Webster v. Rotary Elec. Steel Co.
Decision Date | 14 June 1948 |
Docket Number | No. 52.,52. |
Citation | 321 Mich. 526,33 N.W.2d 69 |
Parties | WEBSTER v. ROTARY ELECTRIC STEEL CO. et al. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Michigan Workmen's Compensation Commission.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law in the matter of the claim of Mary M. Webster, widow of Donald W. Webster, deceased employee, against Rotary Electric Steel Company and Michigan Mutual Liability Company for death benefits wherein payments of $21 per week were begun to widow and her minor daughter. From a determination of the Compensation Commission that payments should continue to minor daughter at same rate of $21 per week although widow remarried, meployer and insurer appeal in the nature of certiorari.
Order vacated and cause remanded with instructions.
Before the Entire Bench.
L. J. Carey and Geo. J. Cooper, both of Detroit, for appellants.
Berger, Manason & Kayes, of Detroit, for appellees.
Plaintiff's decedent, Donald W. Webster, died on the day following an injury suffered while in the employ of defendant Rotary Electric Steel Company. At the time of his death, February 12, 1945, he had two dependents, his wife, Mary M. Webster, and an infant daughter, Connie Mae Webster, then 18 months old. There being no dispute concerning the dependents' right to compensation, payments of $21.00 per week were begun in accordance with section 5, part 2, of the owrkmen's compensation act, 2 Comp.Laws 1929, § 8421, Act No. 245, Pub.Acts 1943, Comp.Laws Supp. 1945, § 8421, Stat.Ann. 1947 Cum.Supp. § 17.155.
Decedent's widow remarried on November 26, 1945, and, under the provisions of subparagraph (c) of section 6 of part 2 of the workmen's compensation act, 2 Comp.Laws 1929, § 8422(c), Stat.Ann. § 17.156, her right to compensation ceased. A dispute having arisen as to whether the proper rate of compensation to the minor dependent should be $19.00 or $21.00 per week, the commission ordered a hearing and the deputy commissioner awarded her $21.00 per week.
On appeal the compensation commission held:
Prior to 1943, section 5 of part 2 of the workmen's compensation act provided for the payment of a fixed amount, regardless of the number of dependents, of not more than $18,00 per week nor less than $7.00 per week for week nor less than $7.00 per week for a period of 300 weeks from amended by Act No. 245, Pub.Acts 1943, to provide compensation for dependents ‘for a period of 400 weeks from the date of the death, the weekly payment not to exceed, however, $19.00 for 1 dependent; $21.00 for 2 dependents; $23.00 for 3 dependents; $25.00 for 4 dependents; and $27.00 for 5 or more dependents, nor to be less than $8.00 for 1 dependent; $10.00 for 2 dependents; $12.00 for 3 dependents; $14.00 for 4 dependents; and $16.00 for 5 or more dependents.’
No change was made in section 6 of part 2 of the act, which continued to read in part as follows:
‘(b) In all cases mentioned in this section the total sum due the surviving wife or husband and her or his own child or children shall be paid directly to the surviving wife or husband for her or his own use, and for the use and benefit of her of his own child or children; * * *
‘(c) Upon the remarriage of a dependent wife receiving compensation as such, compensation payments to such wife shall cease, and such compensation, if any, shall be payable to the person or persons either wholly or partially dependent upon deceased for support at his death as provided in clause (b) of this section * * *.’
The question presented is purely one of statutory construction and is a matter of first impression since the 1943 amendment.
The commission construed the intent of the legislature to be that upon a decrease in the number of dependents the payment to those remaining shall in total be the same as the payments that were made before such decrease.
Although we may not usurp the law-making function of the Legislature, the proper construction of a statute is a judicial function, Albert v. Gibson, 141 Mich. 698, 105 N.W. 19, and we are required to discover the legislative intent, People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557, 3 A.L.R. 1505;Miles ex rel. Kamferbeek v. Fortney, 223 Mich. 552, 194 N.W. 605;Gwitt v. Foss, 230 Mich. 8, 203 N.W. 151; and People v. Gould, 237 Mich. 156, 211 N.W. 346.
Where, however, the language is of...
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...position with our tripartite system of government, we must secure our constitutionally granted authority.12 Webster v. Rotary Electric Steel Co., 321 Mich. 526, 531, 33 N.W.2d 69 (1948).13 It should be noted that this Court routinely refers to decisions of the WCAB as judgments. See Clayton......
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