Webb v. Jarvis

• Decision Date: 28 June 1991
• Docket Number: No. 53S01-9106-CV-499,53S01-9106-CV-499
• Citation: Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 1991)
• Parties: Orville Lynn WEBB, M.D., Appellant, (Defendant Below), v. Thomas D. JARVIS and Madeline Jarvis, Appellees, (Plaintiffs Below), Henry County, Henry County Sheriff's Department and Board of Commissioners of Henry County, Appellees. (Defendants Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 992

575 N.E.2d 992

Orville Lynn WEBB, M.D., Appellant, (Defendant Below), v.Thomas D. JARVIS and Madeline Jarvis, Appellees, (Plaintiffs Below)Henry County, HenryCounty Sheriff's Department and Board of Commissioners of Henry County, Appellees (Defendants Below).

No. 53S01-9106-CV-499.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 28, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 1991.

Richard L. Fairchild, Stephen J. Peters and William N. Ivers, Stewart & Irwin, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Geoffrey Segar, Ice Miller Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, amicus curiae for Indiana State Medical Ass'n.

Henry J. Price, Jerry Garau, Price & Shula, Indianapolis, for appellees.

B. Keith Shake, Henderson Daily Withrow & Devoe, Indianapolis, amicus curiae for Indiana State Police Alliance, Inc.

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

KRAHULIK, Justice.

This case raises the question of what duty a physician owes to a third person injured by the physician's patient as a result of treatment.We hold that, under the circumstances, there is no duty.

Orville Lynn Webb, M.D., seeks transfer from the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment in Webb v. Jarvis (1990), Ind.App., 553 N.E.2d 151.Because we conclude that Dr. Webb was entitled to summary judgment, we now grant transfer, vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and reverse the trial court.

Dr. Webb presents three issues for resolution, but our resolution of the issue of the extent of a physician's duty to third persons makes it unnecessary to address the remaining two.The facts relevant to our discussion follow.

Dr. Webb was a family practitioner in New Castle, Indiana.In 1977, Michael Neal became his patient.Some time thereafter, Dr. Webb began prescribing anabolic steroids for Neal.Unknown to Dr. Webb, during 1984 and early 1985, Neal battered his wife and once pointed a gun at her head.During this time, Neal also threatened his wife, and told her that he would kill her if she told anyone about his mistreatment of her.

On March 27, 1985, Neal twice threatened his wife with a knife and pulled the trigger of an unloaded gun pointed at her head.Mrs. Neal left her husband and went to the home of her sister and brother-in-law, Tom Jarvis, a state police officer.Mrs. Neal told the Jarvises about these instances and Jarvis reported them to Neal's superiors, Major McCorkle and Sheriff Pearcy of the Henry County Sheriff's Department.At their request, Dr. Webb met with Jarvis, Pearcy and McCorkle at the Sheriff's office where the men spoke with Neal by telephone.Neal agreed to meet with Dr. Webb at Neal's home.At their meeting, Dr. Webb found Neal distraught and was concerned that he might hurt someone.At the end of the meeting, Neal promised to take a sleeping pill that evening and go to bed.He agreed to see a psychiatrist the next day.Dr. Webb called McCorkle at the Sheriff's department and reported that Neal had agreed to get psychiatric help the following morning.Dr. Webb also reported that, while he believed Neal would not do anything if no one approached him, everyone should stay away from him for the time being.

Following Dr. Webb's telephone report, McCorkle called Mrs. Neal and told her that everything was fine.Mrs. Neal telephoned her husband and was assured by him that she could come to their house in order to obtain her clothes.Mrs. Neal asked Jarvis to accompany her, requesting that he bring his revolver because she was still afraid of Neal.Jarvis complied and, while Mrs. Neal gathered her clothes, Jarvis chatted with Neal.At one point, Neal left the room and returned with a rifle.He aimed the rifle at Jarvis and said, "Goodbye, Tommy."Mrs. Neal became hysterical.With Neal's attention thus diverted toward her, Jarvis grabbed Neal.The gun dropped to the floor, and Mrs. Neal ran from the house.Neal broke free from Jarvis, and Jarvis also ran from the house.As he was leaving, Neal began shooting.Jarvis was hit once in the right leg before reaching his car, and was hit again after reaching it.As Jarvis struggled to a neighbor's house for assistance, Neal took Jarvis' car and drove to Henry County Memorial Hospital where he shot and killed a nurse before being apprehended by the police.

Jarvis and his wife sought recovery from Dr. Webb on the theory that his overprescribing of anabolic steroids turned Neal into a toxic psychotic who was unable to control his rages.Dr. Webb moved for summary judgment on the premise, among others, that no duty was owed by him to Jarvis.The trial court denied the motion and certified its interlocutory order for appeal to resolve the question of law presented.The Court of Appeals concluded that Dr. Webb owed a duty to Jarvis to refrain from negligently overprescribing steroids to his patient Neal; that Dr. Webb need not have had actual knowledge that Jarvis was a potential victim because of the risk of physical injury to Jarvis; and that Jarvis was a foreseeable plaintiff.Webb, 553 N.E.2d at 155-56.

We recite first the familiar litany of appellate review.In reviewing the propriety of a ruling on summary judgment, we apply the same standard applicable in the trial court.We must consider the pleadings and evidence sanctioned by Ind.Trial Rule 56(C) without deciding its weight or credibility."Rational assertions of fact and reasonable inferences therefrom are deemed to be true."Burke v. Capello (1988), Ind., 520 N.E.2d 439, 440.Any doubt about the existence of a fact or the inference to be drawn from it is to be resolved in favor of the non-moving party.Gaboury v. Ireland Road Grace Brethren, Inc. (1983), Ind., 446 N.E.2d 1310, 1313.Only if such evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law should summary judgment be granted.T.R. 56;Ayres v. Indiana Heights Vol. Fire Dept. (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 1229, 1234.

Having established the ground rules, our analysis follows.

I.Existence of Duty

In this case, Jarvis urges us to find an affirmative duty on the part of a physician to administer medical treatment to a patient in such a way so as to take into account possible harm to unidentifiable third persons.Stated another way, Jarvis claims that he is entitled to recover from Dr. Webb because Dr. Webb committed malpractice when he prescribed drugs for Neal, and that, as a proximate result of that malpractice, Jarvis was injured.The complaint alleges that Dr. Webb breached a duty owed to Jarvis both by prescribing the drugs for Neal and failing to warn others of Neal's dangerous propensity.

Jarvis' action against Dr. Webb sounds in negligence.To premise a recovery on a theory of negligence, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) a duty on the part of the defendant to conform his conduct to a standard of care arising from his relationship with the plaintiff, (2) a failure of the defendant to conform his conduct to the requisite standard of care required by the relationship, and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach.Miller v. Griesel(1974), 261 Ind. 604, 611, 308 N.E.2d 701, 706.Our decision addresses only the first requisite element relating to the existence of a duty.

Whether the law recognizes any obligation on the part of a particular defendant to conform his conduct to a certain standard for the benefit of the plaintiff is a question of law.Miller v. Griesel, 261 Ind. at 611, 308 N.E.2d at 706;Neal v. Home Builders, Inc.(1953), 232 Ind. 160, 111 N.E.2d 280.Recently, this Court analyzed the question of what must be considered in order for a court to impose a duty at common law.See the discussion contained in Garriup Construction Co. v. Foster (1988), Ind., 519 N.E.2d 1224, 1227-28.We now conclude that three factors must be balanced, viz. (1) the relationship between the parties, (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and (3) public policy concerns.Thus, our analysis must examine each of these three factors in order to determine if Dr. Webb owed Jarvis a duty in prescribing medication to Neal.

A.Relationship Between the Parties

The duty of a physician to his patient arises from the contractual relationship entered into between the two of them.The duty has been defined by us as an implied contract that the physician possesses the ordinary knowledge and skill of his profession and will utilize such attributes in a reasonable, diligent, and careful manner in undertaking the care and treatment of his patient.Worster v. Caylor(1953), 231 Ind. 625, 110 N.E.2d 337, 339, overruled on other grounds;C. & S.L.R. Co. v. Henderson(1957), 237 Ind. 456, 146 N.E.2d 531.It is a duty which flows from that special consensual relationship.In other words, it is a duty premised on privity.Here, there was no contractual or special relationship entered into between Dr. Webb and Jarvis.Clearly, therefore, there was an absence of privity between them.

Jarvis, however, argues that privity is not required here because Dr. Webb's treatment of Neal created a situation imminently dangerous to third persons which resulted in personal injury.During the nineteenth century, the common law required privity in order to impose a duty of reasonable care.But this requirement has vanished evolutionarily during the twentieth century.As we approach the next century, it is well-established that privity is not always required.Citizens Gas & Coke Utility v. American Economy Ins. Co. (1985), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 998, 1000(this Court recognized that privity is not required where risk was imminently dangerous to human life);Barnes v. MacBrown and Company(1976), 264 Ind. 227, 229, 342 N.E.2d 619, 621(remote purchaser entitled to sue builder for breach of implied warranty of fitness);J.I. Case Co. v. Sandefur(1964), 245 Ind. 213, 221, 197 N.E.2d 519, 522(manufacturer liable on negligence theory even if no privity where product is imminently...