S.A. and not a collateral attack in a separate action.For procedures adopted in other jurisdictions, see annotation 9 A.L.R.2d 553.

In the case before usdefendant presented evidence of satisfaction of a prior judgment which evidence was valid on its face and discharged defendant from further obligation to plaintiffs.The trial court was correct in entering summary judgment and the judgment appealed is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.

NELSON, JAMES T., Associate Judge, concurs.

CROSS, J., dissents with opinion.

CROSS, Judge (dissenting).

I must of necessity respectfully dissent.I am of the opinion that F.S.1965, Section 55.62, F.S.A. (now F.S.1967, Section 55.141, F.S.A.), as construed in the majority opinion will produce an unreasonable consequence.

The majority opinion establishes that when voluntary payment of a judgment is made into the registry of the court by a tortfeasor against whom a judgment is rendered, such payment, although not accepted by the judgment creditor, is to be considered a satisfaction of the judgment and a bar to an action against another tortfeasor who may be liable for the same tort.I cannot establish such a principle by a proper interpretation of the statute under consideration.

In the interpretation of a statute it will be presumed that the legislature intended every part thereof for a purpose, Alexander v. Booth, Fla.1952, 56 So.2d 716, and that it had some purpose in introducing the particular language used in an enactment.Lee v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 1941, 148 Fla. 612, 4 So.2d 868.The maxim 'Ut res magis valeat quam pereat' requires that not merely the statute should be given effect as a whole, but that effect should be given to Each of its provisions.

The statute applicable here is as follows:

'Satisfaction of judgments and decrees; duties of clerk and judge.--

'(1) All judgments and decrees for the payment of money rendered in the courts of this state and which have become final, may be satisfied at any time prior to the actual levy of execution issued thereon by payment of the full amount of such judgment or decree, with interest thereon, plus the costs of the issuance, if any, of execution thereon into the registry of the court where rendered.

'(2) Upon such payment, the clerk, or the judge if there be no clerk, shall issue his receipt therefor and shall enter notation thereof upon the margin of the record of such judgment or decree and Shall formally notify the owner of record of such judgment or decree, if such person and his address are known to the clerk or judge receiving such payment, and, Upon request therefor, shall pay over to the person entitled, or to his order, the full amount of the payment so received, less his fees for issuing execution on such judgment or decree, if any has been issued, and less his fees for receiving into and paying out of the registry of the court such payment, together with the fees of the clerk for receiving into and paying such money out of the registry of the court.

'(3) Full payment of judgments and decrees as in the preceding Subsections of this section provided shall constitute full payment and satisfaction thereof and any lien created by such judgment or decree shall thereupon be satisfied and discharged.'(Emphasis added.)

Even a cursory reading of the statute under consideration vividly illustrates that the intent of the legislature in promulgating the statute was to create a method whereby a judgment debtor could stop levy of execution on the property which he possessed which was subject to the said levy and not to require a person entitled to a judgment to forcibly accept monies paid into court as satisfaction of that judgment.By reading the statute and interpreting it in the manner in which the intent of the legislature is best shown, it can be seen that there is no satisfaction of a judgment by merely paying monies into the registry of the court; it is evident from the statute that there must be an acceptance by the judgment creditor of the monies received from the registry of the court before an actual satisfaction of judgment occurs.

'* * * shall formally notify the owner of record of such judgment or decree * * * upon request therefor shall pay over to the person entitled, or to his order, * * *.'

This can be noted even further by reading subsection (3) whereby it states that 'full payment of judgment and decrees as in the preceding Subsections of this section provided shall constitute full payment and satisfaction thereof'.Therefore, it can be readily observed by paragraph (3) of this statute that paragraph (2) of the statute is as necessary an element as paragraph (1).

My interpretation of this statute is not without support.See49 C.J.S.Judgments§ 553, and cases cited thereunder;Fitzgerald v. Campbell, 131 Va. 486, 109 S.E. 308, 27 A.L.R. 799, 800;Restatement of the Law of Judgments, § 95, comment (d).

The majority of courts hold that the voluntary payment into the registry of the court by a tortfeasor against whom a judgment is rendered of the amount thereof the costs does not bar an action against other tortfeasors where such payment is not accepted by the judgment owner.SeePower v. Baker, C.C.Minn.1886, 27 F. 396.In the Power case there was a collision between two vessels owned respectively by the complainant and respondent, and the respondent filed a libel against the complainant in admiralty.A decree was obtained and an appeal entered.Prior to the trial of the admiralty suit, a suit was brought on an action of trespass in the state courts against the owners of the shipyard at which both vessels were lying at the time of the collision.In that suit a judgment was obtained by the respondent and the amount of the judgment paid into the registry of the court and satisfaction entered of record by the clerk.However, the respondents declined to accept and receive the amount in question and thereupon the complainants filed a bill in equity against them praying that the decree in admiralty be discharged and cancelled by reason of the payment into the state court of the judgment.The court held that where separate actions are brought for a joint trespass, the plaintiff can recover against one or all, and if separate judgments are obtained, he may...