Weeks v. Quinlan, 1427

• Decision Date: 25 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 1427,D,1427
• Citation: 838 F.2d 41
• Parties: Otis G. WEEKS, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. J. Michael QUINLAN, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. ocket 86-2027.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 41

838 F.2d 41

Otis G. WEEKS, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. J. Michael QUINLAN, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 1427, Docket 86-2027.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued Aug. 13, 1987.

Decided Jan. 25, 1988.

Kevin McNulty, New York City (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, of counsel), for petitioner-appellant.

Bernard W. Bell, New York City, Asst. U.S. Atty., S.D.N.Y. (Rudolph W. Giuliani, U.S. Atty., S.D.N.Y., Nancy Kilson, Asst. U.S. Atty., of counsel), for respondent-appellee.

Before WINTER and MAHONEY, Circuit Judges, and RE, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade. ^*

RE, Chief Judge, Court of International Trade.

Otis G. Weeks, Jr., a prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institute in Otisville, New York, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York which denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Weeks filed a habeas corpus petition seeking credit on his federal sentence for the 25 months that he served in state prison after federal authorities released him from federal prison to state authorities. The court held that, upon Weeks' conviction for narcotics possession with intent to distribute, in violation of his parole, the United States Parole Commission (the Parole Commission) was authorized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4210(b)(2) (1982), to deny Weeks credit for time served in state prison after his parole from federal custody to a state detainer pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Sec. 2.32(a)(1) (1977). Under section 4210 of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act (the Parole Act), the Parole Commission may revoke the parole of any parolee convicted of a new offense punishable by imprisonment, and order that no credit be received for the time served after release on parole.

The question presented on this appeal is whether the district court erred in upholding the determination of the Parole Commission that a federal prisoner who was paroled to detaining state authorities to serve a state sentence, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Sec. 2.32(a)(1), and subsequently violated his parole, can be denied credit on his federal sentence for the time he served in state prison, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4210(b)(2).

Since the court holds that "[p]arole to the actual physical custody of the detaining authorities only," pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Sec. 2.32(a)(1), is parole within the meaning of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 4201-4218, and that the Parole Commission was authorized to deny Weeks credit for the time served in state prison after his parole from federal prison, the decision of the district court is affirmed.

Weeks contends that his release from federal prison under 28 C.F.R. Sec. 2.32(a)(1), "to the actual physical custody of the detaining authorities only," does not constitute "parole" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4210(b)(2). Weeks maintains that he was not paroled until he was released into the community, and, therefore, his federal sentence should be credited with the 25 months he served in state prison.

The respondent, Warden J. Michael Quinlan, contends that release from federal incarceration, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Sec. 2.32(a)(1), constituted valid parole, and, therefore, Weeks cannot be credited for any time he served from his release from federal incarceration on March 24, 1978 to the time of his subsequent arrest.

Background

In April 1975, a Virginia state court sentenced Weeks to 18 months imprisonment for distribution of heroin, and 4 years for possession. In May 1975, Weeks was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, of conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of federal law, and was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment. The state sentence for possession was to run consecutively to the federal sentence, while the state sentence for distribution was to run concurrently with the federal term.

On October 18, 1977, Weeks received an initial parole hearing in which the examiner panel determined that Virginia had lodged a detainer against Weeks on the basis of his state narcotics convictions. A detainer is a request "to an imprisoning jurisdiction to detain a person upon his release so that another jurisdiction may prosecute or incarcerate him...." See Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182, 187 (4th Cir.1968). Hence, the state detainer directed the federal correctional officials to continue holding Weeks in custody pending state action. The panel concluded that, under its guidelines, Weeks should be paroled after serving between 36 and 48 months.

On March 24, 1978, after serving approximately 36 months of his federal sentence, Weeks was released pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Sec. 2.32(a)(1), to the custody of the state of Virginia. Under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, the federal authorities were required to notify the state authorities of the forthcoming release of the prisoner. See 18 U.S.C. app. Sec. 2 (1976). Weeks served 25 months of his state sentence and was released from state prison in April 1980.

On January 18, 1983, Weeks was arrested in Virginia for possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and possession of marijuana. At the time of his arrest, Weeks was still on parole from federal custody. In June 1983 Weeks was convicted of both narcotics charges, and was sentenced by state authorities to 8 years imprisonment.

As a result of Weeks' conviction by the state, the United States Parole Commission, after appropriate administrative proceedings, revoked his parole, and determined that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4210(b)(2), "the entire period of time of parole from the date of Mr. Weeks release [from] federal custody was to be forfeited," including the time he spent in state prison.

Weeks filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the time he spent in state prison was not time on parole, and, therefore, the Parole Commission could not deny him credit for that time. The petition was referred to Magistrate Dolinger, who, after a full briefing of the questions presented, issued a report recommending denial of the petition.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Judge Edward Weinfeld, by a memorandum endorsement, adopted Magistrate Dolinger's recommendation to dismiss the habeas corpus petition. In rejecting the various arguments made by Weeks, Judge Weinfeld noted that once the detaining authority takes the prisoner into custody, the state may release him at any time, and concluded that since the "federal authorities no longer exercise[d] any control over the date of the parolee's release to the community, it would be inappropriate to treat the resulting state custody as a continuation of the federal confinement." Weeks v. Quinlan, No. 84 Civ. 3151, slip op. at 6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1985).

Discussion

It is a well-established principle of administrative law that due weight or deference should be accorded to an agency's interpretation of a statute that it is charged to administer. See, e.g., United States v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657, 666, 106 S.Ct. 1422, 1428, 89 L.Ed.2d 661 (1986); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Regardless of the specific language used by the courts in giving weight or deference to the agency's interpretation of its statutory language, it is clear that the agency's interpretation should be followed "unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong." See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1802, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969); see also Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125, 105 S.Ct. 1102, 1107, 84 L.Ed.2d 90 (1985); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141, 102 S.Ct. 2355, 2361, 72 L.Ed.2d 728 (1982).

The United States Parole Commission was established by Congress to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out a national parole policy, and to administer the Parole Act. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4203 (1982). Section 4203 of Title 18 of the United States Code provides in pertinent part:

(a) The Commission ... shall--

(1) promulgate rules and regulations establishing guidelines for the powers enumerated in subsection (b) of this section and such other rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out a national parole policy and the purposes of this chapter;

.... (b) The Commission, by majority vote, and pursuant to the procedures set out in this chapter, shall have the power to--

(1) grant or deny an application or recommendation to parole any eligible prisoner;

(2) impose reasonable conditions on an order granting parole;

(3) modify or revoke an order paroling any eligible prisoner;

....

18 U.S.C. Sec. 4203(a), (b) (1982).

In reviewing an agency's interpretation of the statute which it administers, the court must determine whether Congress has "directly addressed the precise question at issue...." See Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2782. If Congress has addressed the issue, "the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. If, however, "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. The cases teach that an agency's interpretation of a statute need not be the only reasonable one, or even the one the court would have adopted if the question had initially arisen in a judicial proceeding. See id. at 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 2782 n. 11; Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39, 102 S.Ct. 38, 46, 70 L.Ed.2d 23 (1981). Indeed, for the agency interpretation to be accepted, it need only be shown that it is "sufficiently reasonable." See Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454...