Weekley v. Guidant Corp.
| Decision Date | 23 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:05CV00064 JLH.,1:05CV00064 JLH. |
| Citation | 392 F.Supp.2d 1066 |
| Parties | Jere A. WEEKLEY, Plaintiff v. GUIDANT CORPORATION and Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
David A. Hodges, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, AR, for Plaintiff.
Deborah Ann Moeller, Kansas City, MO, M. Samuel Jones, III, Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C., Little Rock, AR, Rachel A. Emig, Kansas City, MO, Timothy A. Pratt, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Kansas City, MO, for Defendants.
Jere Weekley filed a complaint against Guidant Corporation and Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Arkansas, on July 26, 2004. The complaint alleged that the defendants supplied a defective pacemaker that proximately caused injury and damages to Weekley. The prayer for relief expressly limited damages claimed to an amount less than $75,000, the minimum amount for federal diversity jurisdiction.
On or about July 8, 2005, Weekley filed a document styled, "Amendment to Complaint; Motion for Class Certification." That document consists of one sentence incorporating the original complaint by reference and a four-paragraph motion for class certification alleging, in conclusory fashion, the elements of a class action as stated in Ark. R. Civ. P. 23. The putative class would include individuals who were supplied the same model of pacemaker that was supplied to Weekley and also other cardiac devices manufactured by defendants and subsequently removed in circumstances similar to Weekley's. On July 28, 2005, Guidant Corporation and Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., filed a notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1446, and 1453, as recently revised by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.
Section 9 of the Class Action Fairness Act provides, "The amendments made by this Act shall apply to any civil action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act." The Class Action Fairness Act was enacted on February 18, 2005. Weekley argues that the civil action commenced when she filed her initial complaint on July 26, 2004, so the Class Action Fairness Act does not apply. The defendants argue that the July 8, 2005, amendment to Weekley's complaint, which for the first time sought nationwide class action status, constituted the "commencement" of a class action under the Class Action Fairness Act. Defendants note that the amendment to the complaint is not a routine amendment. They say that the amendment takes a single case by one individual and turns it into a nationwide class action. The defendants observe that the initial complaint could not have put them on notice that all of their cardiac devices were at issue, and they note that the initial complaint implicated the law of Arkansas, but the proposed class action would implicate the laws of all 50 states. Under these circumstances, the defendants argue, the "Amendment to Complaint; Motion for Class Certification" constituted commencement of a new civil action within the meaning of § 9 of the Class Action Fairness Act. The defendants cite Senterfitt v. Sun-Trust Mortgage, Inc., 385 F.Supp.2d 1377 (S.D.Ga.2005), and Heaphy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 05-5404, 2005 WL 1950244 (W.D.Wash. Aug. 15, 2005). See also Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir.2005); Schorsch v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 417 F.3d 748, (7th Cir.2005); Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805 (7th Cir.2005).
Section 9 of the Class Action Fairness Act is about as clear and simple as a statute can be; it says that the Act "shall apply to any civil action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this act." Rule 3 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, like Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that an action is commenced by filing a complaint.1 Because Weekley filed her complaint before February 18, 2005, the Class Action Fairness Act does not apply to this civil action.
When Congress said in § 9 of the Class Action Fairness Act that the Act would apply to "any civil action commenced" before February 18, 2005, it used clear, unambiguous, familiar legal terms. The phrase "any civil action" appears throughout the removal statutes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. Throughout the statutes, a "civil action" refers to the entire proceeding in a civil case. When a "civil action" is removed, the whole case, the whole proceeding, is removed. In narrow circumstances defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1452, "any claim or cause of action in a civil action" may be removed; which is to say that the statutes distinguish between "a claim or cause of action," and "a civil action." A claim or cause of action is asserted in and is a part of a civil action, but the term civil action is more encompassing — it includes motions, discovery, and all other components of the proceeding. The phrase any civil action in § 9 has the same meaning there as it has throughout the removal statutes. A civil action, viewed as the whole case, the whole proceeding, can only be commenced once. See Sneddon v. Hotwire, Inc., 2005 WL 1593593 (N.D.Cal. June 29, 2005). Pleadings may be amended, but amending pleadings does not commence a civil action. By definition, a civil action must already have been commenced before a pleading can be amended. Some claims asserted in the initial complaint may be dismissed, voluntarily or involuntarily, during the course of the action. Other claims may be added during the course of the action. Those new claims may dramatically change the action. Those claims may or may not "relate back" to the original complaint for limitations purposes. Nevertheless, a civil action, viewed as the entirety of the case or the entirety of the proceeding, commenced when the initial complaint was filed.
Twenty-Eight U.S.C. § 1446 states the procedure for removal. Subsection (b) provides that the notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the defendant receives a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief or 30 days after service of summons, whichever is shorter. That subsection then adds:
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper...
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