Webb v. Califano

• Decision Date: 19 April 1979
• Docket Number: Civ. No. S-77-335,S-75-752.
• Citation: 468 F. Supp. 825
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: Arzelia M. WEBB, Plaintiff, v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., Defendant. Andrew GROZA, Plaintiff, v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., Defendant.

468 F. Supp. 825

Arzelia M. WEBB, Plaintiff, v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., Defendant.

Andrew GROZA, Plaintiff, v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., Defendant.

Civ. Nos. S-77-335, S-75-752.

United States District Court, E. D. California.

April 19, 1979.

Danny D. Hullinger, Sacramento, Cal., for plaintiff in Webb.

Douglas H. Drake, Weber & Drake, Sacramento, Cal., for plaintiff in Groza.

Herman Sillas, U.S. Atty., Malcolm Stuart Segal, Chief Asst. U.S. Atty., Sacramento, Cal., for defendant in both actions.

OPINION

MacBRIDE, District Judge.

These two actions, although not consolidated, present the identical legal issue for decision, namely, what effect is to be given to objections to proposed findings and recommendations made by a United States Magistrate when the objections are not filed within the 10 day period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). That section, part of the Federal Magistrates Act, provides for de novo review of the points to which objection is made when the objections are filed within a 10 day period. Neither the section nor the Act explicitly defines the standard of review applicable when no objections are filed or when objections are untimely. These two actions both come before the court on objections to the proposed findings and recommendations filed by the magistrate, and, in each instance, the objections were not timely filed. Since the same question is presented in both cases, it is appropriate to resolve the matter in a single decision.

The action denominated Webb v. Califano, Civ. S-77-335, was filed June 20, 1977, seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare denying plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Defendant filed its answer and a copy of the administrative transcript in due course, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and/or for remand. These motions were referred to Magistrate Esther Mix pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 631 et seq. and Local Rule 305(1)(2).¹ On August 1, 1978, Magistrate Mix filed Proposed Findings and Recommendations in the case; copies of this document were served on the parties on August 4, 1978. On August 18, 1978, plaintiff filed objections to the Proposed Findings and Recommendations. Even if the August 4 starting date is extended by an additional three days as provided under FRCP 6(e),² the objections were filed after the expiration of the 10 day period. Defendant responded to those objections without making any comment on the untimeliness of the filing.

The second of these cases, Groza v. Califano, Civ. S-75-752, was filed on November 18, 1975, seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary denying his claim for disability insurance benefits under the Act. After various delays incident to obtaining a full record of all administrative proceedings, motions to dismiss and/or for summary judgment were filed and referred to Magistrate Mix. On June 22, 1978, she filed Proposed Findings and Recommendations in the case; copies of the document were served on the parties the same day. On July 7, 1978, the defendant filed objections to the Proposed Findings and Recommendations. On July 13, 1978, counsel for defendant wrote a letter to the Clerk of the Court explaining that the late filing had been caused by a combination of a delay in the mails and illness. On September 5, 1978, plaintiff filed opposition to the objections, noting that the objections were untimely filed. Plaintiff urged: "Defendant's objections are untimely, indicative of lack of meritorious content, and for this reason alone, the Magistrate's order should be affirmed." As was true in Webb, the objections were filed after the expiration of the 10 day period provided in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), even if an additional three days are added under FRCP 6(e).

In both Webb and Groza, this court sua sponte required the parties to file briefing on the effect of the late filing of the objections and the appropriate standard of review, de novo or other standard, to be applied. That briefing has been filed, and the matter is now before the court for decision.

The governing law in this instance is section 636(b)(1) of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631 et seq. The section is not a model of clarity; it provides in full:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary—

(A) a judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this paragraph

(A) where it has been shown that the magistrate's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph

(A), of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement.

(C) the magistrate shall file his proposed findings and recommendations under subparagraph (B) with the court and a copy shall forthwith be mailed to all parties.

Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate. A judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions.

Under this section, certain motions and other pretrial matters that have been commonly denominated as "nondispositive" may be referred to the magistrate who is authorized to "hear and determine" those matters. The magistrate's determination is subject to review, but the district court's reconsideration is appropriate in those instances in which "it has been shown that the magistrate's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Thus, determinations made by the magistrate under subsection (A), the nondispositive determinations, are self-operative.

In contrast to the subsection (A) decisions, the magistrate is limited to making proposed findings and recommendations when presented with motions under subsection (B), the "dispositive" motions. Motions governed by subsection (B) include motions for dismissal and for summary judgment, that is, motions whose resolution is likely to be dispositive of the case. The motions referred to the magistrate in the instant actions are dispositive motions under subsection (B). The magistrate's action under this subsection is not self-operative. Instead, the magistrate submits proposed findings and recommendations "for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any of the dispositive motions excepted in subparagraph (A)." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Since the actual disposition of the matter may be effected only by the judge, there must necessarily be some measure of review by the court over the proposed findings and recommendations of the magistrate whether or not objections to the magistrate's proposed disposition are filed.

Although the Federal Magistrates Act and the cases construing it offer no guidance as to the standard of review to be applied when objections to dispositive motions are not timely filed, the Act and the cases do set forth the nature of the court's obligation in two circumstances. The first of these arises when the objections are timely filed, and the Act sets forth the standard of review. The second situation arises when no objections are filed; the cases set forth the minimum standard.

On the one hand, the section provides that, when objections are filed within the 10 day period, "a judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (emphasis added). Under these circumstances, the court is under a mandatory obligation to make a de novo review, given the statute's use of the term "shall." On the other hand, even when no objections at all are filed, the court remains under a duty to review the magistrate's proposals because those proposals are not self-operative. The nature of that review will vary with the circumstances, and the court has the discretion to determine the extent to which it will review the matter. At least a minimal review is necessary because only a court order can put the proposals into effect.

Most of the cases that have discussed the necessity for district court review have arisen when dissatisfied parties have sought to appeal directly from the magistrate's action to the circuit courts. The circuit courts have been unanimous that they lack jurisdiction over such appeals in the absence of an intervening review by the district court. Thus, in Small v. Olympic Prefabricators, Inc., 588 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1978), the court declared "the district court must first review the proceedings of a civil trial conducted before the magistrate before it can enter final judgment." Id. at 292, citing Kendall v. Davis, 569 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1978) (same rule stated); accord, Horton v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403 (1st Cir. 1979); Cason v. Owen, 578 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1978). In...