Weeks v. Jones, 95-6676

• Decision Date: 22 November 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-6676,95-6676
• Citation: 100 F.3d 124
• Parties: , 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 550 Varnall WEEKS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ronald E. JONES, Commissioner of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee. Non-Argument Calendar.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 124

100 F.3d 124

36 Fed.R.Serv.3d 416, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 550

Varnall WEEKS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ronald E. JONES, Commissioner of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 95-6676

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Nov. 22, 1996.

James McMillin, New York City, Barry J. Fisher, Capital Defender Office, Atlanta, GA, for petitioner-appellant.

Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, J. Clayton Crenshaw, Montgomery, AL, for respondent-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, and TJOFLAT and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal presents the first-impression issue for our circuit of whether the right to appointment of counsel in capital habeas corpus cases under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) depends on the ultimate merits of a death-sentenced prisoner's habeas claims. After appointing counsel, the district judge sua sponte found that the federal habeas petition was frivolous, set aside the appointment order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a), and thereby prevented payment of the capital petitioner's attorneys. We REVERSE.

I. BACKGROUND

The petitioner-appellant, Varnall Weeks, was executed on May 12, 1995. ¹ Preceding his execution, Weeks's attorneys ² challenged his death sentence in state and federal court on the basis of his mental incompetence to be executed. ³ Because Weeks was indigent, his attorneys represented him without any payment from their client, and they received no compensation for their representation from the State of Alabama. Following the denial of Weeks's second request for postconviction relief by the Alabama courts, his counsel filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court in the Middle District of Alabama on May 10, 1995, as well as a motion requesting appointment as counsel under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. ⁴ That same day, the district court granted the motions for appointment of counsel and to proceed in forma pauperis, but it denied Weeks's petition for habeas relief on the merits and denied a stay of execution.

On May 11, 1995, Weeks's counsel appealed the district court's denial of a certificate of probable cause and sought a stay of execution in this court. A majority panel addressed the merits of his incompetency claim and concluded, based on the factfindings of the state trial judge and the evidence presented at the state evidentiary hearing, that Weeks was not mentally unfit to be executed. Weeks v. Jones, 52 F.3d 1559, 1561-62 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1104, 115 S.Ct. 1841, 131 L.Ed.2d 846 (1995). Accordingly, this court denied a stay of execution and a certificate of probable cause. The dissent noted that Weeks's case was the first time that our court had addressed the issue of the constitutional standard for competency to be executed. Id. at 1574-75 (Kravitch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

In July, 1995, Weeks's counsel contacted the district court clerk's office because they had not yet received their vouchers needed to submit fee requests. On August 2, 1995, the district court sua sponte issued an order setting aside its previous order appointing counsel for Weeks under § 848(q) "pursuant to Rule 60(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." R2-22-2. In setting aside his former order granting appointment of counsel, the district judge explained his reconsideration resulting in his denying the attorneys' former motion for appointment of counsel:

This Court was recently contacted by Petitioner's attorneys regarding not having received their CJA 30 Vouchers issued to appointed attorneys in death penalty proceedings. In reviewing the file, this Court found on May 10, 1995, it erroneously granted the Motion for Appointment of Counsel filed May 10, 1995, by Attorneys James McMillin, Stephen B. Bright and Barry J. Fisher. Also on May 10, 1995, this Court correctly granted said attorneys' motion for admission pro hac vice and correctly granted Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this Court. However, on May 11, 1995, this Court denied Petitioner's request for a certificate of probable cause based on this Court's finding that the grounds upon which Petitioner was basing his appeal were frivolous and that said appeal was not taken in "good faith" within the meaning of Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438[, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21] (196 ). During all of these proceedings, it was this Court's intention to only allow Petitioner to proceed in forma pauperis without having to pay a filing fee; however, it was never the intention of this Court to appoint attorneys to represent the Petitioner.

Id. at 1-2 (emphasis in Italics added). This appeal from Weeks's counsel ensued. ⁵

II. ANALYSIS

Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, § 7001(b), 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (1988) Congress established an absolute right to counsel for indigent death-sentenced prisoners seeking federal habeas relief:

In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of Title 28, seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation ... shall be entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys....

21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (emphasis added). ⁶ "On its face, this statute grants indigent capital defendants a mandatory right to qualified legal counsel ... '[i]n any [federal] post conviction proceeding.' " ⁷ McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 2571, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). Because of the complexity of federal habeas corpus jurisprudence, even for attorneys, and the stringent pleading requirements, the Court recognized that "[a]n attorney's assistance prior to the filing of a capital defendant's habeas corpus petition is crucial" to adjudication of an indigent capital petitioner's claims on the merits. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2572; see Sloan v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1371, 1380 n. 6 (8th Cir.1995) ("The McFarland Court held that because Congress created a statutory right to counsel for capital defendants during federal habeas proceedings, counsel should be appointed before a petition is actually filed to permit assistance in its preparation.") (citing 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 728, 133 L.Ed.2d 679 (1996).

Because § 848(q)(4)(B) mandates counsel for indigent capital prisoners to prepare federal habeas petitions, a substantive, merits assessment of the petition is irrelevant to the appointment of counsel. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B); see McFarland, 512 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2572 ("In adopting § 848(q)(4)(B), Congress thus established a right to preapplication legal assistance for capital defendants in federal habeas corpus proceedings."); In re Joiner, 58 F.3d 143, 144 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam) ("McFarland ... held that 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) entitles prisoners seeking federal habeas relief to court-appointed counsel for the preparation of a habeas petition.... The Court ... reason[ed] that appointed counsel ... are necessary to prepare and present federal habeas cases effectively."). Thus, the district court's determination that Weeks's habeas petition was frivolous after his execution is inconsequential to the appointment of his counsel to prepare his habeas petition. See In re Joiner, 58 F.3d at 144 ("McFarland addressed the timing of appointment of counsel, not the scope of appointment.").

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explained that indigent litigants' claims are "frivolous" when they "lack[ ] an arguable basis either in law or in fact." ⁸ Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). "Factual allegations are frivolous for purpose of [28 U.S.C.] § 1915(d) when they are 'clearly baseless;' legal theories are frivolous when they are 'indisputably meritless.' " Battle v. Central State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833). This court also has held that a frivolous analysis under § 1915(d) involves a determination of " 'whether there is a factual and legal basis, of constitutional dimension, for the asserted wrong.' " Clark v. Georgia Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 639 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Harris v. Menendez, 817 F.2d 737, 739 (11th Cir.1987)) (emphasis added).

Rather than being baseless, Weeks's history of mental health evaluation and treatment is documented in the record, and he based his second habeas appeal on his incompetency to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (plurality opinion). ⁹ While other circuits have "adopted different legal definitions of Eighth Amendment mental competency for execution" following Ford, the dissent notes that this circuit "addresses this issue for the first time in this case." Weeks, 52 F.3d at 1574, 1575 (Kravitch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In raising the competency-to-be-executed issue, Weeks's counsel stated an arguable constitutional claim, which had not been decided by this court and which precluded the district court's reconsidered determination that Weeks's second habeas petition was frivolous after Weeks's execution. ¹⁰ A claim that is arguable, although ultimately unsuccessful, "must be treated like the claims brought by paying litigants and should survive frivolity review." Cofield v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 936 F.2d 512, 515 (11th Cir.1991).

Significantly, the statute specifically contemplates that a capital inmate shall have federally appointed counsel in habeas proceedings involving competency to be executed. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(8). ¹¹ In a successive death penalty case that raised competency to be executed, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of appointment of counsel under § 848(q)(4)(B)...