Weems v. Or. Univ. Sys.
| Decision Date | 17 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:12-CV-00411-SU |
| Parties | JAMES L. WEEMS, Plaintiff, v. OREGON UNIVERSITY SYSTEM (OUS); GEORGE PERNSTEINER, Chancellor; OREGON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (ODOJ); JOHN R. KROGER, Attorney General; and 1 to 10 JOHN DOE OUS or ODOJ past/present attorney or non-attorney employees; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Plaintiff James Weems ("Weems"), appearing pro se, filed this action alleging violations of his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants the Oregon University System ("OUS"), formerly the Oregon State Board of Higher Education ("Board"), George Pernsteiner ("Pernsteiner"), current chancellor of OUS, the Oregon Department of Justice ("ODOJ"), and former Oregon Attorney General John Kroger. Weems also alleges a claim for fraud upon the court against"1 to 10 John Doe OUS or ODOJ past/present attorney or non-attorney employees." Further, Weems seeks punitive damages based on an alleged conspiracy among all defendants to deprive him of his life's work. Defendants OUS and Pernsteiner1 move to dismiss Weems' complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted and this case is dismissed with prejudice.2
Weems was a tenured associate professor of psychology at Eastern Oregon State College ("EOSC"), now Eastern Oregon University. Compl. ¶ 4. In June 1978, plaintiff alleges that EOSC President Rodney Briggs ("Briggs") declared a state of financial exigency at the school and eliminated the tenured faculty position that Weems held. Id. at ¶ 12. Following his termination, Weems filed suit in Union County Circuit Court ("Circuit Court"), alleging claims for outrageous conduct, breach of contract, conversion, and writ of mandamus against Briggs and the Board. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 16.
On January 11, 1980, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Briggs and the Board on all of Weems' claims. See Weems v. Briggs, Case No. 25782, Mem. Op. 5 (Union Cnty. Cir. Ct. Jan. 11, 1980).3 As explained in his memorandum opinion, Circuit Judge WarnerWasley dismissed the conversion and outrageous conduct claims because Weems failed to comply with the requirements of the Oregon Tort Claims Act ("OTCA"), Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.275(1); the breach of contract and mandamus claims were dismissed because Weems entered into a binding settlement agreement that released all claims against defendants in exchange for $8,000. Id. at 3-4. Accordingly, on January 25, 1980, the Circuit Court dismissed Weems' case with prejudice. Weems v. Briggs, Case No. 25782, Order (Union Cnty. Cir. Ct. Jan. 25, 1980). On October 20, 1980, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's order without opinion. Weems v. Briggs, 48 Or.App. 849, 618 P.2d 1321 (1980). A subsequent appeal to the Oregon Court of Appeals was dismissed as moot. Weems v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., 55 Or.App. 1030, 639 P.2d 1318 (1982) (per curiam).
Weems alleges that between 1980 and 1982, after the Circuit Court dismissed his case, the American Association of University Professors ("AAUP") conducted an investigation into Briggs' claim of financial exigency at EOSC; the investigation revealed that there was neither a financial exigency at EOSC in 1978 nor any financial shortfall. Compl. ¶¶ 33-34. Weems did not learn about the AAUP investigation until December 10, 2008, when he discovered the essay of an EOSC student on the internet that referred to the AAUP investigation. Id. at ¶¶ 24-26. Following the discovery, Weems sent letters to OUS and Pernsteiner, requesting the public records related to Briggs' 1978 claim of financial exigency. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28. Weems was denied access unless he agreed to pay for OUS to redact 2,200 pages of documents. Id. at ¶ 29. Thereafter, Weems filed petitions with the Oregon Attorney General to force OUS to comply with his request but never received a response. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31.
On March 8, 2012, Weems filed a complaint in this Court, alleging that: (1) unnamed OUS and/or ODOJ attorneys committed external fraud upon the Circuit Court by failing to report thatBriggs' claim of financial exigency was false, such that Weems should now be relieved from the Circuit Court's final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3); and (2) OUS and Persteiner deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. Specifically, Weems alleges that, in defending against his claims, Briggs and the John Doe attorney defendants falsely communicated to the Circuit Court through pleadings, affidavits, and oral argument that there were financial exigencies at EOSC. Id. at ¶¶ 36, 38. This deception allegedly caused the Circuit Court to accept that there was a bonafide financial emergency at EOSC, thereby improperly influencing its summary judgment decision and interfering with the "judicial machinery." Id. at ¶¶ 38-39. Thus, Weems now seeks economic and noneconomic damages, in the amount of $1,500,000, and punitive damages arising out of defendants' alleged conspiracy.4
Where the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the action must be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The party who seeks to invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court has the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction exists. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. Of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). In such instances, the court may consider evidence regarding subject-matter jurisdiction and resolve factual disputes where necessary; however, "no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the [court] from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., LLC v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2008).
Similarly, where the plaintiff "fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," the court must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint is liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and its allegations are taken as true. Rosen v. Walters, 719 F.2d 1422, 1424 (9th Cir. 1983). However, bare assertions that amount to nothing more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements" of a claim "are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680-81 (2009). Rather, to state a plausible claim for relief, the complaint "must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts" to support its legal conclusions. Starr v. Bacca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216, reh'g en banc denied, 659 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2011).
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Before dismissing a pro se complaint, the court must, in many circumstances, instruct the pro se litigant as to the deficiencies in the complaint and grant leave to amend. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff's claims may be dismissed without leave to amend where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief and the complaint's deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2008).
Because the alleged injury arises out of a thirty-two year old state court judgment, which Weems now seeks to set aside, defendants contend that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives thisCourt of subject-matter jurisdiction. Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); see also Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2003). Weems argues that this case falls within an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because he is alleging that an external fraud was committed upon the Circuit Court.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a well-established jurisdictional rule prohibiting federal courts, other than the United States Supreme Court, from sitting in direct review of state court decisions. In other words, federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to act as a court of appeals for state court decisions. Johnson v. Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (); Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (). In addition to barring direct review, the doctrine prevents a federal court from considering any claims that amount to a collateral attack on issues that are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court's decision. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1156-58.
Moreover, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "bars any suit that seeks to disrupt or 'undo' a prior state-court judgment, regardless of whether the state court proceeding afforded the federal court plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate [his] claims." Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, "unlike res judicata, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not limited to claims that were actually decided by state courts, but rather it precludes review of all state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional." Id. Simply put, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a plaintiff may not initiate a federal court action that: (1)...
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