Webb v. Braswell, No. 2004-CA-01438-SCT.
| Decision Date | 25 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2004-IA-01566-SCT.,No. 2004-CA-01438-SCT. |
| Parties | Robert W. WEBB, Jr. and Senora B. Webb v. Chris BRASWELL, Jackson and Braswell, P.A. and First National Bank of Rosedale. Robert W. Webb, Jr. and Senora B. Webb, v. First National Bank of Rosedale. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Talbot O. McCain, Greenwood, attorney for appellants.
S. David Norquist, Gerald H. Jacks, Kathy R. Clark, attorneys for appellees.
P. Scott Phillips L. Carl Hagwood, attorneys for appellee.
Before SMITH, C.J., CARLSON and DICKINSON, JJ.
¶ 1. This consolidated appeal arises from orders entered by the Circuit Court for the Second Judicial District of Bolivar County granting summary judgment in favor of two defendants, Chris Braswell and his accounting firm, Jackson and Braswell, P.A. (the Braswell defendants), and granting partial summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendant, First National Bank of Rosedale. First National had filed a combined motion for partial summary judgment and to exclude expert testimony, which the trial court granted in toto. The trial court also denied an earlier motion to amend pleadings filed by the plaintiffs, Robert and Senora Webb. The plaintiffs' motion to amend their pleadings was denied due to untimeliness inasmuch as the trial judge concluded that the granting of the motion would have resulted in undue delay, causing prejudice to the defendants. The trial judge entered final judgment as to the Braswell defendants, resulting in a direct appeal by the Webbs. As to the trial court's grant of a partial summary judgment in favor of First National, the Webbs petitioned this Court for an interlocutory appeal, which we granted. The Braswell defendants also filed a cross appeal from an order of the trial court denying their previously filed motion to dismiss. We have consolidated these appeals.
¶ 2. Robert and Senora Webb had farmed 1,600 acres of farmland in the Greenwood area for several years prior to the events leading to this litigation. During these years of farming, the Webbs had secured crop production loans by hiring accountant Chris Braswell of the Cleveland Certified Public Accounting firm of Jackson and Braswell, P.A. Braswell was able to secure loans from Valley Bank in Greenwood on behalf of the Webbs. In the early spring of 1997, Braswell informed the Webbs that Valley Bank would not make a loan to them that year to fund their farming operation; however, Braswell felt he could obtain that year's loan from First National Bank of Rosedale. First National required numerous conditions to be met prior to approving the loan, such as a requirement that the Webbs file for bankruptcy. In May of 1997, Braswell informed the Webbs that First National would not provide them the loan. The Webbs filed this lawsuit against both First National Bank of Rosedale and the Braswell defendants on October 10, 1998, claiming various causes of action, including breach of contract and malpractice. The Webbs' position was that the actions of First National Bank and Braswell prevented them from securing a production loan in time to harvest a profitable crop, causing them large financial losses, and practically removing them from the farming industry altogether.
¶ 3. In 2000, the Braswell defendants filed a motion "to enforce agreement of plaintiffs to dismiss all claims against them with prejudice," based on an alleged agreement between the lawyers to do so. The trial judge denied this motion because he was unable to determine if such an agreement actually existed. This is the basis for the Braswell defendants' cross-appeal.
¶ 4. After considerable discovery, the trial judge, on October 30, 2002, entered an order setting the trial of this case for December 15, 2003; however, on the day the trial was to commence, the trial court instead entered another order setting various deadlines and assigning a primary trial date of August 23, 2004, with an alternative trial date of December 13, 2004.1
¶ 5. On April 12, 2004, the Webbs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint, adding new claims against both First National and the Braswell defendants, and seeking damages for future lost profits in unplanted crops. Some of these claims included breach of implied contracts, breach of duty of good faith, fraud, estoppel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and claims for compensatory and punitive damages. Many of these claims were based on information the Webbs asserted they learned for the first time through discovery, thus they argued it was not possible for those claims to be included in the original complaint, filed before discovery was commenced. In their response, the Braswell defendants argued that the Webbs had not specifically pleaded fraud as required in Mississippi, and, because discovery deadlines had passed and trial preparation had been ongoing for years, that an amended complaint would cause the Braswell defendants to suffer substantial hardship.
¶ 6. First National filed a combined motion to exclude the new expert testimony and for a partial summary judgment in late April, 2004. The Braswell defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the same day. On June 21, 2004, the trial court conducted a hearing on these motions and at the conclusion of the hearing, took these motions under advisement for subsequent ruling. Shortly thereafter, the trial court entered an order granting First National's combined motion to exclude expert testimony and for a partial summary judgment. The trial court also entered an order denying the Webbs' motion for leave to amend their pleadings because of untimeliness and the resulting undue delay and prejudice to the defendants. Additionally, the trial judge granted the Braswell defendants' motion for summary judgment. As to the Braswell defendants, the trial judge entered a final judgment pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
¶ 7. As to the order granting First National's motion for partial summary judgment, and the order denying their motion for leave to amend their complaint, the Webbs requested a certification from the trial court for interlocutory appeal and a stay of the proceedings, pending the outcome of that interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted on July 26, 2004.2 The Webbs also appealed the final judgment as to the Braswell defendants on their motion for summary judgment. The Braswell defendants meanwhile filed a cross-appeal from the denial of their earlier motion to dismiss filed in 2000. We have consolidated these appeals.
¶ 8. This Court has outlined the standard of review for motions for leave to amend a complaint:
Motions for leave to amend complaint are left to the sound discretion of [the] trial court; the Supreme Court reviews such determinations under an abuse of discretion standard; and, unless convinced that [the] trial judge abused [his/ her] discretion, the Supreme Court is without authority to reverse. Church v. Massey, 697 So.2d 407, 413 (Miss.1997). Grant or denial of [a] motion for leave to amend is within [the] sound discretion of [the] trial court. MBF Corp. v. Century Bus. Communications, Inc., 663 So.2d 595, 600 (Miss.1995); Frank v. Dore, 635 So.2d 1369, 1375 (Miss.1994). Amendments to the pleadings are properly addressed to the discretion of the lower court. Red Enters., Inc. v. Peashooter, Inc., 455 So.2d 793, 796 (Miss.1984); McDonald v. Holmes, 595 So.2d 434, 436 (Miss.1992). Where the plaintiff filed his motion for amendment of declaration setting out its exact terms, and such terms were incorporated into an order which quoted [the] text of [the] motion and which was filed in [the] cause and entered upon [the] minutes of [the] court, [the] amendment was sufficient, as against [the] defendant's contention that [the] original declaration should have been manually amended by interlineation or otherwise. International Order v. Barnes, 204 Miss. 333, 341, 37 So.2d 487 (1948) (overruled on other grounds by Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So.2d 142 (1951)). While the trial court has discretion to allow an amendment and should do so freely under the proper circumstances, an amendment should not occur when to do so would prejudice [the] defendant. Hester v. Bandy, 627 So.2d 833, 839 (Miss.1993).
Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 730 So.2d 574, 579 (Miss.1998). Thus, in today's case, we may reverse the trial court's denial of the Webbs' motion to amend their pleadings, only upon finding abuse of discretion by the trial court. Otherwise, the trial court's denial of this motion to amend must remain undisturbed.
¶ 9. The Webbs argue that because Miss. R. Civ. P. 15(a) requires "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires," the trial court should have granted their motion. Miss. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The Webbs also point out that this Court has found, in part through the comment to the rule, that amended pleadings have been liberally permitted throughout Mississippi's legal history. See Moeller v. Am. Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co., 812 So.2d 953, 962 (Miss.2002); Beverly v. Powers, 666 So.2d 806, 809 (Miss.1995); Rector v. Miss. State Highway Comm'n, 623 So.2d 975, 978 (Miss.1993). However, as the Webbs concede, the rule is not absolute.
Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires"; this mandate is to be heeded. . . if the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,...
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