Webb v. Lucas
| Decision Date | 28 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO.1:07CV3290 |
| Parties | JOSHAWA WEBB, ET AL., Plaintiff, v. LEE LUCAS, ET AL., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motions for Summary Judgment based on Qualified Immunity by the remaining Defendants Lee Lucas (ECF # 175), Matt Mayer (ECF # 176), Robert Cross (ECF # 177), and Charles Metcalf (ECF # 179). For the following reasons, the Court grants these Defendants' Motions.
The case arises from a First Amended Complaint filed by Joshawa Webb ("Webb") alleging constitutional violations, stemming from his arrest and incarceration for an alleged drug conspiracy. Webb contends he was innocent of the charges and his arrest and incarceration were the result of wrongful acts by Defendants based on testimony from confidential informant JerrellBray ("Bray"). The Court previously held that Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint does not allege any constitutional violation claims on behalf of Webb's fellow Plaintiffs, to wit; his mother Juanita Brooks, his unnamed adolescent sister, or his child; further, Webb has not provided any evidence that he is a guardian authorized to bring suit on behalf of his adolescent sister. Finally, there are no federal claims brought on behalf of his wife.
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint allegations
The following recites the allegations in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint as stated in the Court's Opinion and Order granting summary judgment to Cross and Ansari. Webb contends he was wrongfully arrested, indicted and incarcerated for nearly twenty-one months on fabricated evidence. Bray confessed to fabricating evidence to frame innocent people, including Webb. Webb alleges audiotapes used to obtain the warrant for Webb's arrest were tampered with or fabricated by Defendants, and a "stand-in" was used to play the part of Webb in the fictional controlled buy, which "stand-in" confessed to his role.
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint contends the following: Webb never met Agent Lucas prior to being indicted and was not involved in the alleged drug ring. On November 9, 2005, Defendants Lucas, George (subsequently dismissed) and other unidentified individuals kicked in the door of the home of Juanita Brooks, Webb's mother, looking for Webb. They attempted to force Webb's adolescent sister to accompany them. Lucas, George and other unidentified personnel then forced their way into Webb's home where they arrested Webb in the presence of Webb's wife, Lakeisha their infant child. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants then unlawfully searched Webb's home, where no evidence of criminal activity was found.
The First Amended Complaint further states that two experts have reviewed the audiorecordings used to indict Webb and found they were tampered with or fabricated. According to the First Amended Complaint, Bray admitted the controlled buy was simulated and recorded to make it sound like Webb was involved in the drug ring. The First Amended Complaint further alleges Defendants fabricated, destroyed and/or withheld evidence that would have exonerated Webb and alleges Defendants coached and manipulated witnesses and withheld doing so from prosecutors. The First Amended Complaint alleges Defendants violated Webb's rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; Defendants conspired to deprive Webb of his constitutional rights; the municipal defendants failed to train their employees; and, in addition, their policies and practices violated Webb's constitutional rights, and finally, alleges violations of Ohio state law for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The First Amended Complaint does not separate or state the causes of action nor does it distinguish particular acts of the individual defendants except for those described above. Instead, the First Amended Complaint pleads its constitutional claims in general against Defendants as a group.
The Court issued a series of rulings back in September of 2009 on the issue of qualified immunity granting the Defendants' Motions, due, in part, to Plaintiffs' insufficient 56(f) Motion and granted Defendant Lucas's Motion to Dismiss, due in part to Plaintiff's failure to oppose the Motion. Plaintiff moved to reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. R. 59 and 60, citing to a ruling by the Sixth Circuit on similar cases with similar Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) motions holding that limited discovery should have been granted. Plaintiff also offered an explanation supporting a finding that his failure to oppose Lucas's motion was due to excusable neglect. The Court granted theMotion in part and reopened the case against Defendants Lucas, Cross, Metcalf and Mayer. In the intervening period, Lee Lucas's criminal trial had concluded with Lucas's acquittal. The Court allowed limited discovery and ordered the parties to resubmit their Motions for Summary Judgment based on qualified immunity. Those motions are now before the Court.
According to Defendants' affidavits in this suit, on November 9, 2005, Plaintiff Joshawa Webb was indicted for violations of federal criminal drug laws. The investigation began in December of 2004 due to a murder that occurred in Richland County of a Timothy Harris. The Richland County Sheriff's investigation of the murder indicated it was drug related and, as a result, the Richland County Sheriff's Department began an investigation of drug trafficking in Richland County. At the request of the Richland County Sheriff's Department in late August or early September of 2005, the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") Task Force began working collaboratively with the Richland County Sheriff's Department in investigating drug trafficking in and around Richland County.
As part of the investigation, on October 13, 2005, Richland County Sheriff's Department Detective Chuck Metcalf monitored and recorded a phone conversation between Bray, a paid DEA informant, who was also a confidential informant used previously by the Richland County Sheriff's Department, and a man Bray identified as Joshawa Webb, wherein Bray relayed he had $2,000.00 to purchase crack the next day.
On October 14, 2005, Detective Metcalf, Richland County Sheriff's Department Sgt. Matt Mayer, DEA Special Agent Lee Lucas, DEA Task Force Officer Tom Verhiley and DEA Special Agent Robert Cross met at the Richland County Sheriff's Office to arrange a controlledbuy of two and a half ounces of crack cocaine from the person identified by Bray as Plaintiff, Joshawa Webb. That same day Lucas, operating undercover, contacted Bray, who informed Lucas that Webb was with him. After securing money for the buy from federal government funds wherein the serial numbers were previously recorded, Lucas, wearing a wire, along with Metcalf, Cross, Mayer and Verhiley, drove to the location of the controlled buy. Agent Lucas drove in a separate vehicle and pulled into a gas station next to a vehicle with tinted windows. The other agents and Richland officers were unable to observe the vehicles from their monitoring location. Agent Lucas later informed Agent Cross that he entered the vehicle with Bray where a large white male was seated in the front passenger seat. Bray identified the individual as "Josh." Lucas exchanged $2600.00 dollars for approximately 70 grams of crack cocaine. After the transaction, Bray returned to the Richland County Sheriff's office for a debriefing.
In March of 2006, Webb was indicted under a superceding indictment for the alleged sale of crack cocaine as described above. Sometime in 2007 Bray was arrested. Bray then recanted his previous statements regarding the controlled buy allegedly involving Webb. As a result, the government moved to dismiss the charges against Webb and on July 16, 2007, the Court granted the government's motion and dismissed the superceding indictment against Webb. On October 24, 2007, Webb filed his Complaint with this Court.
Lucas was subsequently indicted, tried and acquitted. At the trial, Lucas, Webb and Bray and the alleged stand-in Jeremiah Conrad ("Conrad") all testified and were cross examined on the underlying drug buy at issue here.
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); accord Int'l Union v. Cummins, Inc., 434 F.3d 478, 483 (6th Cir. 2006); Turner v. City of Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2005). The initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Once the movant makes a properly supported motion, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute. An opposing party may not simply rely on its pleadings; rather, it must "produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be resolved by a jury." Cox v. Ky. Dep't. of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir.1995). The "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original); accord Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 689-90 (6th Cir. 2004); Weaver v. Shadoan, 340 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir. 2003). A fact is material only if its resolution "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d...
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