Webster v. Harmon
Decision Date | 26 April 2006 |
Docket Number | 032257; A124889. |
Citation | 205 Or. App. 196,134 P.3d 1012 |
Parties | Donald WEBSTER, Appellant, v. Dan HARMON, Respondent. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Blair J. Henningsgaard, Astoria, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Barbara L. Johnston argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.
Before ARMSTRONG, Presiding Judge, and BREWER, Chief Judge, and HASELTON, Judge.*
Plaintiff appeals from a trial court order upholding defendant's exceptions to an arbitrator's award of attorney fees to plaintiff.Because we agree with plaintiff that defendant did not timely file his exceptions to the award in the trial court under ORS 36.425(6), we reverse and remand.
Defendant damaged plaintiff's sidewalk.Before filing an action, plaintiff made a written demand for payment from defendant of $1,128 in damages, plus costs and attorney fees, pursuant to ORS 20.080(1).1Defendant did not make the demanded payment.In July 2003, plaintiff filed a negligence action against defendant for the damage.The trial court referred the case to its court-annexed arbitration program.
On December 15, 2003, the arbitrator issued an award of $600 to plaintiff, together with costs of $592 and attorney fees in the sum of $1,590.The award was filed in the trial court on December 16.On December 29, defendant filed exceptions to the award.For his exceptions, defendant relied on ORCP 68 C(4), not ORS 36.425.Defendant asserted that plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees because defendant had offered plaintiff $600—the amount of damages that the arbitrator awarded—to settle the claim before the commencement of the action.Defendant did not object to the amount of the attorney fee award.
Plaintiff responded to the exceptions and requested additional attorney fees incurred in responding.Plaintiff argued that defendant had not timely filed his exceptions under ORS 36.425(6) and that defendant had stipulated that his prelitigation tender was $500, not $600.On January 16, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's exceptions.On March 18, the court filed a letter opinion upholding the exceptions.The trial court concluded that the exceptions must be resolved under ORS 36.425(6) but found that defendant had not received a copy of plaintiff's attorney fee statement.As a result, the court determined that it would be unfair to hold defendant to the time limits prescribed by ORS 36.425(6).The court also found that defendant had made a prelitigation tender of $600 in damages to plaintiff and that, because plaintiff had not recovered a greater sum, plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees under ORS 20.080.The court then entered a general judgment and money award that was consistent with the arbitrator's award but which did not include an award of attorney fees.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in upholding defendant's exceptions to the arbitrator's attorney fee award and in failing to award plaintiff additional attorney fees for responding to the exceptions.For the following reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred in both respects.
ORCP 68 C(4) prescribes the procedure for objecting to an award of attorney fees in circumstances that are governed by the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure.2However, ORS 36.425(6), not ORCP 68 C(4), prescribes the procedure for objecting to attorney fee awards that are made by an arbitrator.Ashley v. Garrison,162 Or.App. 585, 591, 986 P.2d 654(1999).ORS 36.425(6) provides:
Although the legislature used the word "may" in setting out the time limit for filing exceptions to an attorney fee award, it is readily apparent from the context that the statute establishes a mandatory seven-day limit for filing such exceptions.SeePioneer Trust Bank v. Mental Health Division,87 Or.App. 132, 136, 742 P.2d 51(1987)( ).Thus, unlike in circumstances that are governed by ORCP 68 C(4)(b), under ORS 36.425(6) a nonprevailing party must file exceptions to an attorney fee award made by an arbitrator within seven days after the arbitrator files the award in the trial court, not serve objections within 14 days after the prevailing partyserves an attorney fee statement on the nonprevailing party.
Defendant nevertheless argues that he timely filed his exceptions.Observing that the arbitrator mailed the award to the parties on December 15, defendant asserts that, by force of ORCP 10 C,3 the seven-day filing period under ORS 36.425(6) did not commence until December 18.Defendant further reasons that, because the seventh day fell on a legal holiday, December 25, his mailing of the exceptions on December 26 was timely.
In Guess v. Lee,198 Or.App. 304, 310, 108 P.3d 647, rev. den.,338 Or. 680, 115 P.3d 245(2005), we held that ORCP 10 C extended the time for appealing an arbitrator's award under ORS 36.425(2) for three days where, as here, the award was served by mail.However, in 2002, the legislature amended ORCP 10 A to provide that "[t]his section does not apply to any time limitation governed by ORS 174.120."Or. Laws 2002, ch. 10, § 9(1st Spec. Sess.).That amendment became effective on February 25, 2002, and it is applicable to this case.Or. Laws 2002, ch. 10, § 11(1st Spec. Sess.).ORS 174.120, which also was amended by the 2002legislature,4 provides, in part:
Subsections (2), (3), and (4) were added to the statute by the 2002amendment.In addition, the 2002amendment deleted the following language from the beginning of subsection (1): "Except as otherwise provided in ORCP 10."Arguably, the effect of the 2002amendments to ORCP 10andORS 174.120 was to eliminate, for the purpose of calculating statutory time limits for acts to be performed in a circuit court—such as the filing of exceptions to arbitral attorney fee awards under ORS 36.425(6)—the three-day grace period provided by ORCP 10 C. If that were the case, our decision in Guess would be inapplicable to the calculation of statutory time limits for acts to be performed in a circuit court after the effective date of the 2002amendments to ORCP 10andORS 174.120.
However, that reading of the 2002amendments to ORCP 10 A and ORS 174.120 is not the only plausible one.ORS 174.120 does not now, nor did it before the 2002amendments were enacted, address the subject or effect of service by mail.Rather, that statute sets out rules for the exclusion and inclusion, respectively, of the first and last days of a statutory time period in determining the timeliness of an act, and it designates exceptions to including the last day.Because ORS 174.120 does not address the subject matter of ORCP 10 C, it is plausible to infer that, by enacting the 2002amendments, the legislature intended to make ORCP 10 A inapplicable only to time limitations governed by ORS 174.120.5That provision addresses the same subject matter as ORS 174.120(2002), making it perfectly logical to infer that the legislature would not want it to overlap or come into conflict with the latter statute.
We need not resolve that issue, though, because, at a minimum, the seven-day...
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 7-day Trial
-
Powers v. Quigley
...of ORS 36.425(6) establishes a mandatory seven-day time limit for filing exceptions to the arbitrator's award. Webster v. Harmon, 205 Or.App. 196, 200, 134 P.3d 1012 (2006) (trial court erred in upholding the defendant's exceptions to an arbitrator's attorney fee award where the defendant n......
-
Lee v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.
...shall be taxed as part of the costs of the action and any appeal thereon.”3 Defendant relies on our statement in Webster v. Harmon , 205 Or.App. 196, 199, 134 P.3d 1012 (2006), that “ORS 36.425(6), not ORCP 68 C(4), prescribes the procedure for objecting to attorney fee awards that are made......
-
HARVEY v. CHRISTIE
...added” to the 20-day appeal period. Guess, 198 Or.App. at 310, 108 P.3d 647 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Webster v. Harmon, 205 Or.App. 196, 134 P.3d 1012 (2006), we revisited our decision in Guess in light of the legislature's 2002 amendment to ORCP 10 A. Both before and after th......
-
§6.7 Attorney Fees
...establishes a mandatory seven-day time limit for filing exceptions to the arbitrator's award. Webster v. Harmon, 205 Ore. App. 196, 200, 134 P.3d 1012 (2006) (trial court erred in upholding the defendant's exceptions to an arbitrator's attorney fee award where the defendant did not file his......
-
§ 8.5 Procedure
...right to attorney fees be established in the course of the arbitration hearing on the merits. In Webster v. Harmon, 205 Or App 196, 198, 134 P3d 1012 (2006), the court reversed a trial court order upholding the defendant's exceptions to an arbitrator's award of attorney fees to the plaintif......