Webb v. L. H. Vought and The Salvation Army

• Citation: 127 Kan. 799,275 P. 170
• Decision Date: 09 March 1929
• Docket Number: 28,541
• Parties: J. C. WEBB, Appellee, v. L. H. VOUGHT and THE SALVATION ARMY, Appellants
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Kansas

275 P. 170

127 Kan. 799

J. C. WEBB, Appellee, v. L. H. VOUGHT and THE SALVATION ARMY, Appellants

No. 28,541

Supreme Court of Kansas

March 9, 1929

Decided January, 1929.

Appeal from Sedgwick district court, division No. 1; J. EVERETT ALEXANDER, judge.

Judgment affirmed

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

CHARITIES--Liability of Corporation for Torts of Servant. The Salvation Army, a religious, charitable and philanthropic organization, is not liable in damages for the injury sustained by a third person in a collision with a motor truck negligently driven by an employee of the Salvation Army.

V Harris and M. P. Shearer, both of Wichita, for the appellants.

Alfred Williams, of Pratt, P. D. Gardiner and O. W. Helsel, both of Wichita, for the appellee.

Marshall, J. Burch, J. concurring. Marshall, J., Harvey, J., dissenting.

OPINION

MARSHALL, J.:

In this action the plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendants damages for injuries sustained by him in an automobile collision. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendants appeal.

There was evidence which tended to prove that the Salvation Army of Wichita is a corporation, organized under the laws of the state of Illinois; that the Salvation Army is engaged in religious, charitable and philanthropic work in the city of Wichita; that in its operations it conducts a store, to which old clothing, books, papers and magazines given to the Salvation Army for distribution among the poor and needy are taken for such distribution; that at the store much of the goods thus collected is given away, but a part of it is sold at a nominal price to those who desire to pay all or a portion of the value of the goods received; that the money received is used by the Salvation Army in furtherance of its religious, charitable and philanthropic work; that in gathering the goods to be distributed from this store the Salvation Army operated a truck; that the truck was driven by the defendant, L. H. Vought; that it was being operated on a paved road west of Wichita, and through the negligence of L. H. Vought a collision occurred between the truck and another truck or automobile in which the plaintiff was riding, the guest of the driver, and that the plaintiff sustained severe injuries in that collision.

It is argued that the Salvation Army, being a religious, charitable and philanthropic organization doing work of that nature, is not liable for the negligence of Vought whereby injury was sustained by the plaintiff. The liability of charitable organizations for injuries caused by the negligence of agents or employees working in or for such organizations has often been presented to the courts of this country. The decisions are in hopeless confusion and irreconcilable conflict. A clear statement of this condition is found in Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, 174 Minn. 389, 392, 219 N.W. 463, as follows:

"Coming to the specific question of the exemption of charitable organizations or institutions from liability for negligence of their officers and servants, we find a great diversity of reasoning and adjudication in the numerous decisions in various states. One line of cases holds that these organizations are wholly exempt from liability for such negligence. Another line of cases, apparently the greater in number, holds that these organizations are exempt from such liability to persons who are recipients of their charity or service, who are beneficiaries of the work carried on by the organization. Many of these cases hold that the organization is liable to third persons, who are not beneficiaries, and to its own hired servants and employees on the same basis as private individuals and business corporations. Some cases hold that hospitals and colleges are liable to patients or students who pay full consideration for their treatment or tuition. Others hold that the fact that payment is so received does not make them liable. In many cases it is stated that such institutions may be held liable for failure to exercise proper care in the selection of officers and servants, and may be held liable for negligently employing incompetent officers and servants, when injury results therefrom.

"Different courts give different reasons for the exemption from liability. The following reasons have been given: That the funds of such institutions are held in trust for specific charitable purposes and should not be diverted to pay damages for negligence; that the better public policy is to hold them exempt; that they serve the same purpose as governmental agencies and should come under the same rule; that one who accepts benefits by becoming a patient, student or beneficiary of the institution impliedly consents to hold it exempt or to waive any claim for negligence...