Weeks v. State, Case No. 5D18-3612

• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: 292 So.3d 1251
• Docket Number: Case No. 5D18-3612
• Decision Date: 27 March 2020
• Parties: Kimberle WEEKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

292 So.3d 1251

Kimberle WEEKS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-3612

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed March 27, 2020

Kevin J. Kulik, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Kimberle Weeks appeals her convictions for seven counts of unlawfully intercepting wire communications and one count of disclosing an unlawfully intercepted wire communication. We conclude that double jeopardy principles preclude convictions on four counts of unlawful interception of wire communications, but otherwise we affirm.¹

Section 934.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), makes it a crime for any person to intercept "any wire, oral, or electronic communication." The proper analysis of this statute’s application in the instant case requires a review of certain statutory definitions. "Intercept" means "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." § 934.02(3), Fla. Stat. (2014). "Wire communication" is defined in section 934.02(1) to mean "any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception ...."² " ‘Aural transfer’ means a transfer

292 So.3d 1253

containing the human voice at any point between and including the point of origin and the point of reception." § 934.02(18), Fla. Stat. (2014).

Here, the State’s evidence established that, without the knowledge or consent of the other participants, Weeks recorded three separate phone conversations. One phone conversation was a conference call with four other individuals, a second phone conversation involved two other individuals, and a third call was a phone call with a single individual. The State’s evidence was sufficient to show that on these three occasions, Weeks intercepted wire communications in violation of section 934.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2014). See, e.g. , Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that "[a] telephone conversation is a wire communication" under same definition of wire communication in federal wiretap statute); Perdue v. State , 78 So. 3d 712, 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ("[T]he recording ... included only the communications that were picked up over the telephone, which clearly meet the definition of ‘wire communication’ in section 934.02(1).").³

Weeks argues that because there were only three recorded telephone calls, double jeopardy principles preclude her from being convicted of more than three counts of unlawfully intercepting wire communications. In response, the State argues that because Weeks...