Weber v. City Council

Citation9 Cal.3d 950,109 Cal.Rptr. 553,513 P.2d 601
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Decision Date04 September 1973
Parties, 513 P.2d 601 Nelson E. WEBER et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY COUNCIL OF THOUSAND OAKS et al., Defendants and Respondents; Larry SADE, Intervenor and Respondent. L.A. 30099.

Christen Brun Henrichsen, Thousand Oaks, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Raymond C. Clayton, City Atty., Burke, Williams & Sorensen, and Royal M. Sorensen, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

John D. Maharg, County Counsel, David D. Mix, Los Angeles, and Douglas V. Hart, Deputy County Counsel, Santa Barbara, Deniel J. Curtin, Jr., City Atty., Walnut Creek, Kenneth C. Scheidig, Asst. City Atty., Holden & Bevins, and Ronald H. Bevins, Fullerton, as amici curiae on behalf of defendants and respondents.

No appearance for intervenor and respondent.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of mandate to compel defendants city council and city clerk to terminate proceedings for annexing approximately 24.7 acres of land to the City of Thousand Oaks under the Annexation of Uninhabited Territory Act of 1939 (Gov.Code, §§ 35300--35326, hereinafter referred to as the 1939 act.) 1

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, own and reside on a parcel of approximately 4.7 acres within the territory sought to be annexed and as such residents had been registered to vote for more than 54 days before commencement of the annexation proceedings. The remainder of the parcel is uninhabited and is owned by Larry Sade, a building contractor, who initiated the annexation proceedings to obtain municipal services necessary for developing his property.

Territory contiguous to a city is deemed uninhabited for purposes of annexation under the 1939 act 'if less than 12 persons who have been registered to vote within the territory for at least 54 days reside within the territory at the time of the' commencement of the annexation proceedings. (§ 35303.) Such an 'uninhabited' annexation proceeding does not require the holding of an election or the obtaining of consent from the residents of the annexed territory, but the proceeding is subject to termination upon written protest by the owners of land and improvements having a value constituting at least one-half the total value of the land in and improvements on the territory proposed to be annexed. (§ 35313, subds. (a), (c).) The assessed value of plaintiffs' property was less than one-half of the total assessed value of the land in and improvements on the territory at the time of the annexation hearing before the defendant city council, and the proposal was approved by the city council notwithstanding plaintiff's oral and written protests. In accordance with the 1939 act, no election was held.

Subject to special exceptions for territory that is publicly owned, located within another city, or 'enclosed' by the annexing city, 2 territory containing 12 or more resident voters, registered for at least 54 days, can only be annexed under the Annexation Act of 1913. (§§ 35100--35158, hereinafter referred to as the 1913 act.) Annexation under the 1913 act requires a special election of registered voters residing in the territory proposed to be annexed at which a majority of the votes cast must be in favor of annexation. (§§ 35122--35135.) 3 However, the proceedings must be terminated without the holding of an election if a written protest is made by the owners of land having a value constituting one-half the value of all the land of the territory, exclusive of improvements. (§§ 35120--35121.1.)

Plaintiffs' basic contention is that the inclusion of their property in the territory proposed to be annexed without giving the residents within that territory an opportunity to vote on the issue violated their rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. 4 They contend that because residents of Inhabited territory are entitled to vote on annexation to a city under the 1913 act, the state is constitutionally required to grant a similar right to vote on annexation to residents of territory that is deemed Uninhabited because it contains fewer than 12 registered voters. For reasons discussed below we reject plaintiffs' contention and hold that differences in the nature and surrounding circumstances of the two proceedings are sufficient to render such constitutional objections inapplicable.

A history of the annexation proceeding leading to the present litigation illustrates the practical context within while the 1939 act is intended to operate. A proceeding to annex 'uninhabited' territory under the 1939 act may be commenced either by a written petition of the owners of at least one-fourth of the area and one-fourth of the assessed land value of the territory to be annexed (§ 35305) or by resolution of the city's legislative body (§ 35310). However, no annexation proceeding may be commenced without the prior approval of the local agency formation commission (LAFCO) of the county in which the city is located. (§§ 35002, 54773--54799.2.)

The first preparatory move shown by the record is evidenced by a letter dated September 25, 1970, from the proposed developer, Sade, to the defendant city council requesting annexation of a parcel of land owned by him containing approximately 9.9 acres. In response, the city planning department asked the Ventura County Public Works Department to prepare a map and legal description which would include not only the parcel proffered by Sade but also an adjoining parcel, the 4.7-acre parcel owned by plaintiffs, with approximately equivalent frontage on the same road. The city planning department also obtained the following figures of assessed valuation from the county assessor's office: Sade parcel: land $24,000, improvements zero; plaintiffs' parcel: land $11,830, improvements $5,050, total $16,880.

On November 20 the city and Sade submitted an application to the Ventura County LAFCO for approval of the annexation, which included plaintiffs' property. In answering a questionnaire Sade stated the reason he was applying for annexation was to obtain city sewer service necessary to develop his property. The city's questionnaire included a statement that annexation would not affect the tax rate because there is no city property tax.

On November 24 the city clerk notified plaintiffs that Sade had applied for annexation of his parcel, that plaintiffs' parcel 'has been added to this request to allow for a more reasonable annexation boundary configuration,' and that LAFCO would be holding a hearing on the application at a time and place which could be ascertained from that agency. In reply plaintiffs, through counsel, objected to annexation of their property. Sade, on learning of this objection, asked the city to proceed without including plaintiffs' property.

On January 5, 1971, the interested parties appeared through counsel at a city council meeting. Plaintiffs' attorney explained that his clients were 'concerned that future problems may arise under zoning regulations due to the use of their property, which is a dog kennel for breeding and showing dogs.' The city council by unanimous vote refused to delete plaintiffs' parcel from the annexation proposal. On January 13 LAFCO approved the proposal, subject to the inclusion of an additional 10.1-acre parcel also owned by Sade. Plaintiffs did not appear at the LAFCO hearing. 5

Having received LAFCO approval, the city council on January 26 adopted a resolution formally giving notice of the proposed annexation of territory which included all three parcels and setting March 9th as the date for a public hearing and for the filing of written protests by property owners within the area proposed to be annexed. (§§ 35305--35307, 35310.) Plaintiffs filed their written protest in which they stated that they were not only property owners but also residents of the territory and had been registered voters therein for more than 54 days prior to the institution of the annexation proceedings. They objected to the annexation 'on all legal grounds' and particularly specified the ground that the annexation 'is a taking without due process of law' in violation of the Constitutions of California and the United States. They also appeared through counsel as the only protesting property owners at the hearing on March 9.

The city planning director reported at the hearing on March 9 that the assessed value of the lands and improvements owned by plaintiffs was less than one half the assessed value of the lands in and improvements on the territory within the proposed annexation. 6 The council formally resolved that no majority protest had been made and that the annexation proceedings were complete. On March 16 the city council adopted a formal annexation ordinance to become effective on April 16.

The present mandate proceeding was commenced on April 15, the day before the city might have completed the annexation under the 1939 act by filing the ordinance with the Secretary of State. (§§ 35316--35318.) Plaintiffs' petition, which sought to set aside the annexation proceedings, was denied by a judgment signed on June 14 and entered June 16, 1971. 7 The judgment recites that at the hearing on the merits, plaintiffs and defendants stipulated that the proceedings before LAFCO and the city council 'were regular and followed applicable State law on annexation matters.' There is no indication that the court made any written findings of fact or conclusions of law.

Defendants make several procedural challenges to the maintenance of this proceeding. It is not necessary that we reach and resolve such issues, however, in view of our conclusion that none of plaintiffs' objections to the annexation proceedings can be sustained. We thus address ourselves to the merits of the petition.

'Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state. Subject only to its own...

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