Webb v. Webb
Decision Date | 10 November 1955 |
Docket Number | 5 Div. 602 |
Citation | 263 Ala. 607,83 So.2d 325 |
Parties | Hilda S. WEBB v. Hulin H. WEBB. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Walker & Walker, Opelika, for appellant.
McKee & Maye, Opealika, for appellee.
This is a detinue suit filed in the circuit court of Lee County on February 26, 1954, by Hilda S. Webb against Hulin H. Webb to recover a 1949 Ford automobile and damages for its detention from September 6, 1951.
The return of the sheriff shows that he took the automobile into possession on March 3, 1954, under writ of seizure issued by the clerk based on affidavit and bond made by the plaintiff. The defendant failing to make bond within five days after seizure, the plaintiff on March 11, 1954, made bond and obtained possession of the automobile. § 920, Title 7, Code 1940.
The complaint is in Code form. Form 27, § 223, Title 7, Code 1940. The defendant did not plead the general issue which in an action of this kind is 'non detinet' or an averment that the allegations of the complaint are untrue. § 225, Title 7, Code 1940; Norris v. Kelly, 249 Ala. 281, 31 So.2d 129, and authorities cited. Instead, the defendant on May 1, 1954, filed the following special pleas:
'One 1949 Ford Two-door sedan Automobile, Motor N. 98BA-644440, being the automobile described in bill of sale from Hulin H. Webb to Hilda S. Webb, dated July 12, 1951;
'neither has, or does the defendant claim any right, title, interest or claim in said chattel above described, and he avers that said property is in the possession of the plaintiff in this cause.
The demurrer filed by the plaintiff to each of the pleas being overruled, the plaintiff joined issue on the pleas.
The cause came on for trial before the court without a jury and on May 21, 1954, the day of the trial, the court entered a judgment which reads:
'On this the 21st day of May, 1954, came the Plaintiff with her Attorneys and also came the Defendant with his Attorneys, issue being joined and trial by jury not having been demanded, the cause is tried and heard by the Court without a jury, and the Court after hearing the evidence in proof of the claim of the Plaintiff for the specific personal property sued for in the bill of complaint and the evidence of the value of the hire or use thereof during the detention and after consideration of the evidence the Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiff should recover the specific personal property sued for, to-wit: one (1) 1949 two-door sedan automobile, motor number 98BA-644440, and further the Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiff is not entitled to recover of the Defendant any value of hire or use thereof during the detention.
'It is further Considered, ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that the Plaintiff, Hilda S. Webb, have no damages for the value of the hire or use thereof during the detention.
'And it is further considered, ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that the cost herein be and hereby is taxed against the Plaintiff, Hilda S. Webb, for which let execution issue.'
On June 17, 1954, the plaintiff filed what is styled 'Motions to Set Aside Portions of Judgment,' which motions were overruled on August 28, 1954. Thereafter, the plaintiff duly perfected her appeal to this court from the decree of June 21, 1954.
It is argued here by the plaintiff below that the trial court erred in overruling her demurrer to each of the pleas.
The general rule is that a plea to the merits of a case must either specifically deny the cause of action set up in the complaint or it must confess the cause of action and set up matters which will legally avoid the cause of action so averred. Shearin v. Pizitz, 208 Ala. 244, 94 So. 92; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Williams, 200 Ala. 73, 75 So. 401; Black v. W. T. Smith Lumber Co., 179 Ala. 397, 60 So. 154; Smith Bros. & Co. v. W. C. Agee & Co., 178 Ala. 627, 59 So. 647.
The gist of an action of detinue is the detention of a chattel at the time of the commencement of the suit, that is, when the complaint is filed in the office of the clerk. § 43, Title 7, Code 1940; Penney v. Speake, 256 Ala. 359, 54 So.2d 709; Knight v. Garden, 196 Ala. 516, 71 So. 715; Gossett v. Morrow, 187 Ala. 387, 69 So. 826; Berlin Machine Works v. Alabama City Furniture Co., 112 Ala. 488, 20 So. 418. And the chattel sued for, together with damages for its detention, are the primary recovery in an action of detinue. § 921, Title 7, Code 1940; Balls v. Crump, 256 Ala. 512, 56 So.2d 108; Heard v. Hicks, 101 Ala. 102, 13 So. 256.
Since detention at the time the complaint was filed is the gist of the action, it is readily apparent that defendant's Plea No. 1 fails to specifically deny the cause of action set up in the complaint. The averment that defendant was not in possession of the automobile at the time of service of the summons and complaint or at the time of the filing of the plea is not a denial of possession at the time the suit was commenced. For aught appearing, the defendant might well have been in possession of the automobile at the time the complaint was filed, although not in possession at time of service or thereafter.
Likewise, defendant's Plea No. 1 is insufficient as a plea of confession and avoidance. It does not admit detention at time of commencement of the suit and seek to justify that detention.
Since there is no denial of possession at time of the commencement of the suit, Plea No. 1 cannot be said to be a 'disclaimer' such as is provided for in § 935, Title 7, Code 1940, which section reads:
It has been said that a 'disclaimer' is neither an answer or a defensive plea, but merely a denial of right or title in the defendant although not necessarily a denial of prior possession. Wilson v. McCoy, 93 W.Va. 667, 117 S.E. 473; Cowden v. Cowden, 143 Tex. 446, 186 S.W.2d 69.
But a casual reading of § 935, Title 7, supra, readily discloses that the 'disclaimer' there provided for is at least, in part, a defensive plea where the defendant must deny possession of the suit property at the time of the commencement of the suit. The last sentence of the section shows that the 'disclaimer' referred to therein is that of possession and certainly the lawmakers would not provide for a plaintiff to join issue on a 'disclaimer' and put upon him the burden of proving possession in the defendant at time of the commencement of the suit unless the 'disclaimer' contain averments denying such possession in the defendant. See Jones, Alabama Practice and Forms, Vol. 2, p....
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