Weeks v. Hous. Auth. of Opp

Decision Date24 August 2012
Docket NumberCase No. 2:11–cv–1011–MEF.
Citation887 F.Supp.2d 1232
PartiesJanie WEEKS, Plaintiff, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF OPP, ALABAMA; United States Department of Housing and Urban Development; et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Anthony B. Bush, Lewis, Bush & Faulk, LLC, Elizabeth Peyton Faulk, Bush & Faulk, LLC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Kimberly Wood Geisler, Joshua Stephen. Thompson, Scott Dukes & Geisler PC, Birmingham, AL, James Joseph Dubois, U.S. Attorney's Office, Stephen Michael Doyle, United States Attorney's Office–ALM, Middle District of Alabama, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

Memorandum Opinion & Order

MARK E. FULLER, District Judge.

I. Introduction

The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and its Secretary, Shaun Donovan, filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. (ECF No. 36.) The plaintiff, Janie Weeks, declined to respond. She instead sought leave to file a third amendment complaint (ECF No. 44), which essentially asks the Court to allow her to plead around the jurisdictional defects brought to light by HUD and Donovan. Because the Court finds the defendants' motion to dismiss meritorious, and concludes that allowing Weeks to amend her complaint would be futile, the defendants' motion will be granted and Weeks's motion denied. The reasons why are discussed more fully below.

II. Motion to Dismiss Standard

A defendant can file a motion to dismiss to contest a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). These motions come in two varieties: one attacking subject-matter jurisdiction on the face of the complaint, the other using extrinsic evidence to launch a factual attack on jurisdiction. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 n. 5 (11th Cir.2003). A court deciding a facial attack to subject-matter jurisdiction has to accept all well-pled factual allegations as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta—Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir.2007). In other words, the court merely looks to “see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1990). If the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to hear the claim, it must dismiss it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000).

III. Background
A. The underlying facts

The Opp Housing Authority (OHA) employed Janie Weeks as its executive director from July 2006 until mid–2011. (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 16, ECF No. 26.) OHA and the United States Department of House and Urban Development (HUD), the executive agency that controls OHA's spending, received complaints accusing Weeks of racial discrimination and misconduct. ( Id. at ¶¶ 21, 26–39.) OHA and HUD responded by meeting with Weeks. ( Id. at ¶ 50.) Attendees at the meeting included Weeks and her husband, members of OHA's board, and HUD representatives from both the Atlanta and Birmingham offices. ( Id.)

After the meeting got underway, Weeks made a severance proposal: she would resign for $125,000 and six months of continued health insurance coverage. ( Id. at ¶ 54.) The OHA board members and HUD representatives agreed to the deal, adding only that she must return all OHA property. ( Id. at ¶ 55.) They told Weeks they would pay her on June 29, 2011. ( Id.) Relying on these assurances, Weeks turned in her keys and left OHA's premises. ( Id. at ¶ 56.)

After HUD representatives met with the OHA tenants and employees who had complained about Weeks, HUD went back on its agreement with her. ( Id. at 57–58.) It withdrew its promise to provide OHA with the necessary money to fund Weeks's severance package, and it even went so far as to deny OHA the authority to disburse the $125,000 out of other funds it may have had. ( Id. at ¶ 58.) With no authority to perform its end of the bargain, OHA put Weeks on paid administrative leave instead. ( Id. at ¶¶ 60–62.) She contends that OHA and HUD breached the severance agreement, noting that HUD never even authorized the federal funds necessary to pay for the leave period. ( Id.)

B. Procedural posture

Weeks filed suit to enforce the agreement. Her initial complaint named the Opp Housing Authority and its board of commissioners as defendants. (Compl. at ¶¶ 6, 7–11, ECF No. 1.) OHA responded by filing a motion to dismiss that contained alternative motions for a more definite statement and for joinder of a necessary party. (ECF Nos. 13, 14.) In the latter motion, OHA asserted that HUD met the definition of a necessary party under Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because HUD would have to approve paying a judgment out of federal funds if Weeks won her suit. (ECF No. 13 at 14–22.) Weeks responded to OHA's motions by amending her complaint and adding HUD and its Secretary, Shaun Donovan, as parties. (First Am. Compl., ECF No. 20.)

After Weeks amended her complaint again (ECF No. 26), HUD and Donovan filed the motion to dismiss now before the Court. The Court put out a briefing schedule (ECF No. 40) that gave Weeks the opportunity to respond. She chose not to, however, opting instead to let the date for filing a response come and go. But she did file a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint (ECF No. 44), which is also now before the Court.

IV. Discussion
A. HUD and Donovan's motion to dismiss

HUD and Donovan raise two grounds for dismissing the claims against them. First, they contend that Weeks failed to plead a waiver of sovereign immunity—a necessary prerequisite in suits against federal agencies and their officers. Second, they assert that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, grants exclusive jurisdiction over Weeks's claims to the Court of Federal Claims. Weeks, as the Court has already mentioned, failed to address either argument.

“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (citing Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554, 108 S.Ct. 1965, 100 L.Ed.2d 549 (1988)); FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 244, 60 S.Ct. 488, 84 L.Ed. 724 (1940). And while Congress can waive sovereign immunity statutorily, federal courts will not construe a statute as containing an implicit waiver. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996). Quite to the contrary, Congress must use explicit language and waive the Federal Government's immunity from suit in no uncertain terms. Id. (citing United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33–34, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992)). And even when Congress includes an express waiver, it “will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531, 115 S.Ct. 1611, 131 L.Ed.2d 608 (1995); Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318, 106 S.Ct. 2957, 92 L.Ed.2d 250 (1986); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161, 101 S.Ct. 2698, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981)). Perhaps most importantly, [s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.” Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475, 114 S.Ct. 996.

So the baseline rule is that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over suits against federal agencies and officers unless a statute specifically says that they do. See 14 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3655, at 344 (3d ed.1998) (stating a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the claim being asserted is covered by a specific statutory authorization”). Combined with the rule that a plaintiff's complaint must have a “short and plain statement of the court's jurisdiction,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1), it is clear that a plaintiff must cite a statute containing an express waiver of sovereign immunity before it can sue the Federal Government and proceed past the motion to dismiss stage. Here, Weeks invokes the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(4), 2201, 2202; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983; and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the Court must look to the text of each statute to determine if any of them contain an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.

After reviewing each statute's text, the Court holds that none of them contain an express waiver of sovereign immunity. The federal question statute does not waive sovereign immunity. See28 U.S.C. § 1331; Garcia v. United States, 666 F.2d 960, 966 (5th Cir.1982). Nor do the statutes giving district courts original jurisdiction over claims arising out of federal civil rights disputes. See28 U.S.C. § 1343; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983; United States v. Timmons, 672 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir.1982) (“It is well established in this circuit that the United States has not waived its immunity to suit under the provisions of the civil rights statutes.”); Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133, 1138 (5th Cir.1972); Salazar v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 527, 528–29 (10th Cir.1986). The same goes for Weeks' Declaratory Judgment Act claims, see28 U.S.C. 2201, 2202; Skelly Oil v. Phillips Petrol., 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S.Ct. 876, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950) (Congress enlarged the range of remedies available to the federal courts but did not extend their jurisdiction ....”), and her constitutional claims, see Garcia, 666 F.2d at 966 (“The constitution does not waive the Government's sovereign immunity in suit for damages.”). Moreover, although [f]ederal courts have general subject matter jurisdiction over actions brought by federal agencies or officers,” 28 U.S.C. § 1345, “there is no corollary rule whereby all suits brought against federal agencies or officers are within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Salim v. Napolitano, No. 11–cv–3402, 2012 WL 1745517, at *4 (N.D.Ala. May 14, 2012) (citing McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608, 610 (10th Cir.1971)).

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