Webb v. Nowak
| Decision Date | 20 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | Sept. Term, 2012.,No. 83,83 |
| Citation | 433 Md. 666,72 A.3d 587 |
| Parties | John L. WEBB, Sr., et ux. v. G. Philip NOWAK, et ux. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
William C. Wantz (Hagerstown, MD), on brief, for Petitioners.
Nicholas J. Nowak (Arnold & Porter, LLP, Washington, DC; Carl W. Disque of Carl W. Disque, P.C., Hagerstown, MD), on brief, for Respondents.
Argued before BARBERA, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD and BELL,* JJ.
An old adage claims that “good fences make good neighbors.” The present case may stand for the corollary principle that disputes over fences virtually guarantee unneighborly outcomes.
Petitioners, John and Ruth Webb (the “Webbs”), believe that they hold title to a 0.26–acre tract of land (the “Disputed Land”) in Sharpsburg, Maryland. The Webbs contend that the Disputed Land is a part of three contiguous parcels acquired by the Webbs in 2000.1 The Disputed Land abuts and shares its western boundary with property owned by Respondents G. Philip and Barbara Nowak (the “Nowaks”), who claim also title to the Disputed Land. The Nowaks acquired their property in 1988.2 The parties dispute the location of the western boundary line of the Webbs' property (and, therefore, the eastern boundary line of the Nowaks' property), the resolution of which dispute will decide ultimately the rightful owner of the Disputed Land; hence this litigation.
On 11 August 2009, the Webbs filed suit in the Circuit Court for Washington County against the Nowaks. The timing of the filing of the suit was precipitated by the removal by the Nowaks of merchantable timber from the Disputed Land. The Webbs sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as damages under a common law theory for trespass. The Nowaks filed a counter-complaint seeking, among other relief, a declaratory judgment that they hold fee simple title to the Disputed Land and therefore owe nothing to the Nowaks for the removal of the timber.
The parties' disagreements stem from conflicting interpretations of a 1928 recorded deed from the heirs of Samuel Miller to Alice Wolf (the “Wolf deed”), a predecessor owner in the relevant chain of title. The Wolf deed describes a fence in a certain location as constituting the western boundary line of the property conveyed to Wolf. During the first half of 2007, the Nowaks commissioned Frederic M. Frederick, a local surveyor, to prepare a survey of their land (the “Frederick Survey”).3 The Frederick Survey located the western boundary line of the Webbs' property along the remnants of a fence line (the “Existing Fence”), approximately 300 feet west from a stake at the west side of the “County road” and running from the stake in a northwesterly direction. Frederick and the Respondents assert that the Existing Fence is the same fence described in the Wolf deed. A 2000 survey prepared for the Webbs (the “Zenith Survey”), by contrast, placed the contentious boundary line 77 to 140 feet beyond the Existing Fence. The Zenith Survey harmonizes with the Webbs' belief that the fence described in the Wolf deed ceased to exist at some point after 1928 and before 2000 and, thus, should be treated as a physical monument lost to antiquity, leaving the distance call in the Wolf deed as controlling. Thus, according to the Webbs, the western boundary line of their property extends beyond the Existing Fence described in the Frederick Survey. The Webbs contend that the Existing Fence did not exist in 1928.
The Circuit Court for Washington County entered judgment in favor of the Nowaks, finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the western boundary of the Webbs' property was, in fact, the Existing Fence referred to in the Frederick Survey. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed in an unreported opinion. The Webbs filed a petition for writ of certiorari, challenging the judgment of the intermediate appellate court on the grounds that it not only erred in its determination as to the location of the disputed boundary, but also applied the incorrect standard of review in doing so. We granted the petition, 429 Md. 303, 55 A.3d 906 (2012), to consider the following questions:
1) Is the principle that the interpretation of a deed is a question of law to be considered de novo on appellate review inapplicable in boundary disputes, as the Court of Special Appeals opined?
2) May the preference for monuments over courses and distances be applied to reduce the amount of a grant, as the Court of Special Appeals determined?
3) Was the trial court's interpretation of the deed incorrect?
The Disputed Land (and the undisputed land owned now by the Webbs and the Nowaks) was originally part of 236 acres acquired by Samuel Miller in 1883. Miller's heirs sold from Miller's property a lot with frontage on a private lane 4 to Alice Wolf in 1928. The private lane intersects Millers Sawmill Road on the latter's west side. Millers Sawmill Road is referred to in the Wolf deed and subsequent relevant deeds as the “County road.” The conveyance from Miller's heirs to Wolf is the point of departure for the dispute between the Webbs and Nowaks.
The Webbs and Nowaks contest the beginning point of the front portion of the lot formerly owned by Wolf as described in the Wolf deed. The calls of the boundaries in the Wolf deed are as follows:
Beginning for the same at a stake located on the west side of the County road leading to Sharpsburg, which said place of beginning is at a point one hundred and five (105) feet in a northerly direction from a large gate post located at or near said County road, and [1] running thence in a westerly direction at a distance of three hundred (300) feet, more or less, to a stake at a fence which said stake is located a distance of one hundred and five (105) feet, in a Northerly direction along said fence from the Northwest corner of the property of Elliott C. Long and [2] running thence in a northerly direction along said fence a distance of one hundred (100) feet to a stake [3] thence in a easterly direction by a line parallel to the first line of this description a distance of three hundred forty (340) feet, more or less, to the west side of a Private road, which leads to the aforesaid County road, and [4] thence along said private road a distance of one hundred (100) feet more or less to the place of beginning, together with a right of way to the grantee, her heirs or assigns over the aforesaid private road, as means of ingress and egress to said County road.
(Emphasis added; boldfaced bracketed numerals at the beginning of each call were added by the Court of Special Appeals in its unreported opinion in this case and are retained by this Court.) 5
The Webbs own three abutting parcels. They are referred to by letter—from north to south along the private lane—as Parcels “A,” “B,” and “C.” Parcel A is a “panhandle lot,” with a mere 12 feet of frontage on the private road providing access to the flared balance of the lot. According to the Zenith Survey (and the Webbs), Parcel A extends back 340 feet from the private road along its northerly boundary. At the end of the 340–foot call, Parcel A's boundarythen turns to the southeast and extends 357 feet to the property's southwesterly corner. Parcel A's boundary line then turns to the east for 153 feet to the property's southeasterly corner. Parcel A's boundary then extends 88 feet to the 12-foot-wide “panhandle” frontage that extends back in an easterly direction to the private road. According to the Webbs' estimation, Parcel A extends an additional 139 feet farther to the west than does Parcel B or Parcel C. Parcels B and C each have 50 feet of frontage on the private lane and extend westerly from the road for approximately 190–200 feet. These two parcels are each shaped, in essence, like parallelograms. See Appendix A. The Frederick Survey, by contrast, maintains that Parcel A is only 200 feet deep from the private road, instead of the 340 feet reflected in the Zenith Survey.
On 11 August 2009, Petitioners filed an action in the Circuit Court for Washington County against Respondents for common law trespass and the destruction of merchantable timber under Md.Code (1973, 2012 Repl. Vol.), Natural Resources Article, § 5–409, which states, in relevant part:
Any person, his aiders, abettors, and counsellors, who willfully, negligently, recklessly, wrongfully, or maliciously enters upon lands or premises of another without written permission of the owner of the lands or premises, in order to cut, burn, or otherwise injure or destroy, or cause to be cut, burned, or otherwise injured, or destroyed, any merchantable trees or timber on the land is liable to the party injured or aggrieved in an amount triple the value of the trees or timber cut, burned, or otherwise injured or destroyed, plus the costs of any surveys, appraisals, attorney fees, or court fees in connection with the case. The damages are recoverable in a civil action, as in any other case.
The Webbs sought, inter alia, compensatory and punitive damages and counsel fees. Respondents filed a counter-complaint, seeking damages for trespass and a declaratory judgment that they owned the Disputed Land upon which the trespass was alleged to have occurred (based on their interpretation of title and a theory of adverse possession) and claimed damages for trespass. The actions were bifurcated and the declaratory judgment claim was set first for a bench trial. The Nowaks withdrew subsequently their claims for trespass and adverse possession. The declaratory judgment claim was tried before Judge Daniel P. Dwyer.
The surveyor who prepared the Zenith Survey died before trial. Petitioners, therefore, presented no testimonial evidence to the Circuit Court to explain directly their version of the discrepancy between the two surveys. Frederic Frederick,the surveyor who prepared the Nowaks' 2007 survey, testified that, in...
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