Webb v. Knox County Transmission Co.

• Decision Date: 27 October 1920
• Parties: WEBB et al. v. KNOX COUNTY TRANSMISSION CO. BARGER et al. v. SAME.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 1046

225 S.W. 1046 143 Tenn. 423 WEBB et al.
v.
KNOX COUNTY TRANSMISSION CO.
BARGER et al.
v.
SAME. Supreme Court of Tennessee. October 27, 1920.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Knox County; Von A. Huffaker, Judge.

Condemnation suits by the Knox County Transmission Company against D. C. Webb and others and against J. N. Barger and others. From judgments for plaintiff, defendants, their motions for new trial having been overruled, appeal. Affirmed.

Donaldson & Montgomery, of Knoxville, for D. C. Webb and J. N. Barger.

Lucky, Jones & Andrews, of Knoxville, for Knox County Transmission Co.

HALL, J.

In these cases the effort of the Knox County Transmission Company to exercise the right of eminent domain is challenged.

This company was organized under the general corporation laws of Tennessee, and more especially under chapter 144, Acts of 1901, chapter 151, Acts of 1909, and chapter 127, Acts of 1909.

The defendants, D. C. Webb and J. N. Barger, are adjoining property owners, over whose lands the company is seeking to condemn a right of way for the erection of an electric power line. The company filed separate petitions against these defendants, seeking to have these rights of way over their lands condemned.

The defendants separately answered, denying the right of petitioner to condemn upon a number of grounds set forth in their respective answers.

Proof was taken upon the issues raised in both cases, and the cases were heard together in the court below upon exactly the same evidence, although they were not consolidated.

The trial resulted in a final judgment being entered sustaining the petitions in both cases, holding that petitioner had the right to condemn, and ordered said rights of way condemned for the benefit of petitioner.

Both defendants made motions for new trials in writing, which motions were overruled, and they have appealed to this court, and have assigned errors.

Without elaborating or discussing the various powers conferred on petitioner by its charter, it appears that, among others, it is endowed with authority to develop the—

"water power of the rivers and streams of this state, whether in fact navigable, or by law declared navigable, or unnavigable; to manufacture electricity to be used for making electric lights, furnishing motive power, heating houses, electrotyping, telephone purposes, or for

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any purpose to which electricity is now or may hereafter be applied in any manner or form whatever; and, for this purpose, said company is hereby authorized and empowered and invested with the privilege of constructing, maintaining, and operating, in such rivers and streams of this state, dams, piers, sluiceways, canals, locks, ponds, breakwaters, abutments, and mill sites for manufacturing purposes, upon the following provisions and conditions."

In the petition it is said:

"By means of poles and towers, with wires and cables strung thereon, your petitioner proposes to carry and transmit said electricity from the point where the same is to be generated or manufactured to various cities, towns, and communities of the state of Tennessee, to be sold to said cities, towns, and communities and to all the inhabitants, citizens, firms, and corporations thereof who may desire to purchase same, and at uniform and reasonable rates, without discrimination, and under the supervision, regulation, and control of the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission of the state of Tennessee, or such other supervisory authority of the state as may be clothed with the power or jurisdiction over the public service corporations or utilities of this state."

"Petitioner purposes also to sell, furnish, and deliver said electricity to such other public service electric light corporation or other public utilities as are authorized by law to sell, furnish, and distribute electricity to the public for heat, light, or power, or for any other purpose for which electricity is or may be used, to the end that such public service corporations to whom said electricity may be sold or furnished by your petitioner may by their proper means and facilities, or by the proper means and facilities of your petitioner, distribute and furnish said electricity to all persons, firms, and corporations desiring the same at reasonable and uniform rates, without discrimination, and under the rules, regulations, and requirements of the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission of the state, as aforesaid."

In the petition it is further said:

"It is the purpose of your petitioner to perform the functions of a public service corporation as contemplated by its charter and the laws of the land by furnishing electricity to all citizens, firms, corporations, and communities along its lines, who may desire said electricity in quantities sufficient to justify the handling of the same at such particular points or places, or as shall be its duty as a public service corporation to furnish, or as may be required by the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission of the state, or such other supervisory authority as may have jurisdiction over your petitioner as a public service corporation. And at all points or places where said electricity is to be sold or furnished, it will be supplied to all classes of customers without discrimination and at uniform rates, where a similarity of conditions makes it reasonable, possible, or practical to maintain such rates, and as to all said matters it will be subject to the requirements of said Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, as aforesaid."

The defendants resist the right of the petitioner to condemn on the grounds:

(1) It is said that it appears from the pleadings and proof that petitioner does not propose or intend to devote the lands or rights of way sought to be condemned to a public use.

(2) That it is not the purpose of petitioner to furnish electricity to the public generally.

(3) That it has not the right of eminent domain, because it proposes to lease, or has leased, its line and facilities to another public corporation.

(4) That petitioner is not a bona fide corporation, because the proof shows that it was organized as a mere dummy, to be used in behalf of the Tennessee Power Company and the Knoxville Railway & Light Company, for the purpose of carrying out and aiding an alleged monopoly formed and existing...