Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Skeen, 8803
| Decision Date | 05 August 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 8803,8803 |
| Citation | 328 P.2d 730,8 Utah 2d 79 |
| Parties | d 79 WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Willard A. SKEEN, also known as Willard Arthur Skeen, John G. Braegger, Jr. and Elsie L. Braegger, his wife, et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Neil R. Olmstead, Ogden, E. J. Skeen, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Joseph C. Foley, Ogden, George M. Mason, Brigham City, Robert B. Porter, Jr., Salt Lake City, for respondents.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the District Court entered upon a special verdict awarding $80,000 to the defendants John G. and Elsie L. Braegger, in a condemnation proceeding. Defendants' land was taken in connection with the creation of the Willard Dam, a part of the Weber Basin Reclamation Project. Defendants' recovery consisted of $66,850 for the value of the land taken, $11,300 for damages to buildings and improvements and $1,850 as severance damage to some 37 acres not condemned. The defendants operated a farm, which included a dairy and cattle business, located near Willard, Utah. Approximately 138 acres of this farm were condemned.
Plaintiff contends (1) that the award of the jury was excessive, influenced by passion and prejudice; (2) that the portion of the award given to compensate for severance damage is totally unsupported by the evidence; and (3) that the trial court committed error by giving the jury certain instructions orally, contrary to the provisions of Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
We examine these contentions in the order set forth.
The contention that the alleged excessive verdict was influenced by passion and prejudice is grounded upon questions asked and comments made by certain jurors relative to elements of damage. Read out of their context and the circumstances under which they were voiced, such questions and comments would suggest that some of the jurors desired to award defendants the maximum amount permissible. However, appraised in light of the whole record we are not persuaded that the verdict was tainted by passion or prejudice. Nor can we say that the damages were in fact excessive.
There were three expert witnesses called to testify to the value of defendants' property, two called by plaintiff and one by defendants. Plaintiff's experts reached figures of roughly $45,000 and $50,000 respectively, while defendants' witness estimated the value to be near $80,000.
Defendants' expert and one of plaintiff's each testified that in their opinion there had been no damage done to the remainder by severance of the condemned land. The parties had stipulated that plaintiff would provide an access road, fencing, irrigation ditches and head gates for the remaining land to ensure its usefulness. Defendants testified the remainder would be of little value to them as it was too small for their normal business use.
The jury had the benefit of opinions from three qualified experts as to the value of the land. Although these opinions varied considerably it is within the prerogative of the jury to believe whom it chooses, and it chose to believe defendants' expert rather than plaintiff's. On cross examination of the two experts, called by plaintiff, some doubt was cast an the thoroughness of their inspection of the land, and this may well have affected the jury's consideration of their lower evaluations.
When a jury verdict is supported by competent evidence, as was here the case, it is generally left unaltered by this court. 1 In this case the alleged passion and prejudice which could alter this rule 2 has not been demonstrated. Despite plaintiff's attempt to show the jury's hostile attitude it remains that the award was within the estimate of value given by one of the expert witnesses and being thus supported by competent evidence, is entitled to the recognition and affirmation of this court. The fact that the jury chose to render its verdict in harmony with the highest of the available valuations is not in itself cause for reversal.
The second point raised by plaintiff is well taken. As noted above the jury, with divergent...
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Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange
...Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985); Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961); Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958). A challenge to the amount of an award of hard compensatory damages, which by definition are to compensate t......
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...remanded for a new trial. Costs to defendants. STEWART, HOWE, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 1 Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 81, 328 P.2d 730, 731 (1958); see also People v. Hayward Bldg. Materials Co., 213 Cal.App.2d 457, 28 Cal.Rptr. 782 (1963).2 Utah, 52......
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Yelderman v. Yelderman, 18516
...of her attorney's fees. Judgment affirmed. Costs to plaintiff. STEWART, J., does not participate. 1 Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958); Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 422, 394 P.2d 77 (1964); Lamkin v. Lynch, Utah, 600 P.2d 530 (1979).2 Defendant h......
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