Webb v. Scott

Decision Date22 December 1936
PartiesWEBB et al. v. Scott [*]
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

En Banc.

Suit by L. T. Webb and others against Robert Scott, wherein the defendant filed a cross-bill. From an adverse decree, the plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

BROWN J., dissenting in part. Appeal from Circuit Court, Hillsborough County L. L. Parks, judge.

COUNSEL

H. D Wentworth and Tom Walden, both of Tampa, for appellants.

Mabry, Reaves, Carlton & White, of Tampa, for appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

L. T Webb and Stella E. Webb, his wife, brought their bill of complaint against Robert Scott, praying that he be enjoined from instituting suit to foreclose paving certificate No. 717 issued by the Board of County Commissioners of Hillsborough County, or from transferring it, pending determination of its validity; that it be canceled as a cloud on complainants' title to lot 18, block 9, Nearbay subdivision; that defendant and all those claiming under him since the institution of this suit be enjoined from claiming any right, title, or interest in said paving certificate; and that the record thereof be stricken from the Improvement Lien Book of the County Commissioners.

The bill of complaint alleged in substance that complainants own lots 18, block 9, Nearbay subdivision, in fee-simple absolute, subject only to a mortgage, executed February 1, 1932, to Andrew M. Ross in the sum of $6,000; that on May 6, 1927, the Board of County Commissioners of Hillsborough County, under the pretended authority of chapter 10145, Acts 1925, issued paving certificate No. 717, purporting to be a lien against said lot in the principal sum of $1,042.37, and an entry thereof was made in the records of the Board of County Commissioners; that said certificate is held by defendant, Robert Scott; that he is asserting lien rights thereunder which constitute a cloud upon complainants' title to said land; that said certificate and pretended assessment are invalid, and said assessment is a cloud upon complainants' title; that said lot extends 138 feet along Mississippi avenue and 50 feet along Moody avenue; that Moody avenue was, prior to the paving of Mississippi avenue, paved and improved and said lot assessed for $376.92 therefor and certificate No. 6121 issued against said lot, which was thereafter foreclosed; that the Board of County Commissioners, in making the assessment of $1,042.37 for improvements on Mississippi avenue, assessed said lot according to front footage without regard to benefits received; that said lot was not benefited by the improvements for which said assessment was made; that a paved street, Moody avenue, already ran in front of said lot; and that said assessment of $1,042.37 and paving certificate No. 717 are illegal, null, and void.

The defendant, Robert Scott, filed an answer and an amended answer, each of which is very prolix, asserting as the principal defense to the bill of complaint that complainants are estopped to assert the invalidity of the assessment and of the paving certificate.

The chancellor entered an order restraining Robert Scott from instituting suit on paving certificate No. 717, or from transferring it, pending determination of its validity.

Robert Scott, after first obtaining permission of the court, filed his cross-bill seeking to foreclose paving certificate No. 717, praying that an administrator ad litem of the estate of A. M. Ross, deceased, be appointed to defend the cross-bill; that an accounting be had to determine the amount owed by virtue of the assessment and certificate of indebtedness; that cross-defendants be ordered to pay the amount found to be due to cross-complainant, or that the premises be sold to satisfy the indebtedness; and that the right of cross-defendants to redeem be foreclosed.

The cross-bill alleged in substance that a petition signed by two-thirds of the owners of the abutting land had requested that Mississippi avenue be graded, paved, and curbed, between Howard avenue and the Atlantic Coast Line Railway; and that the Board of County Commissioners, acting upon said petition, improved said street, and delivered paving certificate No. 717 with others to the contractors in payment for their work; and that thereafter Robert Scott purchased said certificate and is now the owner and holder thereof, and prays for foreclosure of said certificate, which includes the principal and interest thereon and for attorney's fee and costs, including abstract information.

Motion to strike the cross-bill as amended was denied by the chancellor, after which cross-defendants filed their answer to the cross-bill.

The evidence taken before a special master showed, and the chancellor so found, the following facts: Mississippi avenue was for more than twenty years prior to October 16, 1925, a public road in Hillsborough county, and was located outside the corporate limits of any municipality. On August 8, 1924, Margaret E. Creelman, owner of said lot, signed a petition which was presented to the Board of County Commissioners requesting that Moody avenue from Texas avenue to Southview avenue, upon which said lot abuts, be graded, curbed, and paved, and the cost proportionately assessed against abutting property, which was done pursuant to the provisions of chapter 9316, Acts 1923. On October 16, 1925, a petition purportedly signed by the owners of two-thirds of the property abutting Mississippi avenue between Howard avenue and the Atlantic Coast Line Railway was presented to the Board of County Commissioners, asking that that portion of Mississippi avenue be graded, paved, and curbed, the petition stating that petitioners understood that the cost would be paid by owners of the abutting property. At that time Edna H. Holliday was the owner of said lot and signed the petition. Hillsborough county had at that time, and has had ever since, a population of more than 125,000 according to the State Census of 1925. The Board of County Commissioners determined the sufficiency of the petition, ordered the improvement made, and assessed the cost against the abutting property on a frontfoot basis. On November 25, 1925, Edna H. Holliday conveyed said lot to L. H. Hook, who thereby assumed payment of the paving assessment against said lot. L. H. Hook went into possession, had actual knowledge of the improvements, made no objection to them, was satisfied with them, and remained the owner of said lot until the paving certificate on the Moody avenue side of the lot was foreclosed by Harry Raymond, and purchased at the foreclosure sale, on August 2, 1928, by John R. Walsh & Co. On December 19, 1928, L. H. Hook reacquired ownership of the lot by purchase thereof from John R. Walsh & Co. It was stipulated by counsel that on November 17, 1926, L. H. Hook and wife mortgaged the property to A. M. Ross, which mortgage was renewed on December 18, 1928. The mortgage was foreclosed and a master's deed to said lot issued to A. M. Ross on December 2, 1929. Ross owned the lot until February 1, 1932, without questioning the validity of the improvement, assessment, paving certificate, or benefit. On February 1, 1932, A. M. Ross and wife conveyed the lot to L. T. Webb and Stella Webb, his wife, warranting that the lot was free from all incumbrances except taxes for the year 1932, and deposited in escrow $1,700 with the First Savings & Trust Company of Tampa, to pay paving certificate No. 717 if not canceled of record on or before three years after date of agreement, which agreement was dated February 6, 1932.

The chancellor found in favor of defendant and cross-complainant, Robert Scott, dismissed the bill of complaint, and allowed foreclosure of paving certificate No. 717.

From the final decree, L. T. Webb and Stella Webb, his wife, and Tom Walden, as administrator ad litem of the estate of A. M. Ross, deceased, took this appeal.

It is contended, in the first question presented, that chapter 10145, Acts 1925, is unconstitutional (a) because it fails to provide for assessment of abutting property according to benefits received instead of according to frontage; (b) because it undertakes to delegate to petitioning property owners legislative power and fails to provide for notice and hearing prior to granting the petition and incurring the costs; and (c) because it is a special law applicable only to Hillsborough County, and undertakes to prescribe certain duties, regulate the jurisdiction and powers of the County Commissioners in violation of article 3, § 20, Florida Constitution.

Chapter 10145, Acts 1925, provides for assessment of abutting property, by the Board of County Commissioners, for grading paving, and curbing improvements made on the basis of front footage, after a petition has been duly signed by the owners of two-thirds of the abutting property and the petition granted by the Board of County Commissioners. This act failed to provide for notice and hearing and was held unconstitutional. Chapter 12208, Acts 1927, undertook to validate all acts and proceedings of the Board of County Commissioners in respect to assessments and certificates of indebtedness. This court in the case of Smith Brothers v. Williams, 100 Fla. 642, 126 So. 367; Id., 100 Fla. 660, 131 So. 335, was equally divided as to whether chapter 12208 validated the acts done under chapter 10145. On the rehearing of that case three of the six justices were of the opinion that chapter 12208 was a legislative assessment for improvements already made; and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in the case of U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Highway Engineering & Construction Co., 51 F. (2d) 894, unanimously adopted that view, having before them a different statute but one of similar effect. That view should now become the rule in...

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