Weber v. Greenebaum

• Decision Date: 02 May 1921
• Docket Number: 271
• Citation: 270 Pa. 382,113 A. 413
• Parties: Weber v. Greenebaum, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

113 A. 413

270 Pa. 382

Weber v. Greenebaum, Appellant

No. 271

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 2, 1921

Argued March 21, 1921

Appeal, No. 271, Jan. T., 1921, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. No. 2, Phila. Co., Dec. T., 1919, No. 1907, on verdict for plaintiff, in case of William A. Weber v. Simon Greenebaum. Affirmed.

Trespass for personal injuries. Before BARRATT, P.J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $5,215. Defendant appealed.

Error assigned, among others, was refusal of defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v., quoting record.

The judgment is affirmed.

Francis Chapman, for appellant, cited: Patton v. Traction Co., 132 Pa. 76.

J Morris Yeakle, for appellee.

Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., WALLING, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MOSCHZISKER:

On December 5, 1919, between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m., plaintiff was driving his automobile east on Callowhill Street, approaching 21st Street; at the same time, defendant was driving his automobile north on 21st Street toward Callowhill. When plaintiff's machine was some five feet from the crossing he saw defendant about 135, or possibly 150, feet away, approaching from the right; with this knowledge, plaintiff started to cross the intersection, going at the rate of four miles an hour, and was struck, well toward the rear of his car, by defendant's automobile, before he, plaintiff, had cleared the crossing. Plaintiff's car was turned over, and he received severe injuries. There was no direct evidence as to the speed of defendant's machine. A verdict was rendered for plaintiff, on which judgment was entered, and defendant has appealed.

Appellant contends that, since he was on plaintiff's right (although nearly half a square away), the latter, according to the governing rule of the road, should not have proceeded across 21st Street until he, defendant, had passed; and that, under the circumstances, he was not negligent.

The trial judge charged the jury in substance that, if they believed the testimony for plaintiff, they would be justified in finding he was not negligent and defendant was, unless something about the latter's operation of his car would warn a reasonably careful man defendant was not driving properly; that plaintiff was not required to wait on an automobile approaching from the distance the evidence showed defendant's car to be; that the Act of June 30, 1919, P.L. 678, 695, which provides "When two vehicles approach the intersection of two public highways at the same time, the vehicle approaching from the right shall have the right of way," must be given a reasonable and practical application, and it was still the law that one arriving at the intersection, a substantial distance in advance of another, was entitled to proceed, irrespective of the right or left rule; that, if defendant was not negligent, according to the standard thus set, they should find for him; that, if defendant was negligent and plaintiff also was negligent, their verdict should be for the former; and that only in case defendant alone was negligent should they find for plaintiff. These instructions present a proper statement of the law governing the facts involved, and the binding directions contended for by defendant would have been improper.

The trial judge did not misconstrue the statute when he said specifically, "The act means that, when two vehicles are approaching in the sense that they both are in the process of coming near to an intersection so that they [will] reach it about the same time, the one approaching from the left must wait until the one approaching from the right has had an opportunity to pass the intersection in safety so far as the movements of the left one are concerned. It is [still] the law [however] that when one vehicle [actually] reaches an intersection of streets ["substantially in advance of one approaching from the right"], it has the right of way over the other vehicle coming toward the intersection, but not yet arrived, and this without reference to right or left approach."

The evil which the legislature desired to guard against was liability to collisions at crossings....