Weber v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 04 December 1928
• Docket Number: Oct. Term.,No. 99,99
• Citation: 222 N.W. 198,245 Mich. 213
• Parties: WEBER v. FORD MOTOR CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

245 Mich. 213

222 N.W. 198

WEBER

v.FORD MOTOR CO.

No. 99, Oct. Term.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 4, 1928.

Error to Circuit Court, Wayne County; Guy E. Smith, Judge.

Action by Joseph F. Weber against the Ford Motor Company, a Delaware Corporation. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

In the fore part of 1907, the defendant was looking for some property on which to erect its Highland Park plant. The Stevens Land Company had a piece of property which would meet its requirements; to make it available for connection with the Detroit Terminal Railroad Company (a belt line) required 10 lots of a subdivision owned by plaintiff, which at that time had not found a ready market. Plaintiff was approached, and the desirability to him and his property of having the Ford plant there located was pointed out. He was impressed, and for a consideration of $1,500 deeded the lots to the Stevens Company on March 25, 1907; the deed contained the following recitals:

‘For the purposes of a railroad right of way and for no other purpose. * * * And the parties of the first part hereby reserve for themselves, their heirs, executors, administrators or assigns the right at their own separate cost and expense, to connect any spur or sidetracks that may be laid upon land now owned by them adjacent to the premises hereby conveyed, with any railroad track that may hereafter be constructed or operated upon the premises hereby conveyed.’

On April 4, following, the Stevens Land Company conveyed the premises to the terminal company, subject to the conditions of plaintiff's deed. Defendant's plant was built on the Stevens property and the terminal company connected it with its system by four tracks over the lots in question. The defendant has built loading docks, sheds, and other plant facilities on the premises in question, and a small portion of one of its main buildings is also on one of the lots. In 1917 the terminal company moved its main tracks further north, and three of the tracks above referred to were moved to the new locations; connection by the terminal line with the Ford plant was, however, continued. In 1920, the terminal company quitclaimed the lots in question and other lands to defendant. The findings disclose that four of the lots are still occupied by tracks, and it is to be inferred that the other six are not. It would appear that in 1922, plaintiff wrote both the terminal company and defendant about connecting a siding with the tracks of defendant's plant. The letters do not appear in the record; the replies do. The terminal company referred plaintiff to defendant, and defendant, while saying it did not see its way clear to grant the request, suggested that plaintiff come in and talk it over. Nothing further was done. Plaintiff's remaining property was being used as a golf club, and what use he had for a side track does not appear. Without giving notice of forfeiture or demanding compliance with the conditions of the deed, this action of ejectment was brought; it was tried by the court without a jury. The trial judge found as requested by defendant, both as to the facts and the law.

Argued before the Entire Bench. Earl I. Heenan and MacKay, Wiley, Streeter, Smith & Tucker, all of Detroit, for appellant.

Clifford B. Longley and Wallace R. Middleton, both of Detroit, for appellee.

FELLOWS, J. (after stating the facts as above.

We have concluded that the judgment should be affirmed for two reasons which we shall presently state, but our duty requires us to consider the reasons urged by plaintiff for reversal and to state why such reasons do not require or justify a reversal. Before taking up the two reasons referred to, we shall consider the other questions discussed.

1. The trial judge signed defendant's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. He refused to find as requested by plaintiff's counsel on any of the facts, and likewise refused all his requests for conclusions of law. He also refused to amend any of defendant's findings or conclusions. Plaintiff's counsel are justified in part at least in their criticism of this course; a few of the findings are without any evidential support, some of the conclusions of law would have been more appropriate under the findings of fact and vice versa. But is such findings as have evidential support to support the judgment and are not against the clear weight of the evidence, the judgment should be affirmed. Plaintiff's counsel most seriously criticize the refusal of the court to find that the consideration of the deed from plaintiff to the terminal company was nominal. From plaintiff's viewpoint, this was an important fact. Numerous cases hold that conditions are not favored in the law, and numerous other cases hold that in case of voluntary conveyances, where the condition furnishes the only consideration, the courts will not hesitate about enforcing conditions or in finding that a conditional estate exists. Plaintiff testified that the consideration was nominal, and no one testified to the contrary. There was no testimony that the value of the 10 lots was more or less than the $1,500 named in the deed. Possibly the trial judge was justified in refusing to find as requested on this subject on the ground that the...