Webster v. Perrotta
Decision Date | 27 June 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 2000-333-Appeal.,2000-333-Appeal. |
Citation | 774 A.2d 68 |
Parties | Earl H. WEBSTER v. Louis A. PERROTTA et al. Stephen J. Riccitelli v. Louis A. Perrotta et al. Vincent J. Ferrante, Sr. v. Town of Johnston et al. Ruth V. Bolton v. Louis A. Perrotta et al. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.
Stephen C. Mackie, John T. Longo, Providence, for Plaintiff.
Matthew T. Oliverio, John M. Verdecchia, Providence, for Defendant.
These consolidated cases came before the Supreme Court on May 7, 2001, on appeal from default judgments entered in the Superior Court in favor of Earl H. Webster (Webster), Ruth V. Bolton (Bolton)1, Stephen J. Riccitelli (Riccitelli), and Vincent J. Ferranti, Sr.(Ferranti or plaintiffs) and against the Town of Johnston (defendant or town).2 Specifically, the town has appealed the imposition of a monetary judgment made after the default of defendant in this case.
The plaintiffs are former officers of the Johnston Police Department who sought wages and benefits, including any cost of living increases, wage increases, uniform allowances and similar benefits, and interests and costs from the date of their respective retirements to the present. It is undisputed that plaintiffs were employed as police officers for the town. Each plaintiff retired from the force because of an illness or injury alleged in the complaint to have been suffered or contracted in the line of duty.3 At the time each plaintiff retired, a valid and enforceable provision of their respective union contract provided that "[a]ll members of the [p]olice [d]epartment who are injured or contact [sic] illness in the line of duty shall receive benefits in conformity with" G.L.1956 § 45-19-1, often referred to as the Injured on Duty (IOD) provision.4 The plaintiffs all voluntarily retired, in some cases left employmentover three decades ago, and have received pension payments from the town since the date of their retirement. These pension amounts are less than 100 percent of the salary, wages, and benefits plaintiffs would have received had they not retired but remained as police officers. Further, by the fact of the default, it is not contested that the injuries or illnesses contracted by the plaintiffs were suffered in the line of duty and necessitated their retirements.
Each of the judgments entered also provided that the "matter shall be scheduled for a proof of claim hearing to determine only the issue of the amount of money the [Town] owes the plaintiff." Significantly, neither the complaints nor the "Final Judgments" included a claim or finding that these plaintiffs, from the time of their voluntary retirements, remained active members of the police department.
Three judgments were entered by a justice of the Superior Court on June 3, 1999, and the fourth judgment was entered on July 8, 1999, by a second hearing justice who also heard the initial motions to vacate the judgments.8 Shortly after their entry, the town sought to vacate these "Final Judgments" on the ground of excusable neglect. Motions to vacate were filed on June 21, 1999 and heard and denied on July 14, 1999, and were limited to the reasons set forth in Rule 60 (b)(1) of theSuperior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." These motions were denied by the initial hearing justice who declared:
Consolidated oral proof of claim hearings were held before yet a third justice of the Superior Court, wherein the town moved, on grounds distinct from the initial motion to vacate, that the judgments be vacated or modified to comport with the provisions of § 45-19-1 and the pronouncements of this Court. The town sought relief from the judgments pursuant to Rule 60(b) (4), (5) and (6).9 Although the hearing justice failed to address the specific grounds for relief sought by the plaintiff, in a written decisionhe expressed concern that he was asked to vacate or modify prior orders of other justices of the Superior Court designated as "Final Judgments," and a subsequent order of one of the justices "declining to vacate any of said Final Judgments." The hearing justice found that defendants failed to satisfy the burden imposed on them by Rule 60(b)(1)-(6). Moreover, he found that the law of the case precluded him from "second guessing" other justices of the Superior Court with respect to legal determinations made by them.
The hearing justice next dealt with the proof of claim issue. Specifically, he set out to decide what salary and benefits the police officers would have been entitled to had they not been incapacitated and presumably remained as active members of the police department. He rejected the town's argument that attacked the language in the judgments and the town's suggestion that the computation of damages in this case requires a thorough and detailed analysis of the scope and purposes behind § 45-19-1 and the pronouncements of this Court. The town argued that notwithstanding the default in this case and the fact that the town was admittedly:
The hearing justice failed to address this argument, apparently concerned about the law of the case and persuaded that the language of the "Final Judgments" was controlling, he rejected the town's argument that reference must be made to subsection (b) of § 45-19-1 that defines a police officer as any "member of the police department of any city or town regularly employed at a fixed salary or wage."He then declared that, pursuant to § 45-19-1, a police officer, during the period of incapacitation, is entitled to the salary or wage and benefits to which he would have been entitled, had he not been incapacitated. Therefore, with respect to the amount of the principal, he found that the provisions with respect to the calculation damages agreed upon in a previous stipulation to be controlling.10 Lastly, the hearing justice denied plaintiffs' request for prejudgment interest, finding that the town was clearly acting in a governmental, as opposed to a proprietary capacity. Therefore, he concluded prejudgment interest was not appropriate. Both parties have appealed.
The defendant has raised several issues on appeal and has assigned three grounds of error on the part of the trial justice in refusing to vacate or modify the judgments entered in this case. Specifically, defendant alleged that the judgments are void, that the judgments should have been vacated or modified because they improperly exceeded the scope of § 45-19-1 and are applied to individuals who no longer are active members of the department, contrary to the previous pronouncements of this Court and the intent of the Legislature. Further, the town maintained that the hearing justice should have granted the town's motions to vacate or modify the judgments because the judgments were based on an incorrect conclusion of law and an erroneous interpretation of Chester v. aRusso, 667 A.2d 519 (R.I. 1995). Finally, defendants have also urged this Court to revisit its holding in Chester and clarify whether that case is applicable to a voluntary retirement. Alternatively, the town argued that the hearing justice erred by failing to conclude that the proper measure of damages at the hearing on oral proof of claim was controlled by the language of § 45-19-1 and the previous pronouncements of the Court, and not inthe context of the "Final...
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