Webb v. Webb

• Decision Date: 08 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2001 CA 1577.,2001 CA 1577.
• Citation: 835 So.2d 713
• Parties: Robert W. WEBB v. Alberta C. WEBB.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

835 So.2d 713

Robert W. WEBB v. Alberta C. WEBB.

No. 2001 CA 1577.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

November 8, 2002.

Writ Denied March 14, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Richard D. McShan, Amite, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Robert W. Webb.

Clifton T. Speed, Greensburg, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Estate of Alberta C. Webb.

Before: FOGG, FITZSIMMONS, DOWNING, LANIER¹ and KLINE,² JJ.

DOWNING, J.

Plaintiff/appellee, Robert Wayne Webb (Wayne),³ filed this action against his aunt, defendant/appellant, Alberta Courtney Webb (Alberta),⁴ asserting he was entitled to ownership of 83.21 acres of land owned by Alberta. His claim was based on an alleged oral agreement that he would take care of her and the property in exchange for receiving the property through Alberta's will. Alternatively, Wayne claimed reimbursement for all labor performed by him "from 1981 to the present date in addition to reimbursement for all cost [sic] and expenses spent by him, inclusive of the $9,500.00 for the purchase of a certain 5.02 acres . . . . " Alberta filed a cross-claim for the eviction of Wayne and his wife from the premises. Prior to trial, the court ordered Wayne and his wife to vacate the controverted property, with the exception of the 5.02 acre tract for which it stated that the rule to evict was "overruled at this time and until the ownership dispute involving said property can be determined."

Alberta filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action alleging that a promise of a legacy was not enforceable while she was alive. The trial court overruled the exception because "a promise to make a disposition mortis causa is enforceable against the promisor's estate when the formal disposition is not made." See LSA-C.C. art.1967, comment (f). This cause of action was premature when filed because an action for reimbursement for services rendered when there is a breach of the promise to pay for services (labor) by a disposition mortis causa of property is enforceable against the promisor's estate. Wayne's petition stated a cause of action, however, the cause of action was premature when filed because Alberta was still alive; she did not die until after the final judgment in the trial court. The dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity was waived when it was not pleaded prior to, or in, the answer. LSA-C.C.P. art. 928A.

Following trial, the court awarded the following: a lifetime usufruct of the 5.02 acres in favor of Wayne; $85,500.00 to be paid to Wayne for services he provided Alberta from 1981 through 1999; $9,500.00 payment of money to Wayne for the purchase of 5.02 acres in Alberta's name; and the right to maintain the notice of lis pendens filed by Wayne against the land owned by Alberta, which notice would remain in effect until the money judgment was paid. The court ordered that the monetary judgment was not executory until the death of Alberta.

On appeal, Alberta assigns as error:

(1) The court's award of a lifetime usufruct of the 5.02 acres and the court's failure to evict Wayne and his wife from that tract;

(2) The court's failure to order cancellation of the lis pendens notice;

(3) The court's award of $85,500.00 compensation for services/labor performed from 1981 to 1999;

(4) The court's failure to grant defendant's peremptory exception raising the objection of liberative prescription for any claim; and

(5) The court's award of $9,500.00 in compensation for the purchase price of the 5.02 acres, and its failure to require Wayne to account for the receipt of a $1,000.00 payment purportedly made to Alberta for a right-of-way.

OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY

In his reasons for judgment, the trial judge stated "Robert Webb did not present adequate evidence to show an ownership right in the disputed property." Pursuant to this factual finding, judgment was rendered as follows:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff, Robert Wayne Webb, does not have any ownership interest in the property at issue.

Wayne did not appeal or answer the appeal. This judgment is res judicata. LSA-R.S. 13:4231.

The ownership of the property is not at issue in this appeal. Prior to her death, Alberta was the owner of the property.

COMPENSATION

The court found factually that Wayne had "performed work for defendant on the property disputed over the last twenty years." The court then awarded as compensation $85,500.00 and a lifetime usufruct on the 5.02 acre tract. The court did not cite any legal basis for this ruling.

The Usufruct

In his reasons for judgment, the trial judge stated Wayne "was entitled to compensation for work performed for" Alberta and "[a]s compensation this court awards to plaintiff [Wayne] the lifetime usufruct of the 5.02 acre tract." Judgment was rendered accordingly.

A usufruct is a real right that may be established by a juridical act, either inter vivos or mortis causa, or by operation of the law. LSA-C.C. art. 544. Wayne did not allege or prove the creation of a usufruct by a juridical act. There is no legal basis for a court to create a usufruct as, or for, compensation. The establishment, ex proprio mote, of a usufruct in favor of Wayne was legal error. The portion of the judgment granting the usufruct is reversed.

Because Wayne and his wife, Charlotte Durbin Webb, have no legal basis for the occupancy of the 5.02 acres, the trial court should have ordered their eviction.

This assignment of error has merit.

The Monetary Compensation

The nature of the relationship between Wayne and Alberta determines whether or not he has a legal basis to claim compensation. If Wayne has a legal basis to claim compensation, then the evidence must be reviewed to see if he proved his entitlement to compensation.

In his oral reason for judgment, the trial judge stated the following:

So, no matter what it says, I don't find that, the fact that a Will was done, olographic or statutory, gives Mr. Webb any ownership rights in the property. I do not think that there was a donation. I do not think that there was a contract.

. . . .

I don't think there's any doubt that he performed services for twenty years on the property. I don't think there's any doubt that he cut the grass, he planted the hay. I'm not a farmer so all the things that he's testified he did, I have no doubt that he did it. I have no doubt that he loved her. I have no doubt that Mr. Webb cared for Mrs. Alberta, watched over her, and all of that. I also have no doubt, and I say this as an aside that Mrs. Alberta is not the sticking point in this case. I think, quite frankly, she's being used up to a point, and that's quite sad. So, I want that record to complete that. We've been here a long time, so let me get to the bottom line. I think Mr. Webb is entitled to some compensation for the work that he did from 1981 through 1999. (Emphasis added.)

In his written reasons for judgment, the trial judge stated, "[h]owever, plaintiff produced nine witnesses that showed he was entitled to compensation for work he performed for defendant on the property disputed over the last twenty years." Wayne was awarded $85,500.00.

A contract is an agreement by two or more parties whereby obligations are created, modified, or extinguished. LSA-C.C. art.1906. An obligation is a legal relationship whereby a person, called an obligor, is bound to render a performance in favor of another, called the obligee. Performance may consist of giving, doing, or not doing something. LSA-C.C. art. 1756. An obligation cannot exist without a lawful cause. LSA-C.C. art.1966. Cause is the reason why a party obligates him-self. LSA-C.C. art.1967. Article 1967 also provides as follows:

A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the promisee's reliance on the promise. Reliance on a gratuitous promise made without required formalities is not reasonable. (Emphasis added.)

A promise to make a disposition mortis causa is enforceable against the promisor's estate when the formal disposition is not made. See Revision Comment-1984, paragraph (f) for Article 1967. Thus, when a person promises to make a donation mortis causa in return for a promise to render services (perform labor), there is an agreement between two parties that creates reciprocal obligations and this agreement is a contract.

Although Wayne did not expressly plead alternate relief in quasi-contract, he asserted that "he is entitled to reimbursement for all labor performed by him ... and expenses ...." See LSA-C.C.P. arts. 854 and 862. Obligations arising without agreement for which the law has provided an equitable remedy pursuant to Title V of the Louisiana Civil Code are based on the concept of quasi-contract. Louisiana Civil Code articles 2298-2305 address enrichment without cause and a commensurate obligation on the part of the enriched person to compensate for the other party's impoverishment. Actions based on unjust enrichment have been codified in LSA-C.C. art. 2298, as follows:

A person who has been enriched without cause at the expense of another person is bound to compensate that person. The term "without cause" is used in this context to exclude cases in which the enrichment results from a valid juridical act or the law. The remedy declared here is subsidiary and shall not be available if the law provides another remedy for the impoverishment or declares a contrary rule.

The amount of compensation due is measured by the extent to which one has been enriched or the other has been impoverished, whichever is less.

The extent of the enrichment or impoverishment is measured as of the time the suit is brought or, according to the circumstances, as of the time the judgment is rendered. (Emphasis added.)

To recover...