Webb v. Union Pac. R.R.
| Decision Date | 10 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-cv-04075-MDH |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER WEBB, Plaintiff, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 50). Plaintiff Christopher Webb sued Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company ("UPRR") for negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. The complaint arises from an incident on June 27, 2018, in Jefferson City, Missouri, in which Plaintiff, an employee of Defendant, slipped and fell while walking between Defendant's locomotive and another of Defendant's railroad tracks, sustaining injuries. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis that: (1) Section 213.103 of the Federal Rail Safety Act ("FRSA"), 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-20121, precludes Plaintiff's FELA claim as a matter of law; (2) If Plaintiff's FELA claim is not precluded, Plaintiff is required to and has failed to present expert witness testimony with respect to Plaintiff's contention that the ballast between the tracks created an unreasonably safe condition; and (3) Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant breached MO. REV. STAT. § 389.797, which would support a negligence per se finding, is precluded by the FRSA, and in the alternative, Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that Defendant violated § 389.797. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Webb was employed by UPRR starting in 1999 and began working as a brakeman in 2007. Webb worked approximately half the time in UPRR's Jefferson City yard, where Webb's job was comprised of working with an assigned crew to "switch" railcars—meaning add, remove, and move rail cars to build trains for other crews to take to different locations. On June 27, 2018, Webb and his crew took a train on track 3 into the yard, traveling east, and stopped near the 4-5 track switch so that Webb could alight from the train and align the switch for a later move. As Webb got off the train and began to walk toward the 4-5 switch, Webb slipped and fell. Specifically, Webb described his fall:
...it was, like, the ballast gave way. It was like...a mini avalanche or something. And it slid. The ballast gave way and I ended up going in a backwards direction trying to catch myself...and I ended up in one of these voids [referencing photographs of the area of the fall] with my shin against the rail...
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The fall at issue resulted in Webb severely twisting his knee and tearing his meniscus, requiring surgery. Despite undergoing surgery in July 2018, Webb alleges that he continues to experience knee pain and is unable to return to work for UPRR because Webb has difficulty walking on uneven ground. Webb states that his physician determined that Webb is permanently disabled and will require a total knee joint replacement in the future.
UPRR places ballast—essentially, large rocks—throughout its railyards, including in the area in which Webb fell, to structurally support the tracks and to provide proper drainage. Track-supporting ballast is required under the FRSA and Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") regulations. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-20121; 49 C.F.R. § 213.103. UPRR contends that the ballast foul of the track was in the condition it was in at the time of Webb's fall to support the track and drainage, satisfying the FRSA, and UPRR asserts that Webb's claim is entirely relatedto the ballast in the area of his fall. Webb disputes this and states that he identified a variety of factors, in addition to the ballast, that caused or contributed to cause his fall.
First, Plaintiff argues that there is evidence that some of the ballast in the immediate vicinity of the incident had been recently dug up to weld the rail and had not been replaced or tamped down. (Doc. 58-2). Second, he claims that the area around the 4-5 switch had been dug out (Doc. 58-2) to avoid freezing during the winter months, but the hole was never filled in during the summer months, including on June 27, 2018, and Webb alleges this further contributed to cause Webb's incident and injuries after he initially slipped. Third, Webb alleges the ballast size was too large. UPRR's own ballast standards call for the use of yard ballast that is 1½ inches or smaller, yet the ballast in the immediate vicinity of Webb's incident appeared to contain much larger rocks (Doc. 58-8, Testimony of Ryan Wright, 65:11-16) Finally, Webb identified potential tripping hazards such as anchor plates and broken tie pieces. (Doc. 58-6).
Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Reich v. ConAgra, Inc., 987 F.2d 1357, 1359 (8th Cir. 1993). "Where there is no dispute of material fact and reasonable fact finders could not find in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment is appropriate." Quinn v. St. Louis County, 653 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 2011). Initially, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant meets the initial step, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To satisfy this burden, the nonmoving party must "do more thansimply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
A question of material fact is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of the party asserting its existence. Rather, all that is required is sufficient evidence supporting the factual dispute that would require a jury to resolve the differing versions of truth at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248-249. Further, determinations of credibility and the weight to give evidence are the functions of the jury, not the judge. Wierman v. Casey's General Stores, et al., 638 F.3d 984, 993 (8th Cir. 2011).
UPRR alleges that the FRSA precludes Webb's claims, and further that 49 C.F.R. § 213.103 substantially subsumes Plaintiff's claims. This Court concludes that the FRSA does not have preclusive effect as to bar Webb's FELA claims. Even if the FRSA does preclude FELA, only one of Webb's claims directly concerns ballast, and so Webb's FELA claim as a whole is not precluded by the FRSA or § 213.103.
UPRR contends that Webb's only theory of negligence under FELA centers on alleged unreasonableness regarding the size, compaction, and location of ballast—UPRR, then, suggests that this theory is precluded because UPRR was in compliance with FRSA in its use of ballast. Specifically, UPRR asserts that Webb's claim is precluded by 49 C.F.R. § 213.103, which states in its entirety:
The FRSA was enacted in 1970, with the stated purpose of "promot[ing] safety in every area of railroad operations and reduc[ing] railroad-related accidents and incidents." 49 U.S.C. § 20101. While FELA is a general negligence statute that neither requires nor prohibits specific conduct by a railroad, the FRSA proscribes railroad conduct by empowering the Secretary of Transportation to implement comprehensive and detailed railroad safety regulations. Madden v. Anton Antonov & AV Transp., Inc., 156 F. Supp.3d 1011, 1018 (D. Neb. 2015) (citing Waymire v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 218 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 2000)); see 49 U.S.C. § 20103.
The FRSA unequivocally preempts state laws, regulations, and lawsuits. 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2). The statute provides:
A state may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security until the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters) ... prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement.
In CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993), The Supreme Court held that a state-law negligence claim is "covered" and thus preempted if a FRSA regulation "substantially subsume[s]" the subject matter of the suit.
In the case at hand, the question is whether the preemption power of the FRSA over state law negligence suits should also preclude negligence suits under FELA. Here, there is no issue as to whether Plaintiff brought an action under state law, but rather this case concerns the potential preclusion of a cause of action under one federal statute by the provisions of another federal statute. See Madden, 156 F. Supp.3d at 1019. "While preclusion analysis is not governed by the 'complex categorization' applicable to pre-emption, the principles of pre-emption are 'instructive insofar asthey are designed to assess the interaction of laws that bear on the same subject.'" Id. (quoting POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 201, 112, 134 S.Ct. 2228, 2236, 189 L.Ed.2d 141 (2014)). "The matter is ultimately a question of statutory interpretation." Madden, 156 F. Supp.3d at 1019 (citing POM Wonderful, 573 U.S. at 112).
This Court is mindful of the differing conclusions reached by other courts as to the preclusive effect of the FRSA on FELA causes of action. The Seventh Circuit has held that FELA claims are...
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