Webb v. County of Trinity

Decision Date10 August 2010
Docket NumberNo. CIV. S-10-0012 LKK/CMK,CIV. S-10-0012 LKK/CMK
Citation734 F.Supp.2d 1018
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
PartiesBarbara WEBB, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF TRINITY, Linda Wright, Laurie Sumner, Elizabeth Hamilton, and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

Eric Alan Omstead, Law Office of Eric Omstead, Redding, CA, for Plaintiff.

Carolee G. Kilduff, John A. Whitesides, Angelo, Kilday & Kilduff, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff Barbara Webb was formerly employed by the County of Trinity. She alleges that after various misdeeds by her supervisor and other county employees she was wrongfully demoted and then terminated. After proceedings before the California State Personnel Board, the County was ordered to reinstate plaintiff, but the County has refused to comply with this order.

One would expect, therefore, that this would be an easy case. Belying this apparent simplicity, plaintiff's operative complaint enumerates nine claims, challenging the initial actions by the County and individual defendants in addition to defendants' violation of the Personnel Board order. Defendants move to dismiss all claims. In opposing the motion, plaintiff references only four of these claims. The court interprets this as stating non-opposition to dismissal of the others. Of the four disputed claims, one is characterized as a substantive due process claim, but invokes numerous legal theories at most tangentially related to due process. The second disputed claim argues that the refusal to rehire plaintiff deprived her of procedural due process. Plaintiff's third claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and alleges that defendants violated plaintiff's equal protection rights by discriminating against Christians. Finally, the fourth disputed claim is for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The court resolves the motion to dismiss on the papers and after oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted except as to plaintiff's allegations that the county retaliated against her for speech protected by the First Amendment.

I. Background

Before discussing the facts, the court must address the manner of their presentation. The operative Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") presents a threadbare recitation of the facts, alleging the identities of the parties. Copies of three previously-filed government tort claims, presumably filed pursuant to Cal. Gov.Code § 905, are attached to the complaint, and the complaint explicitly incorporates the allegations contained therein. SAC ¶ 11. Although these present a long litany of potential misdeeds, plaintiff now contends that neither the complaint nor the tort claim forms were intended to present a full picture of the facts. Pl.'s Opp'n at 3. While plaintiff's opposition purports to provide various additional facts, these facts are in general not new, instead reiterating the allegations contained in the SAC and the government tort claim forms.

In this order, the court summarizes only the alleged facts that plaintiff argues are relevant to the disputed causes of action.

A. Events Leading to Plaintiff's Termination

Plaintiff was formerly employed by County of Trinity as social worker supervisor II. SAC ¶ 1. On February 7, 2007, plaintiff received a notice of intent to demote. SAC Ex. 1, at 18.1 Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave on that time. On April 16, 2007, she received notice of her disciplinary demotion to the position of Social Worker III, effective February 15, 2007. Id. and SAC ¶ 16. Plaintiff alleges that this demotion was without good cause. SAC ¶ 6. Id. She was ordered to return to work on April 30,2007. Prior to her scheduled return, on April 25, the County sent a notice of intent to terminate. SAC Ex. 1, at 18. On May 21, 2007, she filed a government tort claim against the County complaining of the above conduct. Id., SAC ¶ 7. This claim further alleges that plaintiff was "harassed, ridiculed, degraded, ignored, and subject[ed] to mental anguish." SAC Ex. 1, at 18. On May 25, 2007, the County terminated plaintiff's employment, again allegedly without good cause. SAC ¶ 8, Ex. 2 at 26. In the fall of 2007, plaintiff filed two additional government tort claims against the County. SAC Ex. 2, 3.

Plaintiff attributes a variety of motives to defendants' conduct. The SAC presents a whistle-blower theory, which is emphasized in that it the only theory supported by specific factual allegations in the SAC itself. During plaintiff's employment, she was supervised by defendant Wright. Plaintiff complained that her department, Child Welfare Services ("CWS"), was underfunded, in part because federal funds that should have gone to CWS were allocated to other programs. SAC ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges that some of this funding went to the Sheriff's department, apparently to pay for the Sheriff's assistance to CWS, Opp'n at 2, but it is unclear whether plaintiff contends that funding also went to other programs. SAC Ex. 1 at 19, Ex. 2 at 27-28, Ex. 3 at 35 (alleging that funds were diverted without specifying the uses to which the funds were actually put). The lack of funding for plaintiff's department and concomitant staffing shortage made it difficult for plaintiff to fulfill her duties. SAC Ex. 1 at 19, Ex. 3 at 35. Wright allegedly threatened to terminate plaintiff if plaintiff complained about this allocation to anyone else. SAC ¶ 15. Notwithstanding this threat, when an audit of the county was forthcoming, plaintiff "was prepared to tell the truth to auditors" and informed Wright she would do so. Id. Plaintiff does not allege, however, that she actually spoke of the funding allocation to anyone other than Wright. This audit was completed in December 2006.

Plaintiff alleges that shortly after the above, "discipline of the plaintiff began based upon false charges." SAC ¶ 15. She contends that the "circumstances and timing" indicate that the discipline was intended to discredit plaintiff before she could speak to the auditors or others about the funding. Insofar as the "discipline" refers specifically to plaintiff's demotion and termination, the court notes that those events occurred in 2007, whereas the incorporated government claim form indicates that the audit concluded in December of 2006. See SAC Ex. 1 at 19.

Separate from this whistle-blower theory, plaintiff cursorily alleges numerous other improper motivations for her treatment. The SAC alleges, without explanation, that:

defendants ... deprived plaintiff of the Equal Protection guaranteed to plaintiff under the United States Constitution, ... deprived plaintiff of her right to freedom of religion guaranteed to plaintiff under the United States Constitution, deprived plaintiff of her right to active participation in labor union activities, which constitutes political activity entitled to protection under the United States Constitution, and deprived plaintiff of her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act.

SAC ¶ 14. The attached government claim forms provide some facts relating to medical leave and to religion.

As to medical leave, plaintiff alleges that in a period ending July 11, 2006, plaintiff was on "Family Care Medical Leave" in order to care for her hospitalized mother. SAC Ex. 1 at 19. Shortly after her return, on July 17, Wright threatened plaintiff with loss of her flex day if plaintiff sought additional leave. Id. On August 9, 2006,plaintiff requested to use vacation time to provide further care for her mother. SAC Ex. 3 at 36. This request was denied, and Wright criticized plaintiff's requests in a subsequent performance evaluation. Id. On August 22, 2006, plaintiff's mother passed away. SAC Ex. 1 at 19. Plaintiff was only permitted to take one and a half days off to grieve, with the time coming from plaintiff's earned sick leave. Id.

As to religion, plaintiff's third government claim alleges that she "was repeatedly told [that] there were too many Christians in Children's Protective Services, and was subjected to criticism because she and many of her staff were Christians." SAC Ex. 3 at 28.

The SAC and government claims contain no further allegations regarding equal protection or union activity. Plaintiff's opposition to the present motion indicates that the claim regarding union activity relates to the refusal to re-hire plaintiff after state administrative proceedings, as discussed below.

B. State Administrative Proceedings

Plaintiff appealed her demotion and dismissal. This appeal was heard by a state administrative law judge ("ALJ"), who held a dozen hearings on the matter over the course of two years. The ALJ issued a 49 page order. The ALJ held that some cause existed for the county's actions, but nonetheless reduced the April 16, 2007 demotion to a three month suspension and reduced the May 25, 2007 termination to a demotion from the position of Social Worker Supervisor II to Social Worker III and a six month suspension.2 Defs.' Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A, at 48. In this suit, plaintiff alleges that contrary to the ALJ's determination, there was not cause for the imposition of any discipline. The ALJ awarded plaintiff back pay, with interest, and benefits in accordance with the reduction in discipline. The parties apparently agree that these findings obliged the County to re-hire plaintiff.

The ALJ's order was reviewed by the California State Personnel Board. On October 22, 2009, the Board adopted these findings in full, with one exception not relevant here. The County has refused to re-hire plaintiff in the capacity ordered. SAC ¶ 20.3 Neither party has indicated whether the County has complied with the other obligations imposed by this order.

C. Procedural History

The instant suit began with a complaint filed in state court. Before serving the complaint on any defendant, plaintiff substituted a first amended complaint. Defendants removed the suit to federal court on the basis of the federal claims alleged therein. Defenda...

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