Weber v. Saint Louis University, 92-3903
| Decision Date | 06 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-3903,92-3903 |
| Citation | 6 F.3d 558 |
| Parties | 86 Ed. Law Rep. 88, 17 Employee Benefits Ca 1482 Joan J. WEBER, Appellee, v. SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
F. Douglas O'Leary, St. Louis, MO, argued (Robyn Greifzu Fox appeared on brief), for appellant.
Brian A. Spector, St. Louis, MO, argued (Clyde E. Craig, on brief), for appellee.
Before WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
Saint Louis University appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Joan Weber on a claim for benefits under her group disability insurance. Central to that appeal is the university's challenge to the trial court's refusal to allow discovery on, to hear evidence regarding, or to consider in any way the issue of when Ms. Weber became disabled. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Between 1981 and 1984, Ms. Weber was studying for her master's degree in business administration at Saint Louis University. In mid-1983, she was hired as an assistant with the university's Small Business Development Center. She worked there part-time until she received her degree in mid-1984; she then became a full-time employee until the elimination of her position and the consequent termination of her employment in September, 1986.
As an employee, Ms. Weber was eligible to participate in the retirement plan in effect at Saint Louis University. She applied to do so in early 1986 and was accepted for participation as of April, 1986. The retirement plan used the contributions of participants to buy annuity contracts from TIAA/CREF (essentially a large insurance company primarily serving university and college employees). After an employee completed three years of continuous employment, the university would match any contributions made by the employee.
As a university employee, Ms. Weber was also covered under group disability insurance obtained through TIAA. That plan provided two different types of benefits in the event an employee became disabled--monthly income payments based on a percentage of the employee's regular salary, and monthly premium payments toward any annuities already purchased under the retirement plan by the university's matching contributions. The only condition on the income payments was that the employee's period of disability have begun while the employee was insured (in other words, while the employee was working for the university, since coverage under the group disability insurance ended when an employee's university employment ended). To be eligible for the annuity premium payments, however, an employee's period of disability had to have begun at a time when the university was making matching contributions toward the employee's retirement plan.
In mid-1988, Ms. Weber applied for disability benefits under the group disability insurance in effect at the time of her employment with the university. TIAA preliminarily approved Ms. Weber's application for income payments and annuity premium payments, but the university challenged that approval with respect to the annuity premium payments. (Under the terms of the group disability insurance contract, the university had the right to overrule a preliminary determination by TIAA of coverage for an employee.) The university contended at that time that because of her part-time employment, Ms. Weber had never completed enough years of service to have become eligible for matching retirement contributions from the university and, accordingly, for the annuity premium payments. Consequently, TIAA made only the income payments to Ms. Weber.
In late 1989, Ms. Weber sued the university in federal court. Her complaint alleged that she had completed enough years of service to have become eligible for matching retirement contributions from the university as of June 1, 1986, and was therefore entitled to those contributions under the retirement plan. (Interestingly, the complaint does not mention that eligibility for matching retirement contributions would also allow the annuity premium payments under the group disability insurance.) The university counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment with respect to when Ms. Weber became disabled and, therefore, with respect to the university's obligations under the retirement plan and the group disability insurance plan. After several discovery skirmishes, the trial court ruled that because the university had never challenged the fact of Ms. Weber's disability at the relevant times, and therefore the threshold premise of her right to any benefits at all under the group disability insurance, the trial court would not allow discovery on the issue of when Ms. Weber became disabled.
The parties made cross-motions for summary judgment. In its briefs, the university conceded that Ms. Weber actually had completed enough years of service as of June 1, 1986, to become eligible for matching retirement contributions from the university. The university argued, however, that its obligations under the retirement plan (including potential liability for annuity premium payments under the group disability insurance plan) ended on September 30, 1986, when Ms. Weber's university employment ended. The university further argued that Ms. Weber's period of disability had begun either before June 1, 1986, or after September 30, 1986, but, in any event, not while the university was making matching contributions toward Ms. Weber's retirement plan. Consequently, the university argued, it was not liable for any annuity premium payments under the group disability insurance plan.
The trial court denied summary judgment to the university and granted it to Ms. Weber on both her claim and the university's counterclaim. SeeWeber v. St. Louis University, 804 F.Supp. 1141 (E.D.Mo.1992). In its opinion, the trial court stated that it was reviewing de novo the university's denial of benefits (the annuity premium payments) to Ms. Weber. Id. at 1145. Even under such...
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