Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC

• Decision Date: 28 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2012–356–Appeal.,2012–356–Appeal.
• Parties: Reynalda WEEKS v. 735 PUTNAM PIKE OPERATIONS, LLC d/b/a Greenville Skilled Nursing and Rehabilitation.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

85 A.3d 1147

Reynalda WEEKS

v.735 PUTNAM PIKE OPERATIONS, LLC d/b/a Greenville Skilled Nursing and Rehabilitation.

No. 2012–356–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 28, 2014.

David S. Cass, Esq., for Plaintiff.

William E. O'Gara, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice ROBINSON, for the Court.

The plaintiff, Reynalda Weeks, appeals from an order of the Providence County Superior Court entered on January 30, 2012, staying her civil action in that court and ordering that the “matter * * * be resolved through binding arbitration as required by the governing Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties.” This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After a close review of the record and careful consideration of the parties' arguments (both written and oral),¹ we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and that this appeal may be decided at this time. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the order of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

On September 30, 2011, plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking damages as well as equitable and declaratory relief for alleged violations of the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA) (codified in G.L.1956 §§ 42–112–1 to –2) and the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) (codified in G.L.1956 §§ 28–5–1 to –42).² The defendant, 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC d/b/a Greenville Skilled Nursing and Rehabilitation, is plaintiff's former employer. In her complaint, plaintiff describes herself as being a “black” female and she alleges that during her employment by defendant she was subjected to a “hostile work environment” on account of her “race and color” stemming from what she characterized as “derogatory and disparate treatment” by her supervisor. She further alleges that she was “constructively terminated” on July 18, 2010.³

The defendant responded to plaintiffs complaint by filing a “Motion to Stay Proceedings” arguing that the “proper forum for resolution of the [p]laintiff's employment discrimination and wrongful termination claim [was] binding arbitration.” On January 19, 2012, a hearing was held in the Superior Court on defendant's motion to stay, during which plaintiff conceded that she was a “member of the union” and was subject to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the union and defendant until the time of her alleged “constructive[ ] terminat[ion].” ⁴ An order was subsequently entered on January 30, 2012, in which the hearing justice granted defendant's motion to stay and ordered that the “matter * * * be resolved through binding arbitration as required by the governing Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties.” It is that order which is the subject of plaintiff's appeal.

IIIssue on Appeal

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the hearing justice erred when she granted defendant's motion to stay and ordered the parties to resolve their dispute through binding arbitration. According to plaintiff, the hearing justice's decision was in error because the CBA's arbitration provision does not preclude plaintiff from asserting her statutorily created rights (under the RICRA and the FEPA) in a judicial forum.

IIIAnalysis

AAppeal of the Superior Court Order

The defendant initially argues that, because the hearing justice's order granting its motion to stay was not a final order, plaintiff does not have what it terms “an Appeal as of Right” to this Court. As defendant correctly points out, a party may petition this Court for a writ of certiorari in order to seek appellate review of a decision which is not final ( i.e., an interlocutory decision). See, e.g., In re Joseph J., 465 A.2d 150, 151 (R.I.1983). The plaintiff in the instant case did not petition this Court for a writ of certiorari, but rather filed a direct appeal from the hearing justice's interlocutory order granting defendant's motion to stay. Consequently, defendant argues, plaintiff's appeal must be dismissed.⁵

The defendant cites McAuslan v. McAuslan, 34 R.I. 462, 83 A. 837 (1912) for the principle that “a decree must be final to be appealable as of right.” ⁶ We are in agreement with defendant that, as a generalrule, appeals from interlocutory orders are not permitted. See Boranian v. Richer, 983 A.2d 834, 837 (R.I.2009). However, that rule is not absolute. Seeid. In this jurisdiction, interlocutory appeals are permitted if they fall within one of two exceptions. Id.

The first exception is statutory: pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9–24–7, a party may appeal certain interlocutory orders. However, as defendant accurately points out, an appeal from a motion to stay, as is presented in the instant case, is not one of the specifically enumerated interlocutory orders from which § 9–24–7 permits an appeal.⁷

The second exception is “judicial in origin.” Boranian, 983 A.2d at 837. In McAuslan, this Court announced a rule, which “has been reiterated innumerable times since,” permitting appellate review of “an order or decree which, although in a strict sense interlocutory, does possess such an element of finality that action is called for before the case is finally terminated in order to prevent clearly imminent and irreparable harm.” Town of Lincoln v. Cournoyer, 118 R.I. 644, 648–49, 375 A.2d 410, 412–13 (1977) (citing McAuslan, supra ). If this Court deems the appeal appropriate under McAuslan then we will treat it as a final order.

In Boranian, 983 A.2d at 837, we dealt specifically with an issue involving arbitration, and we stated that, “when an arbitrator's jurisdiction is in question, a Superior Court order compelling arbitration has an element of finality that may be heard on appeal.” Our decision inBoranian was consistent with our earlier decision in Forte Brothers, Inc. v. State Department of Transportation, 541 A.2d 1194, 1196 (R.I.1988), in which we stated:

“We consider that an order [compelling] arbitration [of contract disputes] has sufficient elements of finality * * * so that appellate review is called for before the case is finally terminated. In these days of significant trial delay, an order that requires a party to go forward with arbitration should be tested in this court upon the application of the objecting party before requiring the case to be fully litigated in a tribunal whose jurisdiction has been challenged.”

We perceive no material difference between what is at issue in the instant case and the principles relied upon in Boranian and Forte Brothers. Accordingly, plaintiff's appeal from the trial justice's order granting defendant's motion to stay is proper. Consequently, we shall now address the substantive issues raised by plaintiff.

BThe Standard of Review

We have consistently held that “whether a dispute is arbitrable is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” ⁸State Department of Corrections v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 866 A.2d 1241, 1247 (R.I.2005); see also Providence School Board v. Providence Teachers Union, Local 958, AFT, AFL–CIO, 68 A.3d 505, 508 (R.I.2013); Stanley–Bostitch, Inc. v. Regenerative Environmental Equipment Co., 697 A.2d 323, 325 (R.I.1997); cf. DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1066 (R.I.2009) (“We review the trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration de novo.”). We are cognizant of the fact that the case before us differs from the usual case concerning arbitrability, where our role is to decide whether the parties contractually agreed to have the dispute at issue resolved by arbitration. Here, by contrast, the issue is whether the arbitral process should not occur because plaintiff has opted for a judicial forum. Nevertheless, there is such a conceptual similarity between the two types of cases that we are entirely comfortable in relying on traditional arbitrability principles as we begin our analysis of the issues before us.

When evaluating competing contentions about arbitrability, “we bear in mind that [a]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which it has not agreed so to submit.” AVCORR Management, LLC v. Central Falls Detention Facility Corp., 41 A.3d 1007, 1010 (R.I.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, “[a] duty to arbitrate a dispute arises only when a party agrees to arbitration in clear and unequivocal language; and, even then, the party is only obligated to arbitrate issues that it explicitly agreed to arbitrate.” State Department of Corrections, 866 A.2d at 1247.

CArbitration

The plaintiff contends that the hearing justice erred in determining that she must submit her claim to binding arbitration under the CBA; she argues that she cannot be said to have waived her right to a judicial forum to enforce her statutorily created employment rights conferred by the RICRA and the FEPA. Specifically, she argues that the provisions in the CBA at issue in this case are materially different from those deemed to have constituted such a waiver of a judicial forum in the leading United States Supreme Court case relied on by defendant, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009). Instead, plaintiff relies heavily on earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner–Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), and Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 119 S.Ct. 391, 142 L.Ed.2d 361 (1998), to support her argument that she did not “clear[ly] and unmistak[ably]” waive her statutorily created right to a judicial forum.

The defendant counters that the hearing justice properly applied 14 Penn Plaza, and it points out that the instant case is distinguishable from the several cases cited by plaintiff because plaintiff's claims arise under state rather than federal...