Webster Groves School Dist. v. Pulitzer Pub. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-2559,89-2559
• Citation: 898 F.2d 1371
• Parties: , 59 Ed. Law Rep. 630, 17 Media L. Rep. 1633 WEBSTER GROVES SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellees, v. PULITZER PUBLISHING COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 1371

898 F.2d 1371

58 USLW 2594, 59 Ed. Law Rep. 630, 17

Media L. Rep. 1633

WEBSTER GROVES SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellees, v. PULITZER PUBLISHING COMPANY, Appellant.

No. 89-2559.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 16, 1989.

Decided March 27, 1990.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 14, 1990.

Robert B. Hoemeke, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.

Stephen C. Hiotis, Clayton, Mo., for appellees.

Before BOWMAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges, and ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Pulitzer Publishing Company (Pulitzer) appeals an order of the District Court ¹ rejecting Pulitzer's efforts to open the proceedings in a lawsuit between the Webster Groves, Missouri, School District (School District) and a handicapped student. We affirm.

In November 1988, T.B., a fourteen-year-old public school student who had been classified as a handicapped child under the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(1) (1988), brought a loaded handgun to school, in violation of school policy, and threatened classmates with it. He was first suspended and then expelled from school. Before expulsion, T.B.'s individualized education program (IEP) committee met to determine whether the behavior that resulted in the discipline was a result of the child's handicapping condition. T.B.'s grandmother and legal guardian, a member of the IEP committee, disagreed with the committee's finding of no relation between the gun incidents and the handicap, thus entitling her to seek administrative review on T.B.'s behalf. The "stay put" provision of the EHA, prohibiting expulsion pending the outcome of the review proceedings, was triggered when she requested administrative relief. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(3) (1988). The School District then sought in Missouri circuit court to enjoin T.B. from attending school pending exhaustion of his administrative remedies, see Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327, 108 S.Ct. 592, 606, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988), and was granted a temporary restraining order. Before the state court could hold a hearing on the School District's motion for a preliminary injunction, T.B. removed the case to federal district court. As the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction was about to begin in the District Court on the afternoon of February 2, 1989, counsel for T.B. asked that the courtroom be closed to the public. The School District did not object. Ruling from the bench, Judge Hungate granted the request, whereupon a reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, a daily newspaper published by Pulitzer, left the courtroom without objecting. The hearing ended the same day, and five days later the court issued its memorandum opinion, which was filed under seal along with the rest of the court file.

On February 3, 1989 (the day following the hearing), Pulitzer filed motions to intervene and to open the courtroom. In an amended motion, Pulitzer also requested that the District Court unseal the court file. On March 2, 1989, Pulitzer filed a motion to stay the proceedings, which the District Court granted. The court held a hearing on the motion to intervene on May 25, 1989. On the day the stay was to expire, September 15, 1989, the District Court denied Pulitzer's motions to intervene and to open the courtroom and the file. By that time, the underlying proceedings between T.B. and the School District had been dismissed on the School District's motion.

The first issue is whether or not the motion to open the courtroom is moot, since the hearing is long over. Although neither party briefed or argued the mootness question, were we to render a decision in a case where no live controversy remains, we would be giving, in effect, an advisory opinion. "[F]ederal courts have never been empowered to issue advisory opinions." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 735, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3033, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978). We may adjudicate an apparently moot case, however, if it is one "capable of repetition" as to the wronged party "yet evading review" because of the time required to move the case through the courts. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911). Because we believe this is such a case, we will address the question of whether or not the District Court took the proper precautions and made the appropriate findings of need when it closed the courtroom to the public in this case. ² See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 6, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 2739, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (case not moot even though transcript of closed preliminary hearing released); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2618, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982) (courtroom closed pursuant to mandatory statute so clearly capable of repetition); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 563, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2820, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) (Court found it was "reasonably foreseeable that other trials may be closed by other judges without any more showing of need than is presented on this record").

Pulitzer urges us to find a constitutional right of access to civil proceedings and to apply First Amendment standards to this case. ³ The District Court's order denying Pulitzer's motions appears to take that approach. Although the Supreme Court has held "that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment," Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580, 100 S.Ct. at 2829 (footnote omitted), it never has held that there is a constitutional right of access to civil trials. See id. at 580 n. 17, 100 S.Ct. at 2829 n. 17 ("Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open."). Pulitzer nevertheless suggests we join two other circuits that, according to Pulitzer, have so held. See Stone v. University of Md. Medical Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178 (4th Cir.1988) (access sought to court file in civil rights suit); ⁴ Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir.1984) (finding First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings and granting access to hearing on motion for preliminary injunction against disclosure at stockholders' meeting). The Eighth Circuit has yet to address the issue, although we did find a First Amendment right of access to contempt proceedings, a "hybrid" of criminal and civil proceedings. In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir.1983) ("Arguably, the public interest in securing the integrity of the fact-finding process is greater in the criminal context than the civil context, since the condemnation of the state is involved in the former but not the latter, but it is nonetheless true that the public has a great interest in the fairness of civil proceedings.").

We find it unnecessary to our decision in this case to decide whether there is a First Amendment right of access applicable to civil proceedings. Any First Amendment right of access that might apply would be qualified, not absolute. Given the nature and the circumstances of this case, our decision must be the same whether the case is governed by a First Amendment qualified right of access or a common law right of access. We take this view because this case involves a handicapped child proceeding under the EHA, records and testimony regarding his disability, and his educational records. Under any qualified right of access of which we can conceive, the District Court properly granted the motion of T.B.'s guardian to shelter the proceedings from public view.

The privacy of juveniles is protected by the legislatures and the courts of this country in a variety of ways. For example, in Missouri "[t]he general public shall be excluded" from juvenile court hearings. Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 211.171.5 (1986). Juvenile court records are neither to be inspected nor disclosed, except to those who have a legitimate interest in them. Id. Sec. 211.321. Certain juvenile records may be destroyed or sealed when the child reaches seventeen years old "if the court finds that it is in the best interest of the child." Id. Sec. 211.321.4. In a federal juvenile delinquency proceeding, the minor's name and picture cannot be made public and the records of such a proceeding "shall be safeguarded from disclosure to unauthorized persons." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5038(a), (c), (e) (1988). Although it may be argued that the stigma of criminal proceedings distinguishes these situations from the present case, juvenile courts in Missouri also have jurisdiction over proceedings involving children in need of care or support, adoption proceedings, and guardianship proceedings. Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 211.031.1 (1986). Records of those actions also are regarded as confidential. These measures all reflect a strong public policy favoring the special protection of minors and their privacy where sensitive and possibly stigmatizing matters are concerned. This strong public policy applies forcefully to students classified as handicapped because of a learning disability or some other disability that affects their educational progress.

Under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the regulations thereunder, a school's release of a student's records or personally identifiable information to unauthorized persons will result in the withholding of federal funds. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1232g(b) (1988); 34 C.F.R. Sec. 99.30 (1988). FERPA applies to T.B., and Congress, through the EHA, has further restricted the release of information when a handicapped student is involved. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1417(c) (1988). ⁵ Identifying information about such students is not to be released absent parental consent and its confidentiality is to be protected. 34 C.F.R. Secs. 300.571, .572 (1988). Much of the information is to be destroyed at the parent's request when no longer needed by the school. Id. Sec. 300.573. In judicial proceedings brought...