Webster v. Powell

• Decision Date: 19 November 1895
• Citation: 18 So. 441,36 Fla. 703
• Parties: WEBSTER v. POWELL et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

18 So. 441

36 Fla. 703

WEBSTER v. POWELL et al.

Florida Supreme Court

November 19, 1895

Action by John Powell against Nathaniel Webster and E. Rigney. Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant Webster moves for the issuance of a writ of error. Granted.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. The provision in section 16 of article 3 of the constitution that each law enacted in the legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title, is mandatory; and its restriction should be enforced in all cases falling within the mischiefs intended by it to be remedied, while in cases not coming within such mischiefs a liberal construction should obtain in favor of the lawmaking power.

2. One purpose of section 16 of article 3 of the constitution was to prevent fraud or surprise upon legislation by means of false and deceptive titles to statutes calculated to mislead members of the legislature into voting for bills containing provisions of which the titles give no intimation.

3. An amendatory act does not sufficiently express its subject when it gives simply the number of the section of the Revised Statutes intended to be amended, without also correctly stating the subject of such section.

4. Chapter 4414, Laws 1895, entitled 'An act to amend sections 1270 and 1272 of the Revised Statutes of the State of Florida, relating to supersedeas orders and supersedeas bonds,' is void, on the ground that its title is false and deceptive, and in violation of section 16 of article 3 of the constitution.

COUNSEL

A. W. Cockrell & Son, for plaintiff in error.

OPINION

MABRY, C.J.

Judgment was obtained by John Powell against Nathaniel Webster and E Rigney in the circuit court for Duval county, and Webster desires to prosecute a writ of error from the judgment, but Rigney refuses to join therein. Webster filed with the clerk of the circuit court for Duval county a praecipe for writ of error, reciting therein that Rigney refused to unite in the writ; and it appears that he complied with the law in reference to suing out writs of error in every respect except giving the bond required by chapter 4414, Laws 1895. The clerk of the circuit court refused to issue the writ solely because the said bond was not given, and Webster applied to the clerk of this court to issue the writ. No bond, as required by the act mentioned, having been executed the clerk of this court declined to issue the writ without directions from the court, and Webster has renewed his motion here for the issuance of the writ without the required bond.

This motion involves solely the constitutionality of chapter 4414, Laws 1895; it being conceded that, if this act was constitutionally passed, the writ should not issue without executing the bond required by it. The validity of the act in question is assailed on two grounds. One is that the title is insufficient to authorize the provisions found in the body of the act, and the other is that the common-law writ of error is a writ of right secured to the citizen by provisions of our constitution, and that the legislature cannot impair it by exacting the bond provided by the statute as a condition of its employment. The title of the act is 'An act to amend sections 1270 and 1272 of the Revised Statutes of the State of Florida, relating to supersedeas orders and supersedeas bonds.'

Our constitution provides (section 16, art. 3) that 'each law enacted in the legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title; and no law shall be amended or revised by reference to its title only; but in such case the act, as revised, or section, as amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length.' Such constitutional provisions are not of English origin, but of American growth and they were designed to arrest certain abuses that had developed in legislation under our systems of government. What those abuses were, and the purpose for which such provisions were incorporated into organic laws, are clearly shown by the judicial discussion that has arisen in the interpretation of such laws. We have recently had occasion to consider the purpose and meaning of the provision of our constitution as applied to certain acts of legislation, in the cases of State v. Green, 18 So. 334 Commissioners of Duval Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 18 So. 339, and State v. Hocker, 18 So. 767, decided at this term; and we need not go over again the ground covered by these decisions. The provision of the constitution mentioned is mandatory, and it is the duty of the court to enforce it. It is stated by Sutherland on Statutory Construction (section 82) that 'the courts with great unanimity enforce this constitutional restriction in all cases falling within the mischiefs intended thereby to be remedied; and, in cases not within those mischiefs, they construe it liberally to give convenient and necessary freedom, so far as is compatible with the remedial measure, to the lawmaking power.' The true view is to construe the provision so as to prevent the evils designed to be arrested by it, and at the same time, in the accomplishment of proper legislation, it should not be expounded in a strict or technical sense. One of the objects of the provision, as stated by Cooley (Const. Lim. p. 172) was 'to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles give no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked, and carelessly and unintentionally adopted.' The history of legislation had shown that, by adroit management, provisions had been incorporated into measures in no way indicated by the title, and that members of the legislature had voted for such measures in ignorance of such provisions. The framers of the constitution designed to put a stop to the enactment of laws with such titles. The title of an act in Michigan was, 'An act to provide for the election of two justices of the peace, and for the appointment of a justice clerk, and room for holding justice court, in and for the city of Grand Rapids, and to define their jurisdiction, and to fix their compensation; and to repeal an act to provide for the election of four justices of the peace in and for the city of Grand Rapids, and to define their jurisdiction, and fix their compensation, approved March 11, 1881, and all acts and parts of acts in any wise contravening to the provisions of this act.' At the time of the passage of the act there were four justices of the peace in office in the city of Grand Rapids, and in the body of the act two of them were legislated out of office. The court said: 'No one, in reading the title of this act while it was a bill before the legislature, would have been apprised that the offices of respondent and Justice Hughes were not only to be abolished, but that they were to be deprived of holding the same after the fourth day of July, 1889. If one can gather from the clause in the title in relation to the repeal of the act of 1881, which provides for four justices, that the intention and purport of the bill might be to decrease the number of justices from four to two, yet there is not the slightest hint therein that any of the justices already in office should be deprived of their terms, or, if so, which one, or two, of them was thus to be legislated out of office. The notice in the title, which the constitution imperatively requires, was therefore not given, and the plain purpose of the constitutional mandate evaded and violated.' Brooks v. Hydorn, 76 Mich. 273, 42 N.W. 1122. The title of an act in Wisconsin was 'An act to legalize and authorize the assessment of street improvements and assessments,' and the provisions in the act were confined exclusively to the city of Janesville. The court said: 'No one reading this title would for a moment suppose that the sole purpose of the law was to legalize the proceedings of the common council of the city of Janesville in making these special assessments. It is true, the act embraces but one subject-matter. It does not unite various matters having no necessary or natural connection with each other. It is not therefore open to objection under the first clause of the provision. But there is no reference in the title to the city of Janesville or any other locality; and it would seem impossible to devise a title more calculated to mislead and throw off suspicion or inquiry as to the real subject of the act than the one employed on this occasion. To sanction such a procedure would be to override and...