Webster Bank v. Zak
Decision Date | 13 August 2002 |
Docket Number | (AC 20906) |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | WEBSTER BANK v. JOANNA v. ZAK ET AL. |
Foti, Mihalakos and Daly, Js. Kerry M. Wisser, with whom was Nathan A. Schatz, for the appellant (defendant MFR of East Hampton, LLC).
Jeffrey T. Beatty, with whom, on the brief, was Richard J. Beatty, for the appellee (substitute plaintiff EMC Mortgage Corporation).
This appeal in a foreclosure action returns to this court on remand from our Supreme Court. Webster Bank v. Zak, 259 Conn. 766, 792 A.2d 66 (2002).1 The defendant MFR of East Hampton, LLC (MFR), appeals from the trial court's judgment of foreclosure, claiming that the court improperly concluded that a prior judgment conclusively established the principal amount of debt owed by MFR to the substitute plaintiff, EMC Mortgage Corporation (EMC). The central issue in this appeal is whether it was improper for the court to determine that EMC's amended complaint did not vacate the entire previous judgment, which would have resulted in opening the pleadings as to all issues, including liability and the amount of debt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Our Supreme Court set forth the facts and procedural history of this case in Webster Bank v. Zak, supra, 259 Conn. 766. "On July 16, 1997, the plaintiff, Webster Bank (bank), brought an action seeking to foreclose a mortgage on three parcels of land in Clinton, of which the named defendant, Joanna V. Zak (Zak), was the titleholder of record.2 On November 24, 1997, the trial court, Arena, J., rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale. After determining the amount of the debt due on the note and the costs associated with the foreclosure action, the court scheduled the sale date for July 18, 1998.
MFR claims that the court improperly held that EMC's second amended complaint did not open and vacate the entire November 24, 1997 judgment. Stated otherwise, MFR claims that the "new complaint gives all parties the opportunity to start the case anew for all purposes," and that the court's decision is contrary to established procedural rules and violative of due process. We disagree.
We first set forth the legal principles that govern our resolution of that issue. We review the court's decision not to open the pleadings as to all issues under an abuse of discretion standard. Townsley v. Townsley, 37 Conn. App. 100, 104, 654 A.2d 1261 (1995); see Wagner v. Clark Equipment Co., 259 Conn. 114, 128, 788 A.2d 83 (2002). Further, " (Citation omitted.) People's Bank v. Letendre, 57 Conn. App. 645, 646, 749 A.2d 1227 (2000); see 1 B. Holden & J. Daly, Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed. 1988) § 35, pp. 159-60. "Our review of the trial court's exercise of legal discretion is limited to the question of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did." People's Bank v. Letendre, supra, 646.
Because MFR relies on the second amended complaint as the vehicle for opening the November 24, 1997 judgment as to all issues in the case, including liability and the amount of debt, we focus our attention on that complaint and its attendant circumstances.
Following its acceptance of the quitclaim deed from Zak, MFR moved to be cited in as an additional party defendant. The court properly granted MFR's motion. In response, the court ordered EMC to amend its complaint by naming MFR as a party defendant. To satisfy the court's order, EMC filed a motion requesting leave to do so. The motion specifically stated its limited purpose as "adding MFR ... as a party defendant." MFR's motion to be cited in predicated the court's order for EMC to amend its complaint. In other words, but for MFR's motion to be cited in, EMC never would have had to file the second amended complaint. The filing of the second amended complaint, therefore, was compulsory in nature and not voluntary.
MFR, nevertheless, argues that the filing itself resulted in the opening of the judgment, as if the court never had rendered judgment, thereby allowing MFR to challenge its liability and debt under EMC's note and mortgage. In support of its argument in that regard, MFR relies on Practice Book § 10-61 in conjunction with Clover Farms, Inc....
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