Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat For Humanity Inc.

Citation32 IER Cases 1124,346 S.W.3d 422
Decision Date21 July 2011
Docket NumberNo. M2009–01552–SC–R11–CV.,M2009–01552–SC–R11–CV.
PartiesPam WEBBv.NASHVILLE AREA HABITAT FOR HUMANITY, INC.
CourtSupreme Court of Tennessee

346 S.W.3d 422
32 IER Cases 1124

Pam WEBB
v.
NASHVILLE AREA HABITAT FOR HUMANITY, INC.

No. M2009–01552–SC–R11–CV.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.

Feb. 3, 2011 Session.July 21, 2011.


[346 S.W.3d 424]

R. Eddie Wayland, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc.James L. Harris, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Pam Webb.Dale Conder, Jr. and Bradford D. Box, Jackson, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae, Tennessee Defense Lawyers Association.Justin Gilbert, Jackson, Tennessee, William B. Ryan, Memphis, Tennessee, Jennifer B. Morton, Knoxville, Tennessee, and Wade B. Cowan, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae, Tennessee Employment Lawyers Association.Jonathan O. Harris, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae, Center for Individual Freedom.
OPINION
SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J., JANICE M. HOLDER, GARY R. WADE, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., joined.SHARON G. LEE, J.

In this action alleging retaliatory discharge, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's judgment, holding that the amended complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. We address the issue of the proper standard for Tennessee courts to apply in ruling on a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). We decline to adopt the new Twombly/Iqbal “plausibility” pleading standard and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Background

Pam Webb was employed by the Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc. (“Habitat”) as vice president of family services, beginning her employment in August of 2007. Habitat terminated Ms. Webb's employment in February of 2009. Ms. Webb filed a complaint alleging retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), Tenn.Code Ann. § 50–1–304 (2008 & Supp.2010), and the common law of Tennessee. After Habitat filed a motion to dismiss her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), Ms. Webb filed an amended complaint that alleged the following:

[I]n December 2008 plaintiff filed a written complaint regarding what she had reasonable cause to believe perceived [sic] were illegal acts which had been or would be performed at the discretion of [Habitat's] management. Specifically, plaintiff was told not to allow

[346 S.W.3d 425]

services to be given to a person 74 years old because it would be a bad decision to loan money to someone this old. Further, Chris McCarthy, a management employee, made statements and asked staff members to implement policies that were and are discriminatory and in direct violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, regulations promulgated thereunder, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act in that the policies in question involved unlawful age discrimination. The statements have been made in regard not only to age but also as to familial status, and disability, thus evidencing a course of illegal corporate conduct.

As a result of plaintiff's complaints and unwillingness to participate in or remain silent about these illegal acts, plaintiff was terminated approximately two months later on or about February 23, 2009. The reason given was “budgetary reasons.” However, plaintiff would state that this reason is a pretext meant to disguise the real reason which was the fact that she complained about illegal activities, and refused to participate in or remain silent about those activities.

Habitat responded by filing an amended 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, asserting that the amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The trial court granted Habitat's motion and dismissed Ms. Webb's amended complaint on all of her claims. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's judgment, holding that the amended complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. We granted review to address the issue of the proper standard for Tennessee courts to apply in ruling on a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions altering the federal standard in Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In this appeal, Habitat and amici curiae Tennessee Defense Lawyers Association and The Center for Individual Freedom urge us to adopt the Twombly/Iqbal standard, which “retired” the notice pleading regime recognized in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), and followed for fifty years, in favor of a new “plausibility” standard. For the reasons discussed below, we decline to adopt the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility pleading standard.

Analysis
1. The Tennessee Standards—Motion to Dismiss

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8.01 requires that a pleading for relief “shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.” Rule 8.05(1) further provides:

Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required. Every pleading stating a claim or defense relying upon the violation of a statute shall, in a separate count or paragraph, either specifically refer to the statute or state all of the facts necessary to constitute such breach so that the other party can be duly apprised of the statutory violation charged. The substance of any ordinance or regulation relied upon for claim or defense shall be stated in a separate count or paragraph and the ordinance or regulation shall be clearly identified. The manner in which violation of any statute, ordinance or regulation is claimed shall be set forth.

When a complaint fails to comply with Rule 8, it is subject to dismissal by grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

[346 S.W.3d 426]

claim upon which relief can be granted, as provided by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). The standards by which our courts should assess and dispose of a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss are well-established and have been clearly and consistently applied in Tennessee for nearly forty years, following the adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970.

A Rule 12.02(6) motion challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the strength of the plaintiff's proof or evidence. Highwoods Props., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tenn.2009); Willis v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn.2003); Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tenn.1999); Sanders v. Vinson, 558 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn.1977). The resolution of a 12.02(6) motion to dismiss is determined by an examination of the pleadings alone. Leggett v. Duke Energy Corp., 308 S.W.3d 843, 851 (Tenn.2010); Trau–Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Tenn.2002); Cook ex rel. Uithoven v. Spinnaker's of Rivergate, Inc., 878 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tenn.1994); Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tenn.1975) (overruled on other grounds by McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P'ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 899–900 (Tenn.1996)). A defendant who files a motion to dismiss “ ‘admits the truth of all of the relevant and material allegations contained in the complaint, but ... asserts that the allegations fail to establish a cause of action.’ ” Brown v. Tenn. Title Loans, Inc., 328 S.W.3d 850, 854 (Tenn.2010) (quoting Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tenn.2005)); see Edwards v. Allen, 216 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tenn.2007); White v. Revco Disc. Drug Ctrs., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Tenn.2000); Holloway v. Putnam Cnty., 534 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tenn.1976).

In considering a motion to dismiss, courts “ ‘must construe the complaint liberally, presuming all factual allegations to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences.’ ” Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 232 S.W.3d 28, 31–32 (Tenn.2007) (quoting Trau–Med, 71 S.W.3d at 696); see Leach v. Taylor, 124 S.W.3d 87, 92–93 (Tenn.2004); Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tenn.1997); Bellar v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 559 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tenn.1978); see also City of Brentwood v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 149 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004) (holding that courts “must construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff by ... giving the plaintiff the benefit of all the inferences that can be reasonably drawn from the pleaded facts”). A trial court should grant a motion to dismiss “only when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Crews v. Buckman Labs. Int'l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tenn.2002); see Lanier v. Rains, 229 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tenn.2007); Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tenn.1999); Pemberton v. Am. Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tenn.1984); Fuerst v. Methodist Hosp. S., 566 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tenn.1978); Ladd v. Roane Hosiery, Inc., 556 S.W.2d 758, 759–60 (Tenn.1977). We review the trial court's legal conclusions regarding the adequacy of the complaint de novo. Brown, 328 S.W.3d at 855; Stein, 945 S.W.2d at 716.

Under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8, Tennessee follows a liberal notice pleading standard, see Leach, 124 S.W.3d at 92–93, which recognizes that the primary purpose of pleadings is to provide notice of the issues presented to the opposing party and court. Abshure v....

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